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113,793 result(s) for "GOODWILL"
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Has goodwill accounting gone bad?
Prior to SFAS 142, goodwill was subject to periodic amortization and a recoverability-based impairment test. SFAS 142 eliminates periodic amortization and imposes a fair-value-based impairment test. We examine the impact of this standard on the accounting for and valuation of goodwill. Our results indicate that the new standard has resulted in relatively inflated goodwill balances and untimely impairments. We also find that investors do not appear to fully anticipate the untimely nature of post-SFAS 142 goodwill impairments. Overall, our results suggest that, in practice, some managers have exploited the discretion afforded by SFAS 142 to delay goodwill impairments, thus temporarily inflating earnings and stock prices.
Evidence on the use of unverifiable estimates in required goodwill impairment
SFAS 142 requires managers to estimate the current fair value of goodwill to determine goodwill write-offs. In promulgating the standard, the FASB predicted that managers will, on average, use the fair-value estimates to convey private information on future cash flows. The current fair value of goodwill is unverifiable because it depends in part on management’s future actions (including managers’ conceptualization and implementation of firm strategy). Agency theory predicts managers will, on average, use the unverifiable discretion in SFAS 142 consistent with private incentives. We test these hypotheses in a sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impairment. Our evidence, while consistent with some agency-theory based predictions, does not confirm the private information hypothesis.
Do financial analysts compel firms to make accounting decisions? Evidence from goodwill impairments
This paper examines whether financial analysts’ presence compels recognition of goodwill impairments. Analysts could impact managers’ impairment decisions in at least two ways: (1) by improving the information environment through their analysis of firm performance (i.e., ex ante monitoring) and (2) by increasing the likelihood the manager and firm experience negative consequences when they fail to record a necessary impairment (i.e., ex post monitoring). We find that the likelihood of an impairment is more strongly related to an expected impairment when analyst coverage is higher. Consistent with both forms of monitoring, we also find that analyst downgrades before the firm’s reporting date increase the probability that management records an expected impairment at the reporting date and that failing to record an expected impairment is associated with decreases in analyst following and a lower likelihood that managers are employed at the end of the following year.
Carbon Tail Risk
Strong regulatory actions are needed to combat climate change, but climate policy uncertainty makes it difficult for investors to quantify the impact of future climate regulation. We show that such uncertainty is priced in the option market. The cost of option protection against downside tail risks is larger for firms with more carbon-intense business models. For carbon-intense firms, the cost of protection against downside tail risk is magnified at times when the public’s attention to climate change spikes, and it decreased after the election of climate change skeptic President Trump.
How Valuable Is Financial Flexibility when Revenue Stops? Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis
Firms with greater financial flexibility should be better able to fund a revenue shortfall resulting from the COVID-19 shock and benefit less from policy responses. We find that firms with high financial flexibility within an industry experience a stock price drop that is 26%, or 9.7 percentage points, lower than those with low financial flexibility. This differential return persists as stock prices rebound. Firms more exposed to the COVID-19 shock benefit more from cash holdings. No evidence suggests that recent payouts worsened the average firm’s drop in stock price. Our results cannot be explained by a leverage effect.
Causes and consequences of goodwill impairment losses
The paper examines the reaction of market participants to the announcement of a goodwill impairment loss, the nature of the information conveyed by the loss, and whether a cause of goodwill impairment can be traced back to overpayment for targets at the time of prior acquisitions. Our evidence suggests that both investors and financial analysts revise their expectations downward on the announcement of an impairment loss. We find that the negative impact of the loss is significant under different reporting regimes, that is, pre-SFAS-142, transition period and post-SFAS-142, though it is lower in the post period. We further show that goodwill impairment serves as a leading indicator of a decline in future profitability. Our tests also reveal that proxies for overpayment for targets can predict the subsequent goodwill impairment. Indirect evidence suggests that firms with potentially impaired goodwill that did not report an impairment loss may have used their managerial discretion to avoid taking the loss.