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\"[Fanis] demonstrates an impressive ability to travel nimbly between abstract theoretical concepts and a messy reality. In each one of the case study chapters, her analysis is rich, thoughtful, and imaginative.\"-Ido Oren, University of Florida Combining insights from cultural studies, gender studies, and social history, Maria Fanis shows the critical importance of national identity in decisions about war and peace. She challenges conventional approaches by demonstrating that domestic ethical codes influence perceptions of threat from abroad. With an in-depth study of U.S.-British relations in the first half of the nineteenth century, and with an application to the recent War in Iraq, she ties changes in U.S. and British national interest to shifts in these nations' domestic codes of morality. Fanis's findings have important implications for contemporary international relations theory. Apart from its relevance to current events, her work also makes a contribution to the literatures on foreign policy-specifically American and British foreign policies-and the causes of war.

This article aims to show that from the end of the eighteenth century, international order began to be defined in terms of ground rules relating to non-intervention and intervention, with the former being prioritised over the latter. After the Napoleonic wars, within continental Europe there was an attempt to consolidate an intervention ground rule in favour of dynastic legitimacy over the right of self-determination. By contrast, the British and Americans sought to ensure that this ground rule was not extended to the Americas where the ground rule of non-intervention was prioritised. During the nineteenth century, it was the Anglo-American position which came to prevail. Over the same period international order was increasingly bifurcated with the non-intervention ground rule prevailing in the metropolitan core and with the intervention ground rules prevailing in the periphery. This article, however, only focuses on the metropolitan core and draws on two case studies to examine the non-intervention ground rule in very different circumstances. The first examines the British response to the American Civil War in the 1860s during an era of stability in the international order. The second explores the British Response to the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s when the international order was very unstable and giving way to a very different international order.

This article uses events in Brazil at the close of the nineteenth century as a case study to investigate how nations on the 'periphery' contested the efforts of the great powers to control their behaviour. The article concentrates on Brazil's diplomatic relations with Britain and the United States. It examines the failure of the foreign office to negotiate a commercial treaty to match the reciprocity arrangement concluded between Brazil and the United States in 1891. The set-back is seen as a reflection of the limits of Britain's diplomatic influence and ability to halt the rising economic influence of the United States, but it also illustrates Brazil's success in pursuing an independent foreign economic policy. This is further illustrated by the Brazilian Naval Revolt (1893–4) during which the representatives of the foreign powers have been usually depicted as exercising a superior role in directing events. This article uses evidence from Brazilian diplomatic archives to argue that the most significant factor in determining the outcome of the revolt was the combination of firmness and skilful diplomacy shown by the Brazilian government of Floriano Peixoto rather than the activities of the foreign powers, including Britain and the United States.