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This article examines the organizing practices of indie unions – the emerging grassroots unions coled by precarious migrant workers. It draws on an embedded actor-centred approach involving extensive multi-sited ethnography. The article shows how workers normally considered unorganizable by the established unions can build lasting solidarity and associational power and obtain material and non-material rewards in the context of precarity, scarce economic resources and a hostile environment. Here, I argue that the organization of workers into ‘communities of struggle’ geared towards mobilization facilitates their empowerment, effectiveness and social integration. The article contributes to labour mobilization theory by redefining the concept of organizing in inclusionary terms, so that the collective industrial agency of precarious and migrant workers organizing outside the established unions can be adequately recognized and accounted for.

We give an overview of the “German model” of industrial relations. We organize our review by focusing on the two pillars of the model: sectoral collective bargaining and firm-level codetermination. Relative to the United States, Germany outsources collective bargaining to the sectoral level, resulting in higher coverage and the avoidance of firm-level distributional conflict. Relative to other European countries, Germany makes it easy for employers to avoid coverage or use flexibility provisions to deviate downwards from collective agreements. The greater flexibility of the German system may reduce unemployment, but may also erode bargaining coverage and increase inequality. Meanwhile, firm-level codetermination through worker board representation and works councils creates cooperative dialogue between employers and workers. Board representation has few direct impacts owing to worker representatives’ minority vote share, but works councils, which hold a range of substantive powers, may be more impactful. Overall, the German model highlights tensions between efficiency-enhancing flexibility and equity-enhancing collective action.

This paper investigates whether labor unions use proposals opportunistically to influence contract negotiations. Our empirical strategy relies on the observation that proposals have higher bargaining-chip value in contract expiration years, when a new contract must be negotiated. We find that in contract expiration years compared with nonexpiration years, unions increase their proposal rate by one-fifth, particularly proposals concerning executive compensation. Union proposals made during expiration years are less likely to be supported by other shareholders or a leading proxy advisor; the market reacts negatively to union proposals in expiration years; and withdrawn union proposals are accompanied by higher wage settlements.

Conventional wisdom suggests that labor unions raise worker wages, while the newer empirical literature finds only negligible earnings effects. I reconcile this apparent contradiction by arguing that collective bargaining targets fringe benefits. Using U.S. firm-level data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Multinational Enterprise Survey and Compustat, I exploit a regression discontinuity in majority rule union elections to compare changes in employee compensation at firms whose establishment barely won a union election against those that barely lost an election. Following unionization, average employee compensation and employer pension contributions increase, which raises the labor share of compensation.

We study whether the constraints on firms’ operations imposed by labor unions affect firms’ costs of equity. The cost of equity is significantly higher for firms in more unionized industries. This effect holds after controlling for several industry and firm characteristics, is robust to endogeneity concerns, and is not driven by omitted variables. Moreover, the unionization premium is stronger when unions face a more favorable bargaining environment and is highly countercyclical. Unionization is also positively related to various measures of operating leverage. Our findings suggest that labor unions increase firms’ costs of equity by decreasing firms’ operating flexibility.

Transnational workers on large-scale construction projects are often poorly included in national industrial relations systems, which results in employment relations becoming trapped in vicious circles of weak enforcement and precarious work. This article shows how Danish unions have, nonetheless, been successful in enacting existing institutions and organising the construction of the Copenhagen Metro City Ring, despite initially encountering a highly fragmented, transnational workforce and several subcontracting firms that actively sought to circumvent Danish labour-market regulation. This is explained by the union changing their organising and enforcement strategies, thereby utilising various power resources to create inclusive strategies towards transnational workers. This includes efforts to create shared objectives and identity across divergent groups of workers and actively seeking changes in the public owners’ attitude towards employment relations.

Private governance raises important questions about democratic representation. Rule making is rarely based on electoral authorisation by those in whose name rules are made—typically a requirement for democratic legitimacy. This requires revisiting the role of representation in input legitimacy in transnational governance, which remains underdeveloped. Focussing on private labour governance, we contrast two approaches to the transnational representation of worker interests in global supply chains: non-governmental organisations providing representative claims versus trade unions providing representative structures. Studying the Bangladesh Accord for Fire and Building Safety, we examine their interaction along three dimensions of democratic representation: 1) creating presence, 2) authorisation, and 3) accountability to affected constituents. We develop a framework that explains when representative claims and structures become complementary but also how the politics of input legitimacy shape whose interests get represented. We conclude by deriving theoretical and normative implications for transnational representation and input legitimacy in global governance.

Academics have long investigated trade union behaviour through the complex interaction of identity, ideology and purpose. At the same time, there have been increasing calls to gain a deeper understanding of the purpose of strategies but the two bodies of literature seldom overlap. The article proposes a framework to help understand the essence of trade unions and to situate strategies (such as organizing) in this broader context and bridge the gap between the literature on union purpose and identity and on strategies for renewal. It is argued that the essence of unions framework can assist with the analysis of both historical and contemporary trade unionism and allows both clarification and consideration of the range of concepts and terms already in use in the industrial relations literature.

This article develops a search theory of labour unions in which the possibility of unionization distorts the behaviour of non-union firms. In the model, unions arise endogenously through a majority election within firms. As union wages are set through a collective bargaining process, unionization compresses wages and lowers profits. To prevent unionization, non-union firms over-hire high-skill workers—who vote against the union—and under-hire low-skill workers—who vote in its favour. As a consequence of this distortion in hiring, firms that are threatened by unionization hire fewer workers, produce less and pay a more concentrated distribution of wages. In the calibrated economy, the threat of unionization has a significant negative impact on aggregate output, but it also reduces wage inequality.

Using data from a national sample of American workers, the authors develop measures for ‘‘prosocial unionism’’—the belief that unions contribute to the common good—and use regression analysis to determine its impact on public support for unions and on workers’ likelihood of supporting a union in a representation election in their workplace. Results show that the public’s support for unions is stronger when the public believes that unions act in the interests of all working people instead of just their members. The analyses also show that workers who believe unions have social benefits are significantly more likely to say they would vote ‘‘yes’’ in a union election than those who do not hold this belief. These findings imply that if unions address political and social justice goals that transcend the workplace, their legitimacy and their success in attracting public support and members may be enhanced and help stem the tide of shrinking union density.