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Uncivil Disobedienceexamines the roles violence and terrorism have played in the exercise of democratic ideals in America. Jennet Kirkpatrick explores how crowds, rallying behind the principle of popular sovereignty and desiring to make law conform to justice, can disdain law and engage in violence. She exposes the hazards of democracy that arise when citizens seek to control government directly, and demonstrates the importance of laws and institutions as limitations on the will of the people. Kirkpatrick looks at some of the most explosive instances of uncivil disobedience in American history: the contemporary militia movement, Southern lynch mobs, frontier vigilantism, and militant abolitionism. She argues that the groups behind these violent episodes are often motivated by admirable democratic ideas of popular power and autonomy. Kirkpatrick shows how, in this respect, they are not so unlike the much-admired adherents of nonviolent civil disobedience, yet she reveals how those who engage in violent disobedience use these admirable democratic principles as a justification for terrorism and killing. She uses a \"bottom-up\" analysis of events to explain how this transformation takes place, paying close attention to what members of these groups do and how they think about the relationship between citizens and the law. Uncivil Disobediencecalls for a new vision of liberal democracy where the rule of the people and the rule of law are recognized as fundamental ideals, and where neither is triumphant or transcendent.

Generations of Americans have debated the meaning of Abraham Lincoln's views on race and slavery. He issued the Emancipation Proclamation and supported a constitutional amendment to outlaw slavery, yet he also harbored grave doubts about the intellectual capacity of African Americans, publicly used the n-word until at least 1862, and favored permanent racial segregation. In this book--the first complete collection of Lincoln's important writings on both race and slavery--readers can explore these contradictions through Lincoln's own words. Acclaimed Harvard scholar and documentary filmmaker Henry Louis Gates, Jr., presents the full range of Lincoln's views, gathered from his private letters, speeches, official documents, and even race jokes, arranged chronologically from the late 1830s to the 1860s. Complete with definitive texts, rich historical notes, and an original introduction by Henry Louis Gates, Jr., this book charts the progress of a war within Lincoln himself. We witness his struggles with conflicting aims and ideas--a hatred of slavery and a belief in the political equality of all men, but also anti-black prejudices and a determination to preserve the Union even at the cost of preserving slavery. We also watch the evolution of his racial views, especially in reaction to the heroic fighting of black Union troops. At turns inspiring and disturbing,Lincoln on Race and Slaveryis indispensable for understanding what Lincoln's views meant for his generation--and what they mean for our own.

Among the most long-lasting constitutional controversies in the antebellum era was the interpretation of the fugitive slave clause. It was the subject of repeated legislative and judicial construction at both the state and the federal level. It raised delicate questions about federalism and the balancing of property rights and personal liberty. Slaveholders and abolitionists brought irreconcilable constitutional positions to the table, ultimately dividing Northerners from Southerners. However, it was not just divergent political commitments that made it difficult to fix a stable meaning to the fugitive slave clause. The text itself was ambiguous enough to make it amenable to multiple interpretations. For precisely this reason, an examination of the changing interpretations of the fugitive slave clause uncovers antebellum constitutional praxis, allowing us to see how historical actors interpreted the Constitution and how those interpretations shifted over time.

The U.S. Supreme Court's Supremacy Clause jurisprudence has reached a confusing junction. The Court recently declined to say whether the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action for federal court litigants. As a result, lower courts and litigants are caught between conflicting doctrines: one that suggests and one that denies that the Supremacy Clause confers causes of action. Neither line of cases definitively answers the question. A cause of action is necessary for a federal court plaintiff to bring suit. This Note explores whether potential plaintiffs should be able to rely on the Supremacy Clause when applicable federal law does not otherwise confer a cause of action. Navigating the history of the Supremacy Clause, the contours of dueling lines of precedent, and policy ramifications, the Note concludes that, in the midst of the confusion, state defendants have a strong argument that the Supremacy Clause does not confer plaintiffs a cause of action.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE fugitive slave clause in the U.S. Constitution resonates with the language of Chief Justice Cushing in his letter to Governor Benjamin Guerard: “If a man has a right to the service of another” then “he has a right to take him up and carry him home.” The fugitive slave clause refers to the slaves as laborers, not property. It did not emancipate the “laborer” from his or her service, nor did it directly require the refugee state to return the slave. Cushing likewise was not emancipating theTyrannicideslaves or requiring Massachusetts to return the slaves