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Discusses climate change impact on both the region of southern Africa, and the nation of South Africa.

Since 1982, extreme daily rainfall in the western Sahel has increased persistently, owing to a warmer Sahara which has led to increased wind shear and an increase in intense storms. More storms as desert warms A warming climate is expected to increase the frequency of extreme rainfall events because warmer air can support higher humidity, but other mechanisms may also be at work. Christopher Taylor et al . show that increases in extreme rainfall in the western Sahel region of Africa since 1982 are driven by a larger gradient in temperature across the region caused by a warmer Sahara desert to the north. In turn, the sharper gradient increases wind shear and seems to have led to the frequency of mesoscale convective systems—which are exactly the kind of weather systems likely to generate extreme rainfall—tripling since 1982. The spatial patterns of global warming are likely to further increase the temperature gradient and intensify mesoscale convective systems, leading to more extreme rainfall events. The hydrological cycle is expected to intensify under global warming 1 , with studies reporting more frequent extreme rain events in many regions of the world 2 , 3 , 4 , and predicting increases in future flood frequency 5 . Such early, predominantly mid-latitude observations are essential because of shortcomings within climate models in their depiction of convective rainfall 6 , 7 . A globally important group of intense storms—mesoscale convective systems (MCSs) 8 —poses a particular challenge, because they organize dynamically on spatial scales that cannot be resolved by conventional climate models. Here, we use 35 years of satellite observations from the West African Sahel to reveal a persistent increase in the frequency of the most intense MCSs. Sahelian storms are some of the most powerful on the planet 9 , and rain gauges in this region have recorded a rise in ‘extreme’ 17 daily rainfall totals. We find that intense MCS frequency is only weakly related to the multidecadal recovery of Sahel annual rainfall, but is highly correlated with global land temperatures. Analysis of trends across Africa reveals that MCS intensification is limited to a narrow band south of the Sahara desert. During this period, wet-season Sahelian temperatures have not risen, ruling out the possibility that rainfall has intensified in response to locally warmer conditions. On the other hand, the meridional temperature gradient spanning the Sahel has increased in recent decades, consistent with anthropogenic forcing driving enhanced Saharan warming 10 . We argue that Saharan warming intensifies convection within Sahelian MCSs through increased wind shear and changes to the Saharan air layer. The meridional gradient is projected to strengthen throughout the twenty-first century, suggesting that the Sahel will experience particularly marked increases in extreme rain. The remarkably rapid intensification of Sahelian MCSs since the 1980s sheds new light on the response of organized tropical convection to global warming, and challenges conventional projections made by general circulation models.

During the last decades, climate and land use changes led to an increased prevalence of megafires in Mediterranean-type climate regions (MCRs). Here, we argue that current wildfire management policies in MCRs are destined to fail. Focused on fire suppression, these policies largely ignore ongoing climate warming and landscape-scale buildup of fuels. The result is a 'firefighting trap' that contributes to ongoing fuel accumulation precluding suppression under extreme fire weather, and resulting in more severe and larger fires. We believe that a 'business as usual' approach to wildfire in MCRs will not solve the fire problem, and recommend that policy and expenditures be rebalanced between suppression and mitigation of the negative impacts of fire. This requires a paradigm shift: policy effectiveness should not be primarily measured as a function of area burned (as it usually is), but rather as a function of avoided socio-ecological damage and loss.

The spread of misinformation is a global phenomenon, with implications for elections, state-sanctioned violence, and health outcomes. Yet, even though scholars have investigated the capacity of fact-checking to reduce belief in misinformation, little evidence exists on the global effectiveness of this approach. We describe fact-checking experiments conducted simultaneously in Argentina, Nigeria, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, in which we studied whether fact-checking can durably reduce belief in misinformation. In total, we evaluated 22 fact-checks, including two that were tested in all four countries. Fact-checking reduced belief in misinformation, with most effects still apparent more than 2 wk later. A meta-analytic procedure indicates that fact-checks reduced belief in misinformation by at least 0.59 points on a 5-point scale. Exposure to misinformation, however, only increased false beliefs by less than 0.07 points on the same scale. Across continents, fact-checks reduce belief in misinformation, often durably so.

