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The scandals in publicly listed companies have highlighted the large losses that can result from financial statement fraud and weak corporate governance. Machine learning techniques have been applied to automatically detect financial statement fraud with great success. This work presents the first application of a Bayesian inference approach to the problem of predicting the audit outcomes of financial statements of local government entities using financial ratios. Bayesian logistic regression (BLR) with automatic relevance determination (BLR-ARD) is applied to predict audit outcomes. The benefit of using BLR-ARD, instead of BLR without ARD, is that it allows one to automatically determine which input features are the most relevant for the task at hand, which is a critical aspect to consider when designing decision support systems. This work presents the first implementation of BLR-ARD trained with Separable Shadow Hamiltonian Hybrid Monte Carlo, No-U-Turn sampler, Metropolis Adjusted Langevin Algorithm and Metropolis-Hasting algorithms. Unlike the Gibbs sampling procedure that is typically employed in sampling from ARD models, in this work we jointly sample the parameters and the hyperparameters by putting a log normal prior on the hyperparameters. The analysis also shows that the repairs and maintenance as a percentage of total assets ratio, current ratio, debt to total operating revenue, net operating surplus margin and capital cost to total operating expenditure ratio are the important features when predicting local government audit outcomes using financial ratios. These results could be of use for auditors as focusing on these ratios could potentially speed up the detection of fraudulent behaviour in municipal entities, and improve the speed and quality of the overall audit.

External audit is undergoing rapid changes where more and more routine tasks are automated with analytics and artificial intelligence (AI) instruments. The paper addresses a research problem of mapping data analytics to audit tasks and develops a framework aligning audit phases and AI and using data analytics in teaching audit with AI. The paper contributes to the literature on using data analytics with AI in knowledge specific areas and particularly critical for emerging audit analytics, which is data analytics in external financial audit application. The paper employs the process model methodology (Wynn and Clarkson, Research in Engineering Design 29:161–202, 2018) and the hybrid approach of curriculum development (Dzuranin et al., Journal of Accounting Education 43:24–39, 2018). The framework is extended further by inclusion of knowledge areas and skills recommendations for each identified stage. This inclusion is linked to the peak accounting body guidelines to ensure compliance with course certification and future job prospects. The developed framework is implemented using audit management platform MindBridge AI. The developed teaching and learning materials show implementation of the framework on the practical level. The developed framework was evaluated in a focus group with accounting academics and industry professionals. Its implementation was evaluated in a series of workshops and a survey with participants.

We examine whether and how individual auditors affect audit outcomes using a large set of archival Chinese data. We analyze approximately 800 individual auditors and find that they exhibit significant variation in audit quality. The effects that individual auditors have on audit quality are both economically and statistically significant, and are pronounced in both large and small audit firms. We also find that the individual auditor effects on audit quality can be partially explained by auditor characteristics, such as educational background, Big N audit firm experience, rank in the audit firm, and political affiliation. Our findings highlight the importance of scrutinizing and understanding audit quality at the individual auditor level.

Opponents of mandatory rotation argue that a change of partner is bad for audit quality, as it results in a loss of client-specific knowledge. On the other hand, proponents argue that a change of partner is beneficial, as it results in a positive peer review effect and a fresh perspective on the audit. We test the impact of mandatory partner rotation on audit quality using a unique dataset of audit adjustments in China. Our results suggest that mandatory rotation of engagement partners results in higher quality audits in the years immediately surrounding rotation. Specifically, we find a significantly higher frequency of audit adjustments during the departing partner's final year of tenure prior to mandatory rotation and during the incoming partner's first year of tenure following mandatory rotation.

We identify two research design issues that explain the inconsistency between the theoretically predicted negative relation between audit effort and misstatements (measured using restatements) and empirical findings. First, auditor risk adjustment behavior induces an upward bias in the association between audit effort and restatements. Second, the theoretical prediction applies only to audited financial reports (i.e., annual reports) and not to unaudited reports (i.e., interim quarterly reports). Comingling restatements of audited with unaudited reports introduces an additional upward bias in the association between audit effort and restatements. After correcting for these two sources of bias, we find a robust negative association between audit effort and annual report restatements.

Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process.

Calls from practice suggest that audit committee members with industry expertise can improve audit committee effectiveness. Nevertheless, regulators and the extant literature have focused on the financial expertise of the audit committee. We posit that audit committee industry knowledge is valuable because accounting guidance, estimates, and oversight of the external auditor are often linked to a company's operations within a particular industry. Taking a holistic view, we examine two measures of financial reporting quality (financial restatements and discretionary accruals) and two measures of external auditor oversight (audit and nonaudit fees). As predicted, we find that audit committee members who are both accounting and industry experts perform better than those with only accounting expertise. We also find that in certain instances, supervisory experts who are also industry experts perform better than supervisory experts alone. Overall, these results suggest that industry expertise, when combined with accounting expertise, can improve the effectiveness of the audit committee in monitoring the financial reporting process.

To ensure that audit committees provide sufficient oversight over the auditing process and quality of financial reporting, legislators have imposed stricter requirements on the independence of audit committe members. Although many audit committees appear to be \"fully\" independent, anecdotal evidence suggests that CEOs often appoint directors from their social networks. Based on a 2004 to 2008 sample of U.S.-listed companies after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we find that these social ties have a negative effect on variables that proxy for oversight quality. In particular, we find that firms whose audit committees have \"friendship\" ties to the CEO purchase fewer audit services and engage more in earnings management. Auditors are also less likely to issue going-concern opinions or to report internal control weaknesses when friendship ties are present. On the other hand, social ties formed through \"advice networks\" do not seem to hamper the quality of audit committee oversight.

The spread of the principles and techniques of financial accounting into new systems for measuring, ranking, and auditing performance represents one of the most important and defining features of contemporary governance. Audit procedures are redefining accountability, transparency, and good governance and reshaping the way organizations and individuals have to operate. They also undermine professional autonomy and have unanticipated and dysfunctional consequences. Taking up the concept of audit culture as an analytical framework, we examine the origins, spread, and rationality driving these new financialized techniques of governance, not least through the work of the Big Four accountancy firms, and trace their impact across a number of fields, from administration and the military to business corporations and universities. We ask, what new kinds of ethics of accountability does audit produce? Building on Mitchell (1999), Strathern (2000a), Trouillot (2001), and Merry (2011), we identify how the techniques and logics of financial accountancy have five audit effects. These are “domaining,” “classificatory,” “individualizing and totalizing,” “governance,” and “perverse” effects. We conclude by reflecting on the problems of audit culture and suggest ways to reclaim the professional values and democratic spaces that are being eroded by these new systems of governing by numbers.

I examine how verification of financial statements influences debt pricing. I use a large proprietary database of privately held U.S. firms, an important business sector in which the information environment is opaque and financial statement audits are not mandated. I find that audited firms have a significantly lower cost of debt and that lenders place more weight on audited financial information in setting the interest rate. Further, I provide evidence of a mechanism for this increased financial statement usefulness: accruals from audited financial statements are better predictors of future cash flows. Collectively, I provide novel evidence that audited financial statements are more informative and that this significantly influences lenders' decisions.