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"Greco-Roman antiquity"
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Ethics and Intuitions
2005
For millennia, philosophers have speculated about the origins of ethics. Recent research in evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences has shed light on that question. But this research also has normative significance. A standard way of arguing against a normative ethical theory is to show that in some circumstances the theory leads to judgments that are contrary to our common moral intuitions. If, however, these moral intuitions are the biological residue of our evolutionary history, it is not clear why we should regard them as having any normative force. Research in the neurosciences should therefore lead us to reconsider the role of intuitions in normative ethics.
Journal Article
THE GORGONS' LAMENT: AULETICS, POETICS, AND CHORALITY IN PINDAR'S \PYTHIAN 12\
by
Steiner, Deborah
in
Greco-Roman antiquity
,
Historical studies (History of philosophy. History of ideas)
,
Innovations
2013
This article offers a fresh reading of Pindar's Pythian 12, an ode composed for a victorious aulete, which demonstrates its engagement in current musicological debates concerning innovations in instrumentation, relations between the musical and vocal elements in choreia, and the status of the pipes. In ways that intersect with these issues, Pindar anticipates a motif that resurfaces in later Attic drama and other texts concerning the origins of choral lyric and that identifies women's lament as the prototypical form of song.
Journal Article
Ancient Philosophy and the Doxographical Tradition
by
Mejer, Jørgen
in
ancient philosophy and the doxographical tradition
,
Democritean doxography, deserving scrutiny
,
Diels' doxographical tradition, dominating in early Greek philosophy
2012
This chapter contains sections titled:
Biography
Bibliography
Book Chapter
“Virtue Makes the Goal Right”: Virtue and Phronesis in Aristotle’s Ethics
2011
Aristotle repeatedly claims that character-virtue \"makes the goal right\", while phronesis is responsible for working out how to achieve the goal. Many argue that these claims are misleading: it must be intellect that tells us what ends to pursue. I argue that Aristotle means just what he seems to say: despite putative textual evidence to the contrary, virtue is (a) a wholly non-intellectual state, and (b) responsible for literally supplying the contents of our goals. Furthermore, there are no good textual or philosophical reasons to reject this straightforward interpretation. Contrary to widespread opinion, Aristotle does not characterize phronesis as supplying ends. Instead, its ethical import lies wholly in its ability to \"determine the mean\". Moreover, because character involves non-rational cognition of the end as good, Aristotle can restrict practical intellect to deliberation without abandoning his anti-Humean view that we desire our ends because we find them good.
Journal Article
Rhetoric and Public Reasoning: An Aristotelian Understanding of Political Deliberation
2006
This essay asks why Aristotle, certainly no friend to unlimited democracy, seems so much more comfortable with unconstrained rhetoric in political deliberation than current defenders of deliberative democracy. It answers this question by reconstructing and defending a distinctly Aristotelian understanding of political deliberation, one that can be pieced together out of a series of separate arguments made in the Rhetoric, the Politics, and the Nicomachean Ethics.
Journal Article
Aristotle on Natural Slavery
2008
Aristotle's claim that natural slaves do not possess autonomous rationality (Pol. 1.5, 1254b20-23) cannot plausibly be interpreted in an unrestricted sense, since this would conflict with what Aristotle knew about non-Greek societies. Aristotle's argument requires only a lack of autonomous practical rationality. An impairment of the capacity for integrated practical deliberation, resulting from an environmentally induced excess or deficiency in thumos (Pol. 7.7, 1327b18-31), would be sufficient to make natural slaves incapable of eudaimonia without being obtrusively implausible relative to what Aristotle is likely to have believed about non-Greeks. Since Aristotle seems to have believed that the existence of people who can be enslaved without injustice is a hypothetical necessity, if those capable oí eudaimonia are to achieve it, the existence of natural slaves has implications for our understanding of Aristotle's natural teleology.
Journal Article
The Origin and Aim of Posterior Analytics II.19
2012
Abstract
In Posterior Analytics II.19 Aristotle raises and answers the question, how do first principles become known? The usual view is that the question asks about the process or method by which we learn principles and that his answer is induction. I argue that the question asks about the original prior knowledge from which principles become known and that his answer is perception. Hence the aim of II.19 is not to explain how we get all the way to principles but to defend the claim that our knowledge of them originates in perception. Aristotle explains how we learn principles earlier in book II, in his account of definitional inquiry. In II.19 he explains how we reach by induction the preliminary accounts necessary for such inquiries.
Journal Article
NON SUBRIPIENDI CAUSA SED PALAM MUTUANDI: INTERTEXTUALITY AND LITERARY DEVIANCY BETWEEN LAW, RHETORIC, AND LITERATURE IN ROMAN IMPERIAL CULTURE
by
Peirano, Irene
in
Acknowledgments
,
Greco-Roman antiquity
,
Historical studies (History of philosophy. History of ideas)
2013
This article explores the use of imagery drawn from the legal sphere to describe intertextual relations in Roman culture, drawing attention to the interconnected nature of contemporary debates on ownership and private property in law and literary criticism. Taking as my starting point a remark by Seneca the Elder on Ovid’s “borrowing” of Virgil’s text ( Suas . 3.3), I show how the distinction often invoked between legitimate imitation and literary theft is explained by a deep-seated and multi-faceted analogy between literary and legal judgment. Moreover, I show how the use of legal metaphors derives special meaning from the context of Seneca’s work, in which readers are asked to judge both the legal and the literary merits of the cases presented.
Journal Article
The Origins of the Statesman—Demagogue Distinction in and after Ancient Athens
2012
This article argues against the assumption that Athenian political practice involved an evaluative distinction between terms signifying the good “statesman” and the bad “demagogue.” Terms now translated “demagogue” are used by Aristophanes, Thucydides, and other Athenian orators and historians in a neutral, or even positive, sense. Instead, the evaluative distinction is built by Plutarch out of Platonic analysis, Aristotelian vocabulary, and the Thucydidean classification of Athenian politicians. The article concludes with reflections on the context of Moses Finley’s classic analysis of Athenian demagogues, and on the implications of the argument for political practice and thinking today.
Journal Article
RATIONALITY, EROS, AND DAEMONIC INFLUENCE IN THE PLