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\"Mad River, Marjorie Rowland, and the Quest for LGBTQ Teachers' Rights addresses an important legal case that set the stage for today's LGBTQ civil rights-a case that almost no one has heard of. Marjorie Rowland v. Mad River School District involves an Ohio guidance counselor fired in 1974 for being bisexual. Rowland's case made it to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the justices declined to consider it. In a spectacular published dissent, Justice Brennan laid out arguments for why the First and Fourteenth Amendments apply to bisexuals, gays, and lesbians. That dissent has been the foundation for LGBTQ civil rights advances since. In the first in-depth treatment of this foundational legal case, authors Margaret A. Nash and Karen L. Graves tell the story of that case and of Marjorie Rowland, the pioneer who fought for employment rights for LGBTQ educators and who paid a heavy price for that fight. It brings the story of LGBTQ educators' rights to the present, including commentary on Bostock v Clayton County, the 2020 Supreme Court case that struck down employment discrimination against LGBT workers\"--. Contents: Staking a claim in Mad River -- \"I had to be the fighter\" -- The meaning of Mad River : implications of the case -- \"Coming out of the classroom closet\": LGBTQ teachers' lives after Mad River -- Conclusion.

The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified on July 9, 1868, identified all legitimate voters as \"male.\" In so doing, it added gender-specific language to the U.S. Constitution for the first time. Suffrage Reconstructed is the first book to consider how and why the amendment's authors made this decision. Vividly detailing congressional floor bickering and activist campaigning, Laura E. Free takes readers into the pre- and postwar fights over precisely who should have the right to vote. Free demonstrates that all men, black and white, were the ultimate victors of these fights, as gender became the single most important marker of voting rights during Reconstruction. Free argues that the Fourteenth Amendment's language was shaped by three key groups: African American activists who used ideas about manhood to claim black men's right to the ballot, postwar congressmen who sought to justify enfranchising southern black men, and women's rights advocates who began to petition Congress for the ballot for the first time as the Amendment was being drafted. To prevent women's inadvertent enfranchisement, and to incorporate formerly disfranchised black men into the voting polity, the Fourteenth Amendment's congressional authors turned to gender to define the new American voter. Faced with this exclusion some woman suffragists, most notably Elizabeth Cady Stanton, turned to rhetorical racism in order to mount a campaign against sex as a determinant of one's capacity to vote. Stanton's actions caused a rift with Frederick Douglass and a schism in the fledgling woman suffrage movement. By integrating gender analysis and political history, Suffrage Reconstructed offers a new interpretation of the Civil War-era remaking of American democracy, placing African American activists and women's rights advocates at the heart of nineteenth-century American conversations about public policy, civil rights, and the franchise. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified on July 9, 1868, identified all legitimate voters as \"male.\" In so doing, it added gender-specific language to the U.S. Constitution for the first time.Suffrage Reconstructedis the first book to consider how and why the amendment's authors made this decision. Vividly detailing congressional floor bickering and activist campaigning, Laura E. Free takes readers into the pre- and postwar fights over precisely who should have the right to vote. Free demonstrates that all men, black and white, were the ultimate victors of these fights, as gender became the single most important marker of voting rights during Reconstruction.Free argues that the Fourteenth Amendment's language was shaped by three key groups: African American activists who used ideas about manhood to claim black men's right to the ballot, postwar congressmen who sought to justify enfranchising southern black men, and women's rights advocates who began to petition Congress for the ballot for the first time as the Amendment was being drafted. To prevent women's inadvertent enfranchisement, and to incorporate formerly disfranchised black men into the voting polity, the Fourteenth Amendment's congressional authors turned to gender to define the new American voter. Faced with this exclusion some woman suffragists, most notably Elizabeth Cady Stanton, turned to rhetorical racism in order to mount a campaign against sex as a determinant of one's capacity to vote. Stanton's actions caused a rift with Frederick Douglass and a schism in the fledgling woman suffrage movement. By integrating gender analysis and political history,Suffrage Reconstructedoffers a new interpretation of the Civil War-era remaking of American democracy, placing African American activists and women's rights advocates at the heart of nineteenth-century American conversations about public policy, civil rights, and the franchise.

Mad River, Marjorie Rowland, and the Quest for LGBTQ Teachers’ Rights addresses an important legal case that set the stage for today’s LGBTQ civil rights–a case that almost no one has heard of. Marjorie Rowland v. Mad River School District involves an Ohio guidance counselor fired in 1974 for being bisexual. Rowland’s case made it to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the justices declined to consider it. In a spectacular published dissent, Justice Brennan laid out arguments for why the First and Fourteenth Amendments apply to bisexuals, gays, and lesbians. That dissent has been the foundation for LGBTQ civil rights advances since.   In the first in-depth treatment of this foundational legal case, authors Margaret A. Nash and Karen L. Graves tell the story of that case and of Marjorie Rowland, the pioneer who fought for employment rights for LGBTQ educators and who paid a heavy price for that fight. It brings the story of LGBTQ educators’ rights to the present, including commentary on Bostock v Clayton County , the 2020 Supreme Court case that struck down employment discrimination against LGBT workers.  

