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There is an emerging consensus at international level that systemic transformations are needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Such transformations require paradigm shifts in policies, with appropriate governance frameworks to implement them. Fundamental transformations are likely to generate winners and losers; the latter may act strategically to deter transformation. Most governance literature points at mutual gains negotiation methods to prevent the emergence of losers and create 'win-win ' package deals. In this article a different - and less researched - approach will be discussed: (economic) compensation strategies. Drawing on the political economy literature of reform in transition economies, I propose three compensation strategies to buy out or weaken the opposition of strategic losers - big bang, optimal sequencing and divide-and-rule governance reforms - that can help to frame discussions around the political feasibility of new governance frameworks for SDG transformations. The paper suggests that careful consideration needs to be given to the design of these compensation packages, since history tells us that buying acceptance for reform can involve not just variation in economic outcomes, it can also have long-term political implications and distributional effects.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important corporate reforms: the code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 and the split share structure reform (SSR) in 2005. Design/methodology/approach – This study utilises informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient), conditional accounting conservatism and managerial discretionary accruals to assess earnings quality using 12,267 firm-year observations over 11 years from 2000 to 2010. Further, two dummy variables for measuring the changes of CCG and SSR are employed to estimate the effects of CCG and SSR reforms on earnings quality via OLS regression. Findings – This study finds that the promulgation of the CCG in 2002 has had a positive impact, but the SSR reform in 2005 has had little effect on listed firms’ earnings quality in China. These results hold good after controlling for a number of ownership, governance and other variables and estimating models with multiple measures of earnings’ quality. Research limitations/implications – Future research could focus on how western style corporate governance mechanisms have been constrained by the old management systems and governmental dominated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms. The conclusion is that simply coping Western corporate governance model is not suitable for every country. Practical implications – The results will assist Chinese regulators in improving reporting quality, ownership structure and governance mechanisms in China. The results will help international investors better understand quality of financial information in China. Originality/value – This is the first to our knowledge that addresses the effects of major governance and ownership reforms together on accounting earnings quality and, thus, makes a significant contribution on understanding the effect of regulatory reforms on improving earnings quality. In doing so, it also indirectly assesses the effectiveness of western-style corporate governance mechanisms introduced in China.

There is an evolving trend of pursuing the transfer to sustainable development. Owing to this trend, and alongside the increasing monitoring by society, companies are progressively considering this new position in the capital market. Corporate governance mechanisms and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activities have received extensive consideration. Using a sample of Saudi listed companies, this study examines the association between board composition (size, independence, and gender diversity) and ESG disclosure moderated by corporate governance reforms. Our reported results confirm that the size of a board and its level of independence have positive and significant impacts on ESG disclosure. Moreover, board gender diversity is found to be positively but insignificantly related with ESG disclosure. When the individual dimensions of ESG are considered, the results verify the significant role of board size and board independence and the insignificant impact of board gender diversity in environmental and social disclosures. Interestingly, all measures of board composition have a positive and significant impact on the governance disclosure score. The results also show that reforms of Saudi corporate governance positively and significantly moderate the board size and board independence–ESG relationship. Our results demonstrate that the enhancement of companies’ corporate governance will increase their ESG disclosures. This study offers perceptions from the outlook of a developing economy, Saudi Arabia, and presents theoretical and managerial implications for policymakers and investors.

This paper examines the institutional dynamics of policymaking in Nigeria and South Africa over the last two decades, focusing on how political, economic, and social institutions shape public policies in critical sectors such as education, health, and economic development. The study employs a comparative approach, utilising both historical and rational choice institutionalism as theoretical frameworks to interrogate the evolution and current functioning of these nations’ political and bureaucratic systems. The research employs a qualitative methodology, drawing on secondary data, case studies, and relevant literature, supplemented by interviews with key informants, including policy experts and political analysts. Findings reveal that both Nigeria and South Africa suffer from path-dependent institutional structures that perpetuate inefficiency and inequality, compounded by weak accountability mechanisms and the pervasive influence of informal institutions. While South Africa has achieved comparatively greater progress in reforming its political institutions, Nigeria continues to contend with entrenched corruption and systemic bureaucratic dysfunction. The paper concludes that, despite shared challenges such as inequality, corruption, and governance crises, the institutional contexts in these two developing nations remain pivotal in determining the effectiveness of policy outcomes. Based on these findings, it proposes strengthening accountability mechanisms, integrating informal institutions into reform efforts, enhancing local-level governance, and improving the institutional capacity of political structures to drive systemic change.

Governments pursue their goals by adopting various mixes of policy instruments. This article proposes a specific operationalisation of these mixes and applies it to the analysis of reforms that many Western European governments have pursued, as they have adopted a similar policy design in their higher education systems (HESs) over the last 20 years. In fact, although these policies have similar templates, performance indicators exhibit remarkable variation between countries. Thus, by applying Qualitative Comparative Analysis to a large data set containing all changes in policy instruments undertaken in the last 20 years in 12 HESs in Western Europe, this article explores the possibility that differences in performance across national HESs could be associated – ceteris paribus – with different policy mixes. This article finds not only that the common template has been applied through very different national policy mixes but also that only a few instruments are regularly linked to good teaching performance, regardless of the other components of the actual policy mix.

