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33,356 result(s) for "Financial market structures"
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Decentralized Exchange
Most assets are traded in multiple interconnected trading venues. This paper develops an equilibrium model of decentralized markets that accommodates general market structures with coexisting exchanges. Decentralized markets can allocate risk among traders with different risk preferences more efficiently, thus realizing gains from trade that cannot be reproduced in centralized markets. Market decentralization always increases price impact. Yet, markets in which assets are traded in multiple exchanges, whether they are disjoint or intermediated, can give higher welfare than the centralized market with the same traders and assets. In decentralized markets, demand substitutability across assets is endogenous and heterogeneous among traders.
Automated Marketing Research Using Online Customer Reviews
Market structure analysis is a basic pillar of marketing research. Classic challenges in marketing such as pricing, campaign management, brand positioning, and new product development are rooted in an analysis of product substitutes and complements inferred from market structure. In this article, the authors present a method to support the analysis and visualization of market structure by automatically eliciting product attributes and brand's relative positions from online customer reviews. First, the method uncovers attributes and attribute dimensions using the \"voice of the consumer,\" as reflected in customer reviews, rather than that of manufacturers. Second, the approach runs automatically. Third, the process supports rather than supplants managerial judgment by reinforcing or augmenting attributes and dimensions found through traditional surveys and focus groups. The authors test the approach on six years of customer reviews for digital cameras during a period of rapid market evolution. They analyze and visualize results in several ways, including comparisons with expert buying guides, a laboratory survey, and correspondence analysis of automatically discovered product attributes. The authors evaluate managerial insights drawn from the analysis with respect to proprietary market research reports from the same period analyzing digital imaging products.
Industry Concentration and Average Stock Returns
Firms in more concentrated industries earn lower returns, even after controlling for size, book-to-market, momentum, and other return determinants. Explanations based on chance, measurement error, capital structure, and persistent in-sample cash flow shocks do not explain this finding. Drawing on work in industrial organization, we posit that either barriers to entry in highly concentrated industries insulate firms from undiversifiable distress risk, or firms in highly concentrated industries are less risky because they engage in less innovation, and thereby command lower expected returns. Additional time-series tests support these risk-based interpretations.
Search, Design, and Market Structure
The Internet has made consumer search easier, with consequences for prices, industry structure, and the kinds of products offered. We provide an industry model with strategic design choices that explores these issues. A polarized market structure results: some firms choose designs aimed at broad-based audiences, while others target narrow niches. We analyze the effect of reduced search costs, finding results consistent with the reported prevalence of niche goods and long-tail and superstar phenomena. In particular, the model suggests that long-tail effects arise when there is a wide range of potential designs, relative to vertical heterogeneity among firms. JEL: D11, D21, D83, L11, L86, M31
Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets
We provide a practical method to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information, static, discrete games. With respect to the empirical literature on entry games originated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992), the main novelty of our framework is to allow for general forms of heterogeneity across players without making equilibrium selection assumptions. We allow the effects that the entry of each individual airline has on the profits of its competitors, its \"competitive effects,\" to differ across airlines. The identified features of the model are sets of parameters (partial identification) such that the choice probabilities predicted by the econometric model are consistent with the empirical choice probabilities estimated from the data. We apply this methodology to investigate the empirical importance of firm heterogeneity as a determinant of market structure in the U.S. airline industry. We find evidence of heterogeneity across airlines in their profit functions. The competitive effects of large airlines (American, Delta, United) are different from those of low cost carriers and Southwest. Also, the competitive effect of an airline is increasing in its airport presence, which is an important measure of observable heterogeneity in the airline industry. Then we develop a policy experiment to estimate the effect of repealing the Wright Amendment on competition in markets out of the Dallas airports. We find that repealing the Wright Amendment would increase the number of markets served out of Dallas Love.
Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models in Continuous Time with an Application to Retail Competition
This article develops a dynamic model of retail competition and uses it to study the impact of the expansion of a new national competitor on the structure of urban markets. In order to accommodate substantial heterogeneity (both observed and unobserved) across agents and markets, the article first develops a general framework for estimating and solving dynamic discrete choice models in continuous time that is computationally light and readily applicable to dynamic games. In the proposed framework, players face a standard dynamic discrete choice problem at decision times that occur stochastically. The resulting stochastic-sequential structure naturally admits the use of conditional choice probability methods for estimation and makes it possible to compute counterfactual simulations for relatively high-dimensional games. The model and method are applied to the retail grocery industry, into which Walmart began rapidly expanding in the early 1990s, eventually attaining a dominant position. We find that Walmart's expansion into groceries came mostly at the expense of the large incumbent supermarket chains, rather than the single-store outlets that bore the brunt of its earlier conquest of the broader general merchandise sector. Instead, we find that independent grocers actually thrive when Walmart enters, leading to an overall reduction in market concentration. These competitive effects are strongest in larger markets and those into which Walmart expanded most rapidly, suggesting a diminishing role of scale and a greater emphasis on differentiation in this previously mature industry.
Exchange-Traded Funds, Market Structure, and the Flash Crash
The author analyzes the relationship between market structure and the flash crash. The proliferation of trading venues has resulted in a market that is more fragmented than ever. The author constructs measures to capture fragmentation and shows that they are important in explaining extreme price movements. New market structure reforms should help mitigate such market disruptions in the future but have not eliminated the possibility of another flash crash, albeit with a different catalyst.
E-Commerce and the Market Structure of Retail Industries
This article examines the effect of the advent and diffusion of e-commerce on supply-side industry structure. We specify a general industry model involving consumers with differing search costs buying products from heterogeneous producers. We interpret e-commerce as a reduction in consumers' search costs. We show how it reallocates market shares from high-cost to low-cost producers. We test the model using US data for three industries: travel agencies, bookstores and new car dealers. Each industry exhibits the market share shifts predicted by the model but the mechanisms vary, ranging from aggregate factors in the travel industry to local-market factors in the other two industries.
Entry, exit, and the determinants of market structure
This article estimates a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit for two US service industries: dentists and chiropractors. Entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are important determinants of longrun firm values, firm turnover, and market structure. In the dentist industry entry costs were subsidized in geographic markets designated as Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA) and the estimated mean entry cost is 11 percent lower in these markets. Using simulations, we find that entry cost subsidies are less expensive per additional firm than fixed cost subsidies.
Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives
In the study of managerial incentives, two questions remain unresolved due to conflicts between theory and evidence. The first is how managerial incentives are related to product market competition; the second is how they are related to risk. The purpose of this paper is to bring theory closer to the evidence on both issues raised. A model of an oligopolisitc industry in which firms provide incentives to managers to reduce marginal costs is studied. Product market competition and the provision of incentives are jointly determined as part of the industry equilibrium. With greater competition due to increased product substitutability or a larger market, firms provide stronger incentives to their mangers to reduce costs, even though profits become more volatile.