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"Financial crises -- Russia (Federation)"
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Market Without Economy
The 1998 financial crisis in Russia was one of the most dramatic economic breakdowns of the last decade and symbolized the failure of the transition process as it had been conducted since the end of the Soviet Union. There is no general agreement on the nature of the rouble collapse; a number of contradictory interpretations have been discussed among economists. This book argues that the Russian 1998 financial turmoil is best predicted by Krugman’s and Sargent-Wallace’s models. The currency collapse had its origins in the peculiar way in which the transition was managed. In particular, the Russian government became entrapped into the double constraint of a tight monetary policy imposed by the IMF, on the one side, and a loose fiscal policy to support the private sector, on the other. Those policies were inconsistent, and led to inflationary processes that were postponed through emission of a large amount of Treasury Bonds to finance the fiscal deficit. At the same time, a tight monetary policy retarded the recovery of the industrial sector. While the particular timing of the crisis was co-determined by other factors, such as the Asian financial crisis and the fall of the oil price, it was this incoherent monetary and financial policies mix that constituted the main cause of the rouble’s spectacular collapse in August 1998. The book provides extensive coverage of a decade of Russian reforms. It criticizes neo-liberal ideology and the course of the transition process supported by the “Washington Consensus.”
eBook
No Precedent, No Plan
In 1998, President Boris Yeltsin's government defaulted on Russia's debts and the country experienced a financial meltdown that brought its people to the brink of disaster. In No Precedent, No Plan, Martin Gilman offers an insider's view of Russia's financial crisis. As the senior representative of the International Monetary Fund in Moscow beginning in 1996, Gilman was in the eye of the storm. Now, he tells the dramatic story of Russia's economic evolution following the collapse of the Soviet Union and analyzes the 1998 crisis and its aftermath. Gilman argues that the default and collapse, although avoidable, actually spurred Russia to integrate its economy with the rest of the world's and served as a harbinger of the recent global economic crisis. Gilman details the IMF's involvement and defends it against criticism by economist Joseph Stiglitz and others. In the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia in chaos, with a barely functioning government and no consensus on the path toward a democratic and economic transformation. The smooth transition to a market economy that had been accomplished in other countries in Eastern Europe was impossible. Gilman describes the ordeal of the 1998 crisis and argues that the IMF helped Russia avoid an even greater catastrophe. He recounts Russia's emergence from the IMF's tutelage and explains how the shell-shocked Russian public turned to Vladimir Putin in search of stability after the trauma of 1998. No Precedent, No Plan offers a definitive account--the first from an insider's perspective--of Russia's painful transition to a market economy.
eBook
Russia after the global economic crisis
Russia After the Global Economic Crisis examines this important country after the financial crisis of 2007-09. The second book from The Russia Balance Sheet Project, a collaboration of two of the world's preeminent research institutions, the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), not only assesses Russia's international and domestic policy challenges but also provides an all-encompassing review of this important country's foreign and domestic issues. The authors consider foreign policy, Russia and its neighbors, climate change, Russia's role in the world, domestic politics, and corruption.
eBook
Russia's Virtual Economy
The assumption behind the International Monetary Fund's recent bailout of Russia is that the country is gradually reforming its economy according to market principles. But Russia's economy is much smaller than official figures suggest. Workers, the government, and industry all accept the myth that the manufacturing sector produces value, when in fact what it makes is worth less than the labor and resources it consumes. The result is a mountain of wage and pension arrears and government debt that will continue to provoke crises. The day of reckoning will be much worse if the West does not pull the plug soon.
Magazine Article
The Color of Hot Money
Mahathir Mohamad and others love to blame buccaneering hedge funds for sparking Asia's recent financial crisis, but they have the wrong suspects. The \"hot money\" that rushed in and out of emerging markets came from irresponsible banks, not hedge funds. In fact, hedge funds are minor players in international finance. Rather than worsening financial turbulence, they might even help curb it.
Magazine Article
Deposit Insurance, Banking Crises, and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Deposit Flows and Rates
Using evidence from Russia, we carry out what we believe to be the literature's cleanest test of the direct impact of deposit insurance on market discipline and study the combined effect of a banking crisis and deposit insurance on market discipline. We employ a difference-in-difference estimator to isolate the change in the behavior of a newly insured group (i.e., households) relative to an uninsured \"control\" group (i.e., firms). The sensitivity of households to bank capitalization diminishes markedly after the introduction of deposit insurance. The traditional wake-up call effect of a crisis is muted by this numbing effect of deposit insurance.
Journal Article
Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin
In liberal democracies, the approval ratings of political leaders have been shown to track citizens' perceptions of the state of the economy. By contrast, in illiberal democracies and competitive autocracies, leaders are often thought to boost their popularity by exploiting nationalism, exaggerating external threats, and manipulating the media. Using time-series data, I examine the determinants of presidential approval in Russia since 1991, a period in which leaders' ratings swung between extremes. I find that Yeltsin's and Putin's ratings were, in fact, closely linked to public perceptions of economic performance, which, in turn, reflected objective economic indicators. Although media manipulation, wars, terrorist attacks, and other events also mattered, Putin's unprecedented popularity and the decline in Yeltsin's are well explained by the contrasting economic circumstances over which each presided.
Journal Article