This paper addresses governance reforms of the last three and a half decades and looks into the future. This is done in three parts. The first part presents a birds-eye view of the massive literature on governance and governance reforms with a focus on the good, the bad, and ugly sides, then in part two argues for an alternative concept or theory of “sound governance” with characteristics and dimensions that overcome the deficiencies of other models of governance. As a consequence of reforms, the third part examines the past and explores the future of public organizations via “going home” as a conclusion with possible scenarios, challenges, and opportunities.

Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance compliance, governance reforms and board attributes on operating liquidity of Pakistani listed non-financial firms. The study further tests how these relationships vary in the pre- and post-corporate governance reforms. Design/methodology/approach Fixed-effect regression model is used on 10 years panel data from 2007 to 2016 for a sample of 170 firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange. Two-stage least squares model is used for addressing the endogeneity problem. Findings The findings reveal that governance compliance and governance reforms negatively affect operating liquidity. Among the board attributes, board meetings, directors’ remuneration, board foreign diversity and board gender diversity are significantly related to operating liquidity. Further exploration indicates that internal governance mechanisms are less effective to safeguard shareholders from expropriation during weak external governance. This suggests that strong external governance is inevitable to the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms. Overall, the study findings support the agency theory. Practical implications The findings provide valid recommendations to policymakers interested in safeguarding the investors to focus on macro-level governance for making the micro-level governance effective. Further, the results provide the executives with an insight to improve the compliance level with the code of corporate governance. Originality/value Unlike prior studies, this study examines the impact of corporate governance compliance and novel board attributes – directors’ attendance at board meetings, number of board committees, directors’ remuneration and board foreign diversity on operating liquidity. Further, the study subdivides its sample period into pre- and post-corporate governance reforms to examine how external governance influences internal governance effectiveness.

New participatory, interactive, and less direct forms of governing seem currently to be unfolding in many liberal democracies. Some scholars have tried to conceptualize these forms of governing by using the notion of new public governance (NPG). While promising, the notion remains conceptually underdeveloped. This article first aims to develop NPG from an empirical to an analytical concept that enables categorization and evaluation of new forms of governing. In order to gauge the full scope of the current transformations we draw on David Easton's system theoretical model to identify the constitutive elements of NPG and show how they differ from those elements underpinning classical public administration and new public management. The second aim of the article is to delineate the main challenges that NPG poses for public management and policymaking in a complex and fragmented world. We conclude by reflecting on the need for metagovernance in order to handle the challenges and bring out the positive impact of NPG on normative performance goals such as efficiency, democracy, and innovation.

Research summary: Regulatory bodies often wrestle with the thorny question of whether to mandate a governance practice or allow for organic adoption. While mandates afford rapid diffusion, we theorize that they also result in ceremonial adoptions. Leveraging a quasi-natural experiment, we compare adoption outcomes for a governance practice—lead director adoption—that was mandated by the NYSE but not the NASDAQ. We find that NYSE firms are more likely than NASDAQ firms to have installed a lead director as a symbolic management tactic, so their lead directors are less effectual. We also find that transient institutional investors are deceived by this symbolic management, but dedicated institutional investors are not. Managerial summary: Shareholders and analysts often desire to see companies introduce strict governance measures, such as proxy access and independent boards. Consequently, regulatory bodies often wrestle with the thorny issue of whether and when to mandate such practices for all companies. What they might not realize is that mandates may not work as well as they seem. Although more companies adopt reform under a mandate, they do so merely as a symbolic gesture. We look at one governance reform—appointing a lead director—finding that companies who introduce this reform as a result of a mandate appoint someone that is relatively toothless. We also find, though, that savvy investors are not actually fooled by this tactic and will trade out of firms that attempt such symbolic management.

Political and administrative will are crucial in transforming local government. However, a gap exist in how to mobilise political and administrative will effectivley.. This study investigates the dynamics of navigating political and administrative will in transforming local government. Using a qualitative case it examines how these interactions impact governance reforms in South Africa. Data were collected through focus group interviews with 121 participants from eight municipalities, each group comprising ten participants. Analysis revealed a disconnect between political statements and administrative actions despite rhetorical support for transformation. Participants noted various barriers, with widespread concerns about the lack of consistent follow-through on policy initiatives. Findings suggest that while political and administrative will are necessary, their practical application remains inconsistent. This study suggests that a more integrated approach is necessary to align political directives with administrative processes, thereby achieving meaningful transformation in local government. These insights can help other municipalities facing similar challenges by providing a framework for more cohesive and effective governance reforms.