This Essay provides a new framework for criticizing originalism or its alternatives—the framework of positive law. Existing debates are either conceptual or normative: They focus either on the nature of interpretation and authority, or on originalism's ability to serve other values, like predictability, democracy, or general welfare. Both sets of debates are stalled. Instead, we ought to ask: Is originalism our law? If not, what isi Answering this question can reorient the debates and allow both sides to move forward. If we apply this positivist framework, there is a surprisingly strong case that our current constitutional law is originalism. First, I argue that originalism can and should be understood inclusively. That is, it permits doctrine like precedent if those doctrines can be justified on originalist grounds. Second, I argue that our current constitutional practices demonstrate a commitment to inclusive originalism. In Supreme Court cases where originalism conflicts with other methods of interpretation, the Court picks originalism. By contrast, none of the Court's putatively anti-originalist cases in fact repudiate originalist reasoning. These judicial practices are reinforced by a broader convention of treating the constitutional text as law and its origin as the framing. So while constitutional practice might seem, on the surface, to be a pluralism of competing theories, its deep structure is in fact a nuancedform of originalism.

Because voter-identification laws discourage voter turnout, particularly among identifiable minority groups, their implementation abridges a fundamental constitutional right. The U.S. Constitution includes a little-known remedy for denying or abridging the right to vote that reduces a state's congressional representation in proportion to the extent of the abridgements.

I argue that enrollment of a diverse student body is but a pragmatic first step toward the broader social goal of inclusion and ask whether motives for campus diversification are aligned with pedagogic goals. I address this question by focusing on inclusion, namely, organizational strategies and practices that promote meaningful social and academic interactions among students who differ in their experiences, views, and traits. After illustrating the contours and pace of diversification, I discuss challenges to achieving meaningful integration as campuses become more racially diverse by focusing on ethnic programming and evidence about students' social interaction patterns. Integration is not an automatic by-product of campus diversity; therefore, to harness the benefits of diverse student bodies, institutional leaders must pursue deliberate strategies that promote inclusion.

This paper advocates for the recognition of the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment as a fundamental right under the current text and content of the U.S. Constitution, specifically through the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The research underscores that existing legal mechanisms—such as the Equal Protection Clause, civil rights statutes, and federal environmental laws—are insufficient to consistently and robustly protect environmental rights or ensure environmental justice, particularly for marginalized communities. The paper argues that environmental justice cannot be achieved without grounding environmental rights in constitutional norms, and demonstrates that such a right is embedded in the nation's history, tradition, and concept of ordered liberty. Drawing from state constitutional models, international instruments, and evolving jurisprudence, the paper further contends that environmental rights can be inferred as penumbras of substantive due process. It concludes that recognizing environmental rights as fundamental would empower individuals and communities to challenge harmful government actions or omissions and require courts to apply strict scrutiny to policies that compromise environmental integrity. This framework offers a durable and just path toward achieving environmental equity, resilience, and protection across generations.

Argument from the \"anticanon,\" the set of cases whose central propositions all legitimate decisions must refute, has become a persistent but curious feature of American constitutional law. These cases, Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner v. New York, and Korematsu v. United States, are consistently cited in Supreme Court opinions, in constitutional law casebooks, and at confirmation hearings as prime examples of weak constitutional analysis. Upon reflection, however, anticanonical cases do not involve unusually bad reasoning, nor are they uniquely morally repugnant. Rather, these cases are held out as examples for reasons external to conventional constitutional argument. This Article substantiates that claim and explores those reasons. I argue that anticanonical cases achieve their status through historical happenstance, and that subsequent interpretive communities' use of the anticanon as a rhetorical resource reaffirms that status. That use is enabled by at least three features of anticanonical cases: their incomplete theorization, their amenability to traditional forms of legal argumentation, and their resonance with constitutive ethical propositions that have achieved consensus. I argue that it is vital for law professors in particular to be conscious of the various ways in which the anticanon is used — for example, to dispel dissensus about or sanitize the Constitution — that we may better decide if and when those uses are justified.

Homelessness is punishing to those who experience it, not just from the inherent and protracted trauma of living exposed on the street, but also due to widespread and pervasive laws that punish people for being homeless. People experiencing homelessness, particularly chronic homelessness, often lack reasonable alternatives to living in public. Yet cities throughout the country are increasingly enacting and enforcing laws that punish the conduct of necessary, life-sustaining activities in public, even when many people have no other option. These laws are frequently challenged in court and often struck down as unconstitutional. But legally sound, cost-effective, and non-punitive alternatives to ending chronic homelessness exist. This article exposes some of the problems with criminalization laws, not only for people experiencing homelessness, but also for the broader community. It discusses how current approaches often make chronic homelessness worse and explains why non-punitive alternatives, especially Housing First and permanent supportive housing, are the most cost-effective means of addressing chronic homelessness. Ultimately, this article urges cities and their constituents to stop punishing homelessness and instead to start solving it.

Under current Supreme Court doctrine under the First Amendment, constitutional complaints that a state university has selected its faculty on ideological grounds—that it has “cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom”, in the language of the court from 1967—face three barriers. States may claim that an ideologically uniform faculty is required for the efficient performance of government functions, that it represents the state’s own speech, or that faculty’s expression of ideology is part of their jobs, subject to an uncertain exception for “expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction”. This article looks at these claims from the perspective that the Court has used with increasing frequency: the meaning expressed by the text of the Fourteenth Amendment in its original 1868 context. While there are strong arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply the First Amendment’s meaning as of 1791 against states, the Fourteenth Amendment does require that citizens of all political and religious creeds receive the same civil rights as similarly situated fellow citizens. However, the “civil rights” covered by the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 excluded “political rights” to influence the government and serve on its behalf. State universities’ Fourteenth Amendment obligations of ideological neutrality thus run not directly to faculty, but to students. An ideologically slanted process of faculty selection violates students’ civil rights in the same way that a racially biased process of jury selection violates defendants’ rights to a fair trial.