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Fishers face multidimensional decisions: when to fish, what species to target, and how much gear to deploy. Most bioeconomic models assume single-species fisheries with perfectly elastic demand and focus on inter-seasonal dynamics. In real-world fisheries, vessels hold quotas for multiple species with heterogeneous biological and/or market conditions that vary intra-seasonally. We analyze within-season behavior in multispecies fisheries with individual fishing quotas, accounting for stock aggregations, capacity constraints, and downward-sloping demand. Numerical results demonstrate variation in harvest patterns. We specifically find: (1) harvests for species with downward-sloping demand tend to spread out; (2) spreading harvest of a high-value species can cause lower-value species to be harvested earlier in the season; and (3) harvest can be unresponsive or even respond negatively to biological aggregation when fishers balance incentives in multispecies settings. We test these using panel data from the Norwegian multispecies groundfish fishery and find evidence for all three. We extend the numerical model to account for transitions to management with individual fishing quotas in multispecies fisheries. We show that, under some circumstances, fishing seasons could contract or spread out.

The problem of the commons is more important to our lives and thus more central to economics than a century ago when Katharine Coman led off the first issue of the American Economic Review. As the US and other economies have grown, the carrying capacity of the planet—in regard to natural resources and environmental quality—has become a greater concern, particularly for common-property and open-access resources. The focus of this article is on some important, unsettled problems of the commons. Within the realm of natural resources, there are special challenges associated with renewable resources, which are frequently characterized by open-access. An important example is the degradation of open-access fisheries. Critical commons problems are also associated with environmental quality. A key contribution of economics has been the development of market-based approaches to environmental protection. These instruments are key to addressing the ultimate commons problem of the twenty-first century—global climate change.

Using a two-stage optimisation model, we simulate the determination of market-clearing quota lease prices in a multispecies fishery. Assuming fixed proportions technologies, we find that equilibrium quota prices are jointly determined. Price equilibria are sensitive to both the number of quota species and the heterogeneity of the fleet, with corner prices observed where there are a relatively large number of species. Where the fleet is very heterogeneous, quota prices fail to capture all rent as resource rent and inframarginal rents are earned by some vessels. If there is excess demand for quota (for example, as a result of the exhaustion of the quota for a “choke” species) bidding up of the quota price causes all other quota prices to fall. This can result in some vessels starting to earn inframarginal rents even though they are discarding part of the catch. We also use the model to examine the impact of a “deemed value” charge for over-quota landings.

This paper addresses normative exploitation of common renewable resources with changes in technology and technical, allocative, and scale efficiency that exacerbate the commons problem and externality. Their impact depends on the rate and nature of change, investment, and state of property rights. An augmented fundamental equation of renewable resources with a modified marginal stock effect and a new marginal technology effect account for changes in disembodied and embodied technology and technical efficiency. Neglecting these changes generates misleading policy advice and dynamic inefficiency with overaccumulation of physical and natural capital and sizable foregone rents. An empirical application illustrates.

Small-scale fisheries often operate under conditions of regulated open access; that is, the fishery is subject to natural or regulatory constraints on fishing technology, including regulations of fishing gear and fishing practices, but typically there is no direct regulation of catches. We study how an increase in harvesting efficiency changes the different components of welfare—consumer surplus and producer surplus—in such a regulated open-access fishery, taking t the feedback of harvesting on stock dynamics, i.e. the dynamic common-pool resource externality into account. We find that both components of welfare change in the same direction. If, and only if, initial efficiency is low enough so that there is no maximum sustainable yield (MSY) overfishing, an improvement of harvesting efficiency increases welfare.

Introduction -- Origins and meaning of IUU fishing -- Rationale for an IUU fishing interpretive lens -- Compliance and state responsibility -- IUU fishing as compliance mechanism -- IUU fishing and state accountability -- IUU fishing as flag state accountability paradigm -- Conclusion.

Although fishing is regarded as a risky production process, limited attention has been given to the impact of input factor use on production risk. Production risk is particularly important for fisher behavior and fisheries management when input factors are restricted, since input restrictions can influence production risk in addition to output levels. This paper investigates production risk by estimating production and risk functions for the main vessel groups in the Norwegian fishing fleet. The results indicate that production risk is present and that the effect of input use on production risk varies between vessel groups. Capital has a risk-reducing effect in the ocean fleet, but are risk-increasing in coastal fisheries. Fuel use is found to be a risk-increasing input for most of the vessel groups, while labor use is risk-reducing.

We estimate a recreation demand model for warmwater fishing in Delaware and then use it to measure welfare gains associated with improved fishing quality as measured by catch rate of fish, diversity of species, and clarity of water. We use a “linked” site choice – trip frequency model with data gathered by the Delaware Division of Fish and Wildlife. Our site choice model includes 118 rivers and lakes in the state with detailed characteristics of each. We develop hypothetical scenarios of fishing quality improvement involving combinations of fish catch, fish diversity, and water clarity and apply it to individual water bodies, water basins, selected water body groupings, and statewide. Values are reported in seasonal per angler and aggregate terms.