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result(s) for
"Government size"
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Tax decentralization and local government size
This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments. While many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it, they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy. The paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments (taxseparation), rather than on tax-base sharing, would restrain local public expenditures. Using an unbalanced panel of OECD countries, the key finding is that only property taxes—mostly based on a \"tax-separation\" scheme—seem to favor smaller local governments. Thus, while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments, it does not appear sufficient, as tax-separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required.
Journal Article
New insights into the growth-maximizing size of government: evidence and implications for Turkey
This paper provides new insights into the growth-maximizing size of government in Turkey. Unlike previous studies that traditionally use the share of government spending in GDP as a proxy variable of government size, in this paper we consider a fairly large number of proxy variables ranging from the share of tax revenues in GDP to the share of public investment in total investment. After reviewing the potential non-linear relationship between government size and growth
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we estimate various thresholds for government size that maximize growth. To this end, we use the threshold autoregressive model proposed by Hansen (1996: 413-430; 2000: 575-603)) and apply it to Turkey’s annual time-series data for the period from 1974 to 2019. Overall, we arrive at the following main result: Government size is non-linearly related to growth, confirming the existence of a growth-maximizing threshold for any measure of government size, beyond which growth tends to slow down as government size continues to increase. More precisely, the results show that the estimated thresholds for government size lie within the range of 4.28–15.19%, depending on the definition or proxy variable representing government size.
Journal Article
The rule of many
As twins Ava and Mira have inspired a rebellion against the one-child policy and Governor Roth's strict enforcement of the rule, the sisters and two other allies head back to Dallas despite the dangers.
Book
Fiscal Discipline, Size of Government and Economic Growth in A Small Macro-Model of The Nigerian Economy
This study examines the interplay between fiscal discipline, government size, and economic growth within a small macroeconomic model of Nigeria. It addresses the rising fiscal deficits and escalating public debt prevalent in SubSaharan Africa, driven by high-interest borrowing, limited revenue collection, and dependence on commodity exports. Using Nigeria as a case study, the research explores how fiscal discipline impacts government size, output growth, and unemployment through simulation scenarios. The study employs an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDE) model and simulations to analyze the responses of key macroeconomic variables to changes in fiscal discipline, including fiscal deficit, government debt, and public expenditure stimuli. Findings reveal that fiscal indiscipline, measured as deficits exceeding 5% of GDP, increases government size, reduces output growth, and exacerbates unemployment. Simulation results show a 5% fiscal deficit stimulus raises government size by 0.5%-2%, decreases output growth by 4.5%-7.5%, and elevates unemployment by 0.8%-5.5%. Furthermore, excessive government debt and spending lead to unsustainable fiscal conditions, underscoring the need for robust fiscal rules and efficient public finance management. This research contributes to understanding fiscal dynamics in resource-dependent economies, offering actionable insights for policymakers aiming to balance growth objectives with fiscal prudence. It highlights the critical role of fiscal discipline in achieving macroeconomic stability and sustainable development, serving as a reference for policy frameworks in Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Journal Article
Internet and Politics
We empirically study the effects of broadband internet diffusion on local election outcomes and on local government policies using rich data from the U.K. Our analysis shows that the internet has displaced other media with greater news content (i.e. radio and newspapers), thereby decreasing voter turnout, most notably among less-educated and younger individuals. In turn, we find suggestive evidence that local government expenditures and taxes are lower in areas with greater broadband diffusion, particularly expenditures targeted at less-educated voters. Our findings are consistent with the idea that voters’ information plays a key role in determining electoral participation, government policies, and government size.
Journal Article
Necessity or opportunity? Government size, tax policy, corruption, and implications for entrepreneurship
Government size, corruption, and tax policy can influence allocation towards necessity or opportunity-driven entrepreneurship. Using a comparative multi-source sample across 52 countries during 2005–2015, we apply a mixed-process estimation of the simultaneously unrelated system of equations and unpack these heterogeneous and complex effects. Interestingly, our results show that the influence of tax policy and corruption on necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship depends on government size. Our results hold for numerous robustness analyses.Plain English summaryInstitutions matter for the choice of opportunity and necessity-driven entrepreneurship. Government size, the level of corruption, and tax policy directly affect entrepreneurs’ motivation and incentives. We study 52 countries during 2005–2015 to find out to what extent tax rate, corruption, and a range of government expenditure change the allocation of necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship. Our main implications are for (1) Research: Formal and informal institutions need to be considered when studying entrepreneurship allocation, particularly in an emerging and developing country context. Results suggest that the impact of the same institutional settings and informal institutions such as corruption on necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship is not uniform in size and scope and have different magnitude. The effect of government expenditure on necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship is not ubiquitous. (2) Management: The broader institutional context affects allocation of entrepreneurship, and potential entrepreneurs can consider how corruption in particular can affect them. (3) Policy: Policymakerscan measure the extent to which opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship are likely to change, when they make changes to tax policy, resources for public spending, and take anti-corruption measures.
Journal Article
Ideology and the size of US state government
This paper theorizes that the impact of ideology on the size of US state governments increases with state income. This idea is tested using state-level ideology data derived from the voting behavior of state congressional representatives. Empirically the interaction of ideology and mean income is a key determinant of state government size. At 1960s levels of income the impact of ideology is negligible. At 1997 levels of income a one standard-deviation move towards the left of the ideology spectrum increases state government size by about half a standard deviation. Estimated income elasticities differentiated by state and time are found to be increasing with ideology and diminishing with income, as predicted by the theory.
Journal Article
Government Size and Trust
This paper uses individual level data from the Japanese General Social Survey to examine how government size influences generalized trust. After controlling for the endogeneity of government size using instrumental variables, I found: (1) using all samples, government size is not associated with generalized trust, and (2) after splitting the sample into workers and non-workers, government size does not influence generalized trust for non-workers, whereas it significantly reduces generalized trust for workers. This suggests that workers, through their work experience, might have to face greater bureaucratic red tape coming from \"larger government,\" leading to negative externality effects on relationships of trust in the labor market.
Journal Article