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We propose a measure of managerial ability, based on managers' efficiency in generating revenues, which is available for a large sample of firms and outperforms existing ability measures. We find that our measure is strongly associated with manager fixed effects and that the stock price reactions to chief executive officer (CEO) turnovers are positive (negative) when we assess the outgoing CEO as low (high) ability. We also find that replacing CEOs with more (less) able CEOs is associated with improvements (declines) in subsequent firm performance. We conclude with a demonstration of the potential of the measure. We find that the negative relation between equity financing and future abnormal returns documented in prior research is mitigated by managerial ability. Specifically, more able managers appear to utilize equity issuance proceeds more effectively, illustrating that our more precise measure of managerial ability will allow researchers to pursue studies that were previously difficult to conduct. This paper was accepted by Mary E. Barth, accounting.

Based on the proposition that leasing is environmentally superior to selling, some firms have adopted a leasing strategy and others promote their existing leasing programs as environmentally superior to \"green\" their image. The argument is that because a leasing firm retains ownership of the off-lease units, it has an incentive to remarket them or invest in designing a more durable product, resulting in a lower volume of new production and disposal. However, leasing might be environmentally inferior because of the direct control the firm has over the off-lease products, which may prompt the firm to remove them from the market to avoid cannibalizing the demand for new products. Motivated by these issues, we adopt a life-cycle environmental impact perspective and analytically investigate if leasing can be both more profitable and have a lower total environmental impact. We find that leasing can be environmentally worse despite remarketing all off-lease products and greener than selling despite the mid-life removal of off-lease products. Our analysis also provides insights for environmental groups and entities that use different approaches to improve the environmental performance of business practices. We show that imposing disposal fees or encouraging remanufacturing, under some conditions, can actually lead to higher environmental impact. We also identify when educating consumers to be more environmentally conscious can improve the relative environmental performance of leasing. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.

Entrepreneurs, even more than employees, tend to locate in regions in which they have deep roots (\"home\" regions). Here, we examine the performance implications of these choices. Whereas one might expect entrepreneurs to perform better in these regions because of their richer endowments of regionally embedded social capital, they might also perform worse if their location choices rather reflect a preference for spending time with family and friends. We examine this question using comprehensive data on Danish start-ups. Ventures perform better-survive longer and generate greater annual profits and cash flows-when located in regions in which their founders have lived longer. This effect appears substantial, similar in size to the value of prior experience in the industry (i.e., to being a spin-off). This paper was accepted by Gérard P. Cachon, organizations.

This paper studies the incentive for vertical information sharing in competing supply chains with production technologies that exhibit diseconomies of scale. We consider a model of two supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer selling to one retailer, with the retailers engaging in Cournot or Bertrand competition. For Cournot retail competition, we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when (1) the production diseconomy is large and (2) either competition is less intense or at least one retailer's information is less accurate. A supply chain may become worse off when making its information more accurate or production diseconomy smaller, if such an improvement induces the firms in the rival supply chain to cease sharing information. For Bertrand retail competition, we show that information sharing benefits a supply chain when (1) the production diseconomy is large and (2) either competition is less intense or information is more accurate. Under Bertrand competition a manufacturer may be worse off by receiving information, which is never the case under Cournot competition. Information sharing in one supply chain triggers a competitive reaction from the other supply chain and this reaction is damaging to the first supply chain under Cournot competition but may be beneficial under Bertrand competition. This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management.

We consider a supply chain with a retailer and a supplier: A newsvendor-like retailer has a single opportunity to order a product from a supplier to satisfy future uncertain demand. Both the retailer and supplier are capital constrained and in need of short-term financing. In the presence of bankruptcy risks for both the retailer and supplier, we model their strategic interaction as a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader. We use the supplier early payment discount scheme as a decision framework to analyze all decisions involved in optimally structuring the trade credit contract (discounted wholesale price if paying early, financing rate if delaying payment) from the supplier's perspective. Under mild assumptions we conclude that a risk-neutral supplier should always finance the retailer at rates less than or equal to the risk-free rate. The retailer, if offered an optimally structured trade credit contract, will always prefer supplier financing to bank financing. Furthermore, under optimal trade credit contracts, both the supplier's profit and supply chain efficiency improve, and the retailer might improve his profits relative to under bank financing (or equivalently, a rich retailer under wholesale price contracts), depending on his current \"wealth\" (working capital and collateral).

