Explore the vast range of titles available.

We examine firm value and performance implications of the growing trend of nontechnology companies engaging in activities relating to digital technologies. We measure digital activities in firms based on the disclosure of digital words in the business description section of 10-Ks. Digital activities are associated with a market-to-book ratio 8%–26% higher than industry peers, and only 25% of the differences in market-to-book is explained by accounting capitalization restrictions. To control for selection bias, we implement lagged dependent variable and IV regressions, and our market-to-book findings are robust to these specifications. Portfolios formed on digital activity disclosure earn a Daniel et al. The Journal of Finance 52 (3): 1035–1058 ( 1997 )-adjusted return of 30% over a three-year horizon and a monthly alpha of 44-basis-points. On the other hand, we find weak evidence of near-term, positive improvements in fundamental performance, as we find some evidence of interim productivity increases but declines in sales growth conditional on digital activities.

Managers are required to disclose material climate risk in Form 10-K, but their decision whether or not to disclose is confounded by the lack of consensus on whether climate risk is material to the firms, as well as uncertainty about enforcement of disclosure regulations. Using the SASB Materiality Map™ to proxy for market expectations of climate risk materiality, we test whether the association between disclosing climate risk in 10-Ks and firm risk (proxied by cost of equity (COE)) varies with market expectations of climate risk materiality. Using S&P 500 firms’ decisions whether to disclose climate risk in Form 10-K for 2008 to 2016, we find that disclosing firms’ COE is 27 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’ COE. In industries where the market expects climate risk to be material, disclosing firms’ COE is 50 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’, while in industries where the market does not expect climate risk to be material, disclosing firms’ COE is 23 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’. Our results indicate that markets use expectations of climate risk materiality to infer the credibility of managers’ climate risk disclosure decisions. Our research contributes to policy-making on climate risk disclosures in regulatory filings and informs the debate around the costs and benefits of the SEC’s current proposal to enhance climate risk disclosures.

This paper exploits intertemporal variations in employment protection across countries and finds that rigidities in labor markets are an important determinant of firms' capital structure decisions. Over the 1985–2007 period, we find that reforms increasing employment protection are associated with a 187 basis point reduction in leverage. We interpret this finding to suggest that employment protection increases operating leverage, crowding out financial leverage. This result does not appear to be due to pretreatment differences between treated and control firms, omitted variables, unobserved changes in regional economic conditions, and reverse causality. Heterogeneous treatment effects are consistent with our economic intuition.

We investigate the effect of CFO narcissism, as measured by signature size, on financial reporting quality. Experimentally, we validate that narcissism predicts misreporting behavior, and that signature size predicts misreporting through its association with narcissism. Empirically, we examine notarized CFO signatures and find CFO narcissism is associated with more earnings management, less timely loss recognition, weaker internal control quality, and a higher probability of restatements. The results are consistent for within-firm comparisons focusing on CFO changes and are robust to controlling for CFO overconfidence and CEO narcissism. The results highlight the importance of CFO characteristics in the domain of financial reporting decisions.

We show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U-shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance. The quality of corporate decisions, such as M&A, financial reporting quality, and CEO compensation, also has a quadratic relation with board tenure. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that directors' on-the-job learning improves firm value up to a threshold, at which point entrenchment dominates and firm performance suffers. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a sample of firms in which an outside director suffered a sudden death, and find that sudden deaths that move board tenure away from (toward) the empirically observed optimum level in the cross-section are associated with negative (positive) announcement returns. The quality of corporate decisions also follows an inverted U-shaped pattern in a sample of firms affected by the death of a director.

We investigate whether short-termism distorts the investment decisions of stock market-listed firms. To do so, we compare the investment behavior of observably similar public and private firms, using a new data source on private U.S. firms and assuming for identification that closely held private firms are subject to fewer short-termist pressures. Our results show that compared with private firms, public firms invest substantially less and are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities, especially in industries in which stock prices are most sensitive to earnings news. These findings are consistent with the notion that short-termist pressures distort investment decisions.

The deregulation of securities laws—in particular the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996—has increased the supply of private capital to latestage private startups, which are now able to grow to a size that few private firms used to reach. NSMIA is one of a number of factors that have changed the going-public versus staying-private trade-off, helping bring about a new equilibrium where fewer startups go public, and those that do are older. This new equilibrium does not reflect an initial public offering (IPO) market failure. Rather, founders are using their increased bargaining power vis-à-vis investors to stay private longer.

We study capital structure choices that entrepreneurs make in their firms' initial year of operation, using restricted-access data from the Kauffman Firm Survey. Firms in our data rely heavily on external debt sources, such as bank financing, and less extensively on friends-and-family-based funding sources. Many startups receive debt financed through the personal balance sheets of the entrepreneur, effectively resulting in the entrepreneur holding levered equity claims in their startups. This fact is robust to numerous controls, including credit quality. The reliance on external debt underscores the importance of credit markets for the success of nascent business activity.

We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower-level management and non-chief executive officer (non-CEO) higher-level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks' CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non-CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk-taking channel of lower-level managers.

We use credit default swaps (CDS) trading data to demonstrate that the credit risk of reference firms, reflected in rating downgrades and bankruptcies, increases significantly upon the inception of CDS trading, a finding that is robust after controlling for the endogeneity of CDS trading. Additionally, distressed firms are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they are linked to CDS trading. Furthermore, firms with more \"no restructuring\" contracts than other types of CDS contracts (i.e., contracts that include restructuring) are more adversely affected by CDS trading, and the number of creditors increases after CDS trading begins, exacerbating creditor coordination failure in the resolution of financial distress.