How drought may change in the future are of great concern as global warming continues. In Part I of this study, we examine the uncertainties in estimating recent drought changes. Substantial uncertainties arise in the calculated Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) with Penman-Monteith potential evapotranspiraiton (PDSI_pm) due to different choices of forcing data (especially for precipitation, solar radiation and wind speed) and the calibration period. After detailed analyses, we recommend using the Global Precipitation Climatology Centre (GPCC) or the Global Precipitation Climatology (GPCP) datasets over other existing land precipitation products due to poor data coverage in the other datasets since the 1990s. We also recommend not to include the years after 1980 in the PDSI calibration period to avoid including the anthropogenic climate change as part of the natural variability used for calibration. Consistent with reported declines in pan evaporation, our calculated potential evapotranspiration (PET) shows negative or small trends since 1950 over the United States, China, and other regions, and no global PET trends from 1950 to 1990. Updated precipitation and streamflow data and the self-calibrated PDSI_pm all show consistent drying during 1950–2012 over most Africa, East and South Asia, southern Europe, eastern Australia, and many parts of the Americas. While these regional drying trends resulted primarily from precipitation changes related to multi-decadal oscillations in Pacific sea surface temperatures, rapid surface warming and associated increases in surface vapor pressure deficit since the 1980s have become an increasingly important cause of widespread drying over land.

Armed conflict within nations has had disastrous humanitarian consequences throughout much of the world. Here we undertake the first comprehensive examination of the potential impact of global climate change on armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. We find strong historical linkages between civil war and temperature in Africa, with warmer years leading to significant increases in the likelihood of war. When combined with climate model projections of future temperature trends, this historical response to temperature suggests a roughly 54% increase in armed conflict incidence by 2030, or an additional 393,000 battle deaths if future wars are as deadly as recent wars. Our results suggest an urgent need to reform African governments' and foreign aid donors' policies to deal with rising temperatures.

Three consecutive dry winters (2015–2017) in southwestern South Africa (SSA) resulted in the Cape Town “Day Zero” drought in early 2018. The contribution of anthropogenic global warming to this prolonged rainfall deficit has previously been evaluated through observations and climate models. However, model adequacy and insufficient horizontal resolution make it difficult to precisely quantify the changing likelihood of extreme droughts, given the small regional scale. Here, we use a high-resolution large ensemble to estimate the contribution of anthropogenic climate change to the probability of occurrence of multiyear SSA rainfall deficits in past and future decades. We find that anthropogenic climate change increased the likelihood of the 2015–2017 rainfall deficit by a factor of five to six. The probability of such an event will increase from 0.7 to 25% by the year 2100 under an intermediate-emission scenario (Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2-4.5 [SSP2-4.5]) and to 80% under a high-emission scenario (SSP5-8.5). These results highlight the strong sensitivity of the drought risk in SSA to future anthropogenic emissions.

Heatwaves have become more frequent and intense due to anthropogenic global warming and have serious and potentially life-threatening impacts on human health, particularly for people over 65 years old. While a range of studies examine heatwave exposures, few cover the whole globe and very few cover key areas in Africa, South America, and East Asia. By using global gridded climate reanalysis, population, and demographic data, this work analyses trends in change in exposure of vulnerable populations to heatwaves, providing global and per-country aggregate statistics. The difference between the global mean of heatwave indexes and the mean weighted by vulnerable population found that these populations are experiencing up to five times the number of heatwave days relative to the global average. The total exposures, measured in person-days of heatwave, highlight the combined effect of increased heatwaves and aging populations. In China and India, heatwave exposure increased by an average of 508 million person-days per year in the last decade. Mapping of changes per country highlighted significant exposure increases, particularly in the Middle East and in South East Asia. Major disparities were found between the heatwave exposures, country income group, and country health system capacity, thus highlighting the significant inequalities in global warming impacts and response capacities with respect to health across countries. It is therefore of prime importance that health development and response are coordinated with climate change mitigation and adaptation work.

In the existing 276 international river basins, the increase in water variability projected by most climate change scenarios may present serious challenges to riparian states. This research maps the institutional resilience to water variability in transboundary basins and combines it with both historic and projected variability regimes, with the objective of identifying areas at potential risk of future hydropolitical tension. To do so, it combs existing international treaties for sources of institutional resilience and considers the coefficient of variation of runoff as a measure of past and future water variability. The study finds significant gaps in both the number of people and area covered by institutional stipulations to deal with variability in South America and Asia. At present, high potential risk for hydropolitical tensions associated with water variability is identified in 24 transboundary basins and seems to be concentrated mainly in northern and sub-Saharan Africa. By 2050, areas at greatest potential risk are more spatially dispersed and can be found in 61 international basins, and some of the potentially large impacts of climate change are projected to occur away from those areas currently under scrutiny. Understanding when and where to target capacity-building in transboundary river basins for greater resilience to change is critical. This study represents a step toward facilitating these efforts and informing further qualitative and quantitative research into the relationship between climate change, hydrological variability regimes, and institutional capacity for accommodating variability.