A common justification for organizational change is that the circumstances in which the organization finds itself have changed, thereby eroding the value of utilizing existing knowledge. On the surface, the claim that organizations should adapt by generating new knowledge seems obvious and compelling. However, this standard wisdom overlooks the possibility that the reward to generating new knowledge may itself be eroded if change is an ongoing property of the environment. This observation in turn suggests that environmental change is not a self-evident call for strategies of greater exploration. Indeed, under some conditions the appropriate response to environmental change is a renewed focus on exploiting existing knowledge and opportunities. We develop a computational model based on the canonical multiarmed bandit formulation of exploration and exploitation. We endeavor to understand the mechanisms by which environmental change acts to make purposeful efforts at organizational adaptation less (or more) valuable. This paper was accepted by Jesper Sørensen, organizations.

Are the attitudes and beliefs of chief executive officers (CEOs) linked to their firms' innovative performance? This paper uses a measure of overconfidence, based on CEO stock-option exercise, to study the relationship between a CEO's \"revealed beliefs\" about future performance and standard measures of corporate innovation. We begin by developing a career concern model where CEOs innovate to provide evidence of their ability. The model predicts that overconfident CEOs, who underestimate the probability of failure, are more likely to pursue innovation, and that this effect is larger in more competitive industries. We test these predictions on a panel of large publicly traded firms for the years from 1980 to 1994. We find a robust positive association between overconfidence and citation-weighted patent counts in both cross-sectional and fixed-effect models. This effect is larger in more competitive industries. Our results suggest that overconfident CEOs are more likely to take their firms in a new technological direction. This paper was accepted by Kamalini Ramdas, entrepreneurship and innovation.

Increasingly, user-generated product reviews serve as a valuable source of information for customers making product choices online. The existing literature typically incorporates the impact of product reviews on sales based on numeric variables representing the valence and volume of reviews. In this paper, we posit that the information embedded in product reviews cannot be captured by a single scalar value. Rather, we argue that product reviews are multifaceted, and hence the textual content of product reviews is an important determinant of consumers' choices, over and above the valence and volume of reviews. To demonstrate this, we use text mining to incorporate review text in a consumer choice model by decomposing textual reviews into segments describing different product features. We estimate our model based on a unique data set from Amazon containing sales data and consumer review data for two different groups of products (digital cameras and camcorders) over a 15-month period. We alleviate the problems of data sparsity and of omitted variables by providing two experimental techniques: clustering rare textual opinions based on pointwise mutual information and using externally imposed review semantics. This paper demonstrates how textual data can be used to learn consumers' relative preferences for different product features and also how text can be used for predictive modeling of future changes in sales. This paper was accepted by Ramayya Krishnan, information systems.

Disruptive events that halt production can have severe business consequences if not appropriately managed. Business interruption (BI) insurance offers firms a financial mechanism for managing their exposure to disruption risk. Firms can also avail of operational measures to manage the risk. In this paper, we explore the relationship between BI insurance and operational measures. We model a manufacturing firm that can purchase BI insurance, invest in inventory, and avail of emergency sourcing. Allowing the insurance premium to depend on the firm's insurance and operational decisions, we characterize the optimal insurance deductible and coverage limit as well as the optimal inventory level. We prove that insurance and operational measures are not always substitutes, and we establish conditions under which they can be complements; that is, insurance can increase the marginal value of inventory and can increase the overall value of emergency sourcing. We also find that the value of insurance is higher for those firms less able to absorb financially significant disruptions. As disruptions become longer but rarer, the value of emergency sourcing increases, and the value of inventory and the value of insurance increase before eventually decreasing. This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management.

In this paper, we argue that managers confront a paradox in selecting strategy. On one hand, capital markets systematically discount uniqueness in the strategy choices of firms. Uniqueness in strategy heightens the cost of collecting and analyzing information to evaluate a firm's future value. These greater costs in strategy evaluation discourage the collection and analysis of information regarding the firm, and result in a valuation discount. On the other hand, uniqueness in strategy is a necessary condition for creating economic rents and should, except for this information cost, be positively associated with firm value. We find empirical support for both propositions using a novel measure of strategy uniqueness in a firm panel data set between 1985 and 2007. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.