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Sovereign state-contingent instruments (SCDIs) have been suggested as complements or alternatives to traditional sovereign debt instruments for a long time, but with little uptake. Markets for SCDIs have suffered from low liquidity and issues around measurement. This article argues that the escalating climate and ecological crises provide a strong rationale to reconsider the use of sovereign SCDIs as the physical and transition impacts of climate change and environmental degradation are increasingly altering the risk profile of sovereigns. The use of risk-linked sovereign instruments such as cat bonds or resilience bonds and embedding disaster risk clauses in sovereign debt contracts would be an important way for governments, especially in highly climate-vulnerable countries, to mitigate climate risks and scale up investment in resilience. Moreover, instruments such as sustainability-linked bonds that incentivise sustainability-oriented policies and investments could help to bring about better sustainability outcomes and contribute to greater debt sustainability. SCDIs can also play an important role in facilitating debt restructurings. The international community, supported by key institutions like the IMF and the major multilateral development banks, should make a concerted effort to promote the widespread adoption of sovereign SCDIs to support better public debt management, the climate-proofing of public finances, and the achievement of more ambitious sustainability outcomes.

State-contingent government debt has been proposed as a way to reduce costly debt crisis. However, markets for this type of debt remain very limited, for reasons that are not yet fully understood. This paper describes a new database covering state-contingent government debt issued between 1863 and 2020. Based on these data, this paper shows stylized facts regarding the main design features, and market performance, of state-contingent government debt. It also provides a brief history of state-contingent government borrowing, which is contextualized with a simple theoretical model of state-contingent debt. The results show that there have been several small, heterogeneous, issuances of state-contingent debt, which resemble pilot runs in this new asset class. The paper concludes with some common challenges associated to state-contingent government debt.

We develop and present a model for pricing GDP-linked bonds that takes into account both GDP fluctuations and fiscal default. The indexation is based on the size of GDP deviations from the trend and default is based on the size of sovereign debt. We consider a mapping of these instruments to normal fixed-income securities, and a bond equivalent yield is calculated as well as a default premium. We construct various indexed bond products with different coupon variations and we price them via Monte-Carlo simulations for the case of Greece. The model can be applied to other countries provided that the data are adjusted. One of the main results is that GDP-linked bonds are more conducive to debt management. In particular, replacing conventional bond instruments with carefully designed GDP-linked bonds of equivalent yield can lead to lower terminal values of debt-to-GDP ratio, provided that the macroeconomic environment is the same.

This paper provides a tractable framework to assess how the structure of debt instruments – specifically by currency denomination and indexation to GDP – can raise the debt limit of a sovereign. By calibrating the model to different country fundamentals, it is clear that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' approach to optimal instrument design. For instance, low income countries may find benefit in issuing local currency debt; while in advanced economies, debt tolerance can be substantially enhanced through issuing GDP-linked bonds. By looking at the marginal impact of these instruments, the paper also provides insight into the optimal portfolio composition.

Following a brief review of the recent history of GDP-linked instruments, this paper proposes a set of tools to examine the quantitative properties of GDP-linked warrants. It argues that trigger conditions should be clearly identifiable and payment amounts easily calculable. Based on a design that includes these features and historical data for the main EMBI countries, the paper provides an assessment of the issuer's capacity to service GDP-linked warrants, comparing payments with tax revenues stemming from contemporaneous growth. The price of the GDP-linked warrants are then estimated from the point of view of both domestic and foreign investors.

This paper compares supply and demand to assess to what extent there can be a market for GDP-linked bonds (GLBs). For the government side, simulations illustrate the debt-stabilisation property of GLBs. These simulations consider shock persistence with a VAR structure and large events with shocks drawn from the residuals. Countries where shock persistence and the standard deviation of the interest rate – growth rate differential scaled with the debt level are higher reap more benefits from GLBs and hence can accept a larger risk premium on GLBs. For the investors’ side, risk premia compensating for GDP volatility are calculated with a CAPM, considering not only the size of growth shocks and their correlation with market prices, but also their persistence. Calculations are made with simplifying assumptions going against the case of GLBs: in particular, the possible reduction in the default risk premium is ignored. Even so, both high-risk and low-risk countries can benefit from GLBs: the ones that have to pay a larger risk premium are those that need this insurance against debt crises the most.