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We investigate the effect of CFO narcissism, as measured by signature size, on financial reporting quality. Experimentally, we validate that narcissism predicts misreporting behavior, and that signature size predicts misreporting through its association with narcissism. Empirically, we examine notarized CFO signatures and find CFO narcissism is associated with more earnings management, less timely loss recognition, weaker internal control quality, and a higher probability of restatements. The results are consistent for within-firm comparisons focusing on CFO changes and are robust to controlling for CFO overconfidence and CEO narcissism. The results highlight the importance of CFO characteristics in the domain of financial reporting decisions.

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that \"strategic\" CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while \"accounting\" CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non-MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce \"strategic\" CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity-based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post-hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper-echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource-based view, and assortative matching literatures.

Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process.

Purpose The study aims to examine the influence of female chief executive officer (CEO) and female chief financial officer (CFO) on the linkage between internationalization and firm performance. Design/methodology/approach This study used 2926 firm-year observations of nonfinancial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 2012–2021. This study used ordinary least squares regression method to test the hypotheses, and additionally, generalized method of moments estimation and fixed effect analysis were used to check for the robustness of the results. Findings Using the framework of upper echelons theory and resource dependence theory, this study reports that internationalization has a positive impact on firm performance. Moreover, the results show that the presence of female CEO and female CFO strengthens the positive relationship between internationalization and firm performance. The results add to the gender diversity literature by highlighting the positive role of female CEOs and female CFOs on the internationalization and performance of firms in a male-dominated society. Originality/value This study adds to the limited literature on the internationalization of businesses in an emerging market and provides empirical support to upper echelons theory and resource dependence theory by highlighting the benefits brought to the firm through female CEOs and female CFOs.

An abundance of evidence relates facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) to masculine behaviors in males. We show that hedge funds operated by high-fWHR managers underperform those operated by low-fWHR managers, bear greater downside risk, are more susceptible to fire sales, and fail more often. High-fWHR managers compensate for their underperformance by marketing their funds more aggressively, thereby garnering higher flows and fee revenues. By exploiting major personal events that shape testosterone, namely marriage and fatherhood, we trace the biological mechanism underlying the relation between fWHR and investment performance to circulating testosterone. Our findings are robust and extend to equity mutual funds.

In this study, we examine the effect of CEO and CFO power on both accruals and real earnings management (AEM and REM, respectively), and the extent to which CEO and CFO power mitigate the effect of one another on AEM and REM. We further examine whether the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) altered these effects. In the pre-SOX period, we find that AEM (REM) is greater when the CEO (CFO) is powerful relative to the CFO (CEO). In the post-SOX period, however, we find that the effect of relative CEO power on AEM subsides, whereas the effect of relative CFO power on REM persists. Additionally, we find evidence to suggest that powerful CFOs inhibit the AEM preferences of powerful CEOs in both the pre- and post-SOX periods. Finally, we find evidence to suggest that powerful CEOs inhibit the REM preferences of powerful CEOs in the pre-SOX period, but not in the post-SOX period. Collectively, our results suggest that the power of the CEO relative to the CFO is an important factor in the both the type and magnitude of earnings management.

Prior studies document that managers consider a variety of costs and benefits when deciding whether to issue earnings forecasts. Using an abstract experiment and a survey of experienced financial managers, we provide evidence that managerial overconfidence may also contribute to this decision. Our experiment shows that participants engage in self-serving attribution, giving greater weight to internal than external factors as explanations for good performance. This increases confidence in improved future performance, which increases their willingness to issue forecasts. Two facets of the stable individual trait overconfidence, dispositional optimism and miscalibration, also contribute to confidence in improved future performance and willingness to issue forecasts. Consistent with these results, experienced financial manager survey participants believe other managers are likely to overestimate the extent to which they contribute to positive firm performance, and both overoptimism about firm performance and overconfidence in their ability to predict future firm performance contribute to issuance of earnings forecasts.

PurposeThis paper aims to examine whether the cooperation between female chief financial officers (CFO) and the proportion of female directors would impact investment efficiency. The investigation is grounded in the increasing number of female top managers globally and the notion that female tends to cooperate more with other female than with male.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses publicly listed firms in Bursa Malaysia from 2016 to 2020, which yielded a sample of 2,022 firm-year observations. The authors used multivariate ordinary least square regression to test the relationship, and to correct for the selection bias, the Heckman selection and PSM test were used.FindingsThe authors find a positive relationship between female CFOs and investment efficiency. A higher proportion of female directors accentuates this result. The findings support the homophily argument that similar characteristics (gender) promote cooperation. This shows that cooperation between female CFOs and directors improves investment efficiency. The results suggest that the improvement in investment efficiency could relate to higher managerial discretion for female CFOs and their ability to collaborate with female directors. These results are robust to a series of additional endogeneity tests. The findings have important implications for policymakers and firms to encourage more appointments of females in top management positions.Originality/valueBy highlighting the cooperation between female CFOs and female directors, this study contributes to the understanding that cooperation among females improves investment efficiency.

SYNOPSIS: The authors examine the association between chief financial officer (hereafter, CFO) gender and the quality of accruals. Based on findings in prior research on gender differences in a variety of decision settings—risk-taking attitudes, financial judgments, and regulatory compliances—they hypothesize that firms with female CFOs will have higher quality of accruals. The empirical findings, based on a sample of 1,559 (1,222) firms in 2005 (2004), support this hypothesis. The study shows that companies with female CFOs have lower performance-matched absolute discretionary accruals and lower absolute accrual estimation errors, after controlling for other factors that prior research has shown to be associated with accruals.

Firms trade off CFOs' fiduciary duties against their decision-making duties when designing CFO bonus plans. Decreasing bonus incentives tied to financial measures benefits CFOs' fiduciary responsibilities at the expense of motivating their decision-making duties. As prior research indicates that clawbacks increase personal misreporting costs through the loss of previously awarded compensation, we examine whether clawbacks allow firms to increase incentives in CFO bonus contracts. Based on a sample of U.S. firms between 2007 and 2013, we find that clawbacks are associated with greater CFO bonus incentives. We also find the increase in incentives to be more pronounced for CFOs relative to other executives. Our results are moderated by firms' susceptibility to misreporting. The relation between clawbacks and incentives is weaker when firms experienced internal control deficiencies, have larger abnormal accruals, when CFOs are more vulnerable to pressure from CEOs, and when audit committees have less financial expertise and prestige.