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In northern Kiev,¹ at Dorogozhychi metro station, there are several monuments commemorating the murder and enslavement of the Ukrainian population during the Second World War, including one erected in 2005 in memory of Ukrainian forced labourers. Dorogozhychi is situated close to the ravine Babi Yar, where some 200,000 people were murdered by the occupying Germans prior to Kiev’s liberation on 5 November 1943.² Today, the memorial park next to the metro station stands as an illustration of how memorial culture, and the former forced labourers’ place in it, has changed over the years. The memorial to the mass murder of

This article analyses how, in Poland, the populist political orientation of the ruling party (Law and Justice—PiS) has coloured the historical discourse of the government and has affected, in turn, its foreign policy and diplomatic relations. We argue that the historical discourse of the PiS government is a reflection of the party’s reliance on populism as a political mode of articulation in that it seeks to promote a Manichean, dichotomic and totalizing re-definition of the categories of victim, hero and perpetrator—and of Poland’s roles in this trinity. The article details the direct and indirect repercussions of PiS populist-inspired historical posture on Poland’s foreign policy by analysing its policies towards—and relations with—Ukraine and Germany. As such, the article sheds light on the under-explored links between populism and historical memory and makes a contribution to the nascent scholarship on the foreign policy of populist governments.

Many scholars have empirically tested the influence of geopolitical risk on economic activities and financial indicators. This paper attracts a new research strand by investigating the geopolitical risk determinants. More precisely, we examine if the international geopolitical risk of a selected group of countries spills over to Russia. Alternatively, it inspects if the geopolitical tension among nations is cointegrated. This group of countries includes the United States, Germany, China, and Ukraine. The current paper designed and computed an empirical model using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag model (ARDL) during the period 1993:01–2022:05. The results reveal that the international geopolitical risk of Russia is cointegrated with the other four nations. In the short run, the international geopolitical risk of the four nations spills over to Russia by increasing its international geopolitical risk. While in the long run, the same impacts persist. But the effect of the United States' geopolitical risk becomes statistically insignificant. The results also show that Germany has the largest effect on Russia’s geopolitical risk in the long run. Moreover, the increase in oil prices overflows Russia by decreasing its international geopolitical risk. Thus, rival nations should reach a settlement to reduce the geopolitical tension. Otherwise, the world economic performance will deteriorate.

This paper aims to assess the impact of EU energy and climate policy as a response to Russia’s war in Ukraine on the EU decarbonization enterprise. It showcases how the Russian invasion was a crunch point that forced the EU to abandon its liberal market dogma and embrace in practice an open strategic autonomy approach. This led to an updated energy and climate policy, with significant changes underpinning its main pillars, interdependence, diversification, and the focus of market regulation and build-up. The reversal of enforced interdependence with Russia and the legislative barrage to support and build-up a domestic clean energy market unlocks significant emission reduction potential, with measures targeting energy efficiency, solar, wind, and hydrogen development; an urban renewable revolution and electricity and carbon market reforms standing out. Such positive decarbonization effects, however, are weakened by source and fuel diversification moves that extend to coal and shale gas, especially when leading to an infrastructure build-up and locking-in gas use in the mid-term. Despite these caveats, the analysis overall vindicates the hypothesis that geopolitics constitutes a facilitator and accelerator of EU energy transition.

The paper examines the recent trends in international mobility, attractivity for international students, and the number of publications of two universities (Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Slovakia, CPU and Tbilisi State Medical University, Georgia, TSMU) to understand whether the COVID-19 pandemic affected these processes and whether the adverse consequences of the pandemic were still retained after its end. In addition, we examined the influence of EU support for these processes. For this purpose, we analyzed the rates of international mobility (the number of outgoing and incoming students and employees, the number of international students, and the number of publications indexed in SCOPUS and the WoS database of CPU and TSMU before, during, and after the abolishment of administrative restrictions induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. The comparison of CPU and TSMU demonstrated the similarity between these universities in the development of international contacts and cooperation. The indexes of international mobility and the number of publications in the EU university CPU were higher than those in the non-EU TSMU. On the other hand, before COVID-19, the indexes of international mobility and the number of publications of TSMU were stable or tended to decline, but in CPU, they increased. COVID-19 had a negative impact on all indexes of international mobility, but the number of international students continued to increase in both universities, even during the pandemic. The use of home offices during the pandemic promoted an increase in the number of international publications among authors from CPU but not among those from TSMU. After the end of the pandemic, in both universities, the indexes of international mobility increased but sometimes did not return to pre-pandemic levels. In the post-COVID-19 period, in both CPU and TSMU, the number of international students continued to grow, and the number of publications declined. These observations highlight the trend of internalization experienced by both universities, the negative impact of COVID on their international mobility, and the importance of EU support for research.

This paper focuses on the study of the activity of German consular institutions on the territory of Soviet Ukraine during 1922–1938. German consular representatives operating in Ukrainian cities were career diplomats, who had higher education, a perfect command of foreign languages, and deep knowledge in the fields of history, geography, statistics, political economy, and international law. While operating in Ukraine, German consuls were taking their official duties seriously: normalization of bilateral trade and economic relations, the establishment of cultural ties, as well as protection and assistance to German citizens living within the consular district. One of the important aspects of consular activity was the performance of the “honorary spy” functions.

Since 2014 and especially after 2022, the German–Ukrainian relations have developed impressive depth. With over seven billion euros in military aid spent since 2022, another seven earmarked for 2024, and a long-term security agreement signed, Germany has become an indispensable and reliable partner for Ukraine. Given the dire situation on the battlefield and the prospect of a long and difficult war ahead, several factors impede the potential strategic relationship. If not addressed, those could prove a problem for the otherwise strong German support for and partnership with Ukraine. They include improper communication on the German side, especially from the chancellor who is not properly making the case to his electorate more broadly as to why Ukraine aid is in Germany's interest. While Germany has changed course and only after Russia openly invaded Ukraine, it has failed to critically examine its failed Russia policy and underinvested in addressing what scholars refer to as the country's “Ukraine-ignorance”. Additionally, the cautious and fear-driven logic of German decision-making and a lingering distrust of the Ukrainian side impede the provision of much-needed weaponry and influence the bilateral relationship.