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This monograph is about income diversification among fishers, pressure on marine resources and the relation between the two. Socio-economic characteristics of artisanal fishers, including income diversification, are examined together with fishing practices, fish landings, fish marketing, and resource conservation.

The decentralisation of resource management through co-management assumes that the devolution of power benefits resource users. This assumption is often premised on the democratic election of leaders within resource user organisations. In this article, we investigate the validity of co-management assumptions about who benefits from a devolution of decision-making power through a case study analysis of political equity in fisherfolk organisations of Beach Management Units (BMUs) in Lake Victoria (Kenya). From the analysis of the distribution of political power, we identify how, where, and for whom greater accountability can work to address the current political inertia of fisherfolk, who form a majority of the BMU membership. We also identify the relationships between the empowerment of fisherfolk, the accountability of the BMU leaders, and the distribution of political power determining decision making in co-management. We conclude with identifying how other mechanisms of social accountability beyond elections can improve accountability of elected leaders of resource users for improved co-management outcomes.

The emerging world crisis created by declining fish stocks poses a challenge to resource users and managers. The problem is particularly acute in poor nations, such as those in East Africa, where fishing is an important subsistence activity but high fishing intensity and use of destructive gear have resulted in declining catches. In this context developing effective management strategies requires an understanding of how fishers may respond to declines in catch. We examined the readiness of 141 Kenyan fishers to stop fishing under hypothetical scenarios of declines in catch and how socioeconomic conditions influenced their decisions. As expected, the proportion of fishers that would exit the fishery increased with magnitude of decline in catch. Fishers were more likely to say they would stop fishing if they were from households that had a higher material style of life and a greater number of occupations. Variables such as capital investment in the fishery and the proportion of catch sold had weak, nonsignificant relationships. Our finding that fishers from poorer households would be less likely to exit a severely declining fishery is consistent with the literature on poverty traps, which suggests the poor are unable to mobilize the necessary resources to overcome either shocks or chronic low-income situations and consequently may remain in poverty. This finding supports the proposition that wealth generation and employment opportunities directed at the poorest fishers may help reduce fishing effort on overexploited fisheries, but successful interventions such as these will require an understanding of the socioeconomic context in which fishers operate.

Managing ecosystems for multiple ecosystem services and balancing the well-being of diverse stakeholders involves different kinds of trade-offs. Often trade-offs involve noneconomic and difficult-to-evaluate values, such as cultural identity, employment, the well-being of poor people, or particular species or ecosystem structures. Although trade-offs need to be considered for successful environmental management, they are often overlooked in favor of win-wins. Management and policy decisions demand approaches that can explicitly acknowledge and evaluate diverse trade-offs. We identified a diversity of apparent trade-offs in a small-scale tropical fishery when ecological simulations were integrated with participatory assessments of social–ecological system structure and stakeholders’ well-being. Despite an apparent win-win between conservation and profitability at the aggregate scale, food production, employment, and well-being of marginalized stakeholders were differentially influenced by management decisions leading to trade-offs. Some of these trade-offs were suggested to be “taboo” trade-offs between morally incommensurable values, such as between profits and the well-being of marginalized women. These were not previously recognized as management issues. Stakeholders explored and deliberated over trade-offs supported by an interactive “toy model” representing key system trade-offs, alongside qualitative narrative scenarios of the future. The concept of taboo trade-offs suggests that psychological bias and social sensitivity may exclude key issues from decision making, which can result in policies that are difficult to implement. Our participatory modeling and scenarios approach has the potential to increase awareness of such trade-offs, promote discussion of what is acceptable, and potentially identify and reduce obstacles to management compliance. Significance Environmental management inevitably involves trade-offs among different objectives, values, and stakeholders. Most evaluations of such trade-offs involve monetary valuation or calculation of aggregate production of ecosystem services, which can mask individual winners and losers. We combine a participatory, modeling, and scenarios approach to identify social–ecological trade-offs in a tropical fishery and the implications on well-being of different stakeholders. Such trade-offs are often ignored because losers are marginalized or not represented by quantification, and because the nature of underlying values may result in socially “taboo” trade-offs that pit incommensurable values against one another. A participatory modeling and scenarios approach can increase awareness of such trade-offs, promote discussion of what is socially acceptable, and potentially identify and reduce obstacles to compliance.

Ecosystem services are supplied by nature but, by definition, are received by people. Ecosystem service assessments, intended to influence the decisions people make regarding their interactions with nature, need to understand how people benefit from different ecosystem services. A critical question is therefore, What determines the distribution of ecosystem service benefits between different sections of society? Here, we use an entitlements approach to examine how people perceive ecosystem service benefits across 28 coral reef fishing communities in four countries. In doing so, we quantitatively show that bundles of benefits are mediated by key access mechanisms (e.g., rights-based, economic, knowledge, social, and institutional). We find that specific access mechanisms influence which ecosystem services people prioritize. Social, institutional, and knowledge mechanisms are associated with the largest number and diversity of benefits. However, local context strongly determines whether specific access mechanisms enable or constrain benefits. Local ecological knowledge enabled people to prioritize a habitat benefit in Kenya, but constrained people from prioritizing the same benefit in Madagascar. Ecosystem service assessments, and their resultant policies, need to include the broad suite of access mechanisms that enable different people to benefit from a supply of ecosystem services. Significance Ecosystems provide a range of services that can benefit people. However, the extent to which people are able to harness those benefits depends not only on the supply of ecosystem services but also on their capacity to access them via a range of social, economic, and institutional mechanisms. Here, we examine how people perceive ecosystem service benefits across 28 coral reef fishing communities in four countries. We quantitatively show that bundles of benefits are mediated by key access mechanisms (e.g., rights-based, economic, knowledge, social, and institutional). Interestingly, social, institutional, and knowledge mechanisms were associated with the greatest number and diversity of benefits. Resource managers can focus on these access mechanisms to maximize ecosystem service benefits while minimizing human–environment impacts.

This study examined trends along a gradient of fishing intensity in an artisanal coral reef fishery over a 10-year period along 75 km of Kenya's most populated coastline. As predicted by Malthusian scenarios, catch per unit effort (CPUE), mean trophic level, the functional diversity of fished taxa, and the diversity of gear declined, while total annual catch and catch variability increased along the fishing pressure gradient. The fishery was able to sustain high (~16 Mg·km⁻²·yr⁻¹) but variable yields at high fishing pressure due to the dominance of a few productive herbivorous fish species in the catch. The effect of two separate management strategies to overcome this Malthusian pattern was investigated: fisheries area closure and elimination of the dominant and most \"competitive\" gear. We found that sites within 5 km of the enforced closure showed significantly lower total catch and CPUE, but increased yield stability and trophic level of catch than predicted by regression models normalized for fishing effort. Sites that had excluded illegal beach seine use through active gear management exhibited increased total catch and CPUE. There was a strong interaction between closure and gear management, which indicates that, for closures to be effective at increasing catch, there must be simultaneous efforts at gear management around the periphery of the closures. We propose that Malthusian effects are responsible for the variation in gear and catch and that active management through reduced effort and reductions in the most competitive gear have the greatest potential to increase the functional and trophic diversity and per-person productivity.

There is an increasing need to evaluate the links between the social and ecological dimensions of human vulnerability to climate change. We use an empirical case study of 12 coastal communities and associated coral reefs in Kenya to assess and compare five key ecological and social components of the vulnerability of coastal social-ecological systems to temperature induced coral mortality [specifically: 1) environmental exposure; 2) ecological sensitivity; 3) ecological recovery potential; 4) social sensitivity; and 5) social adaptive capacity]. We examined whether ecological components of vulnerability varied between government operated no-take marine reserves, community-based reserves, and openly fished areas. Overall, fished sites were marginally more vulnerable than community-based and government marine reserves. Social sensitivity was indicated by the occupational composition of each community, including the importance of fishing relative to other occupations, as well as the susceptibility of different fishing gears to the effects of coral bleaching on target fish species. Key components of social adaptive capacity varied considerably between the communities. Together, these results show that different communities have relative strengths and weaknesses in terms of social-ecological vulnerability to climate change.

Identifying the rates of recovery of fish in no-take areas is fundamental to designing protected area networks, managing fisheries, estimating yields, identifying ecological interactions, and informing stakeholders about the outcomes of this management. Here we study the recovery of coral reef fishes through 37 years of protection using a space-for-time chronosequence of four marine national parks in Kenya. Using AIC model selection techniques, we assessed recovery trends using five ecologically meaningful production models: asymptotic, Ricker, logistic, linear, and exponential. There were clear recovery trends with time for species richness, total and size class density, and wet masses at the level of the taxonomic family. Species richness recovered rapidly to an asymptote at 10 years. The two main herbivorous families displayed differing responses to protection, scarids recovering rapidly, but then exhibiting some decline while acanthurids recovered more slowly and steadily throughout the study. Recovery of the two invertebrate-eating groups suggested competitive interactions over resources, with the labrids recovering more rapidly before a decline and the balistids demonstrating a slower logistic recovery. Remaining families displayed differing trends with time, with a general pattern of decline in smaller size classes or small-bodied species after an initial recovery, which suggests that some species-and size-related competitive and predatory control occurs in older closures. There appears to be an ecological succession of dominance with an initial rapid rise in labrids and scarids, followed by a slower rise in balistids and acanthurids, an associated decline in sea urchins, and an ultimate dominance in calcifying algae. Our results indicate that the unfished \"equilibrium\" biomass of the fish assemblage >10 cm is 1100-1200 kg/ha, but these small parks (<10 Km²) are likely to underestimate prehuman influence values due to edge effects and the rarity of taxa with large area requirement, such as apex predators, including sharks.

The adoption of fisheries closures and gear restrictions in the conservation of coral reefs may be limited by poor understanding of the economic profitability of competing economic uses of marine resources. Over the past 12 years, I evaluated the effects of gear regulation and fisheries closures on per person and per area incomes from fishing in coral reefs of Kenya. In two of my study areas, the use of small‐meshed beach seines was stopped after 6 years; one of these areas was next to a fishery closure. In my third study area, fishing was unregulated. Fishing yields on per capita daily wet weight basis were 20% higher after seine‐net fishing was stopped. The per person daily fishing income adjacent to the closed areas was 14 and 22% higher than the fishing income at areas with only gear restrictions before and after the seine‐net restriction, respectively. Incomes differed because larger fish were captured next to the closed area and the price per weight (kilograms) increased as fish size increased and because catches adjacent to the closure contained fish species of higher market value. Per capita incomes were 41 and 135% higher for those who fished in gear‐restricted areas and near‐closed areas, respectively, compared with those who fished areas with no restrictions. On a per unit area basis (square kilometers), differences in fishing income among the three areas were not large because fishing effort increased as the number of restrictions decreased. Changes in catch were, however, larger and often in the opposite direction expected from changes in effort alone. For example, effort declined 21% but nominal profits per square kilometer (not accounting for inflation) increased 29% near the area with gear restrictions. Gear restrictions also reduced the cost of fishing and increased the proportion of self‐employed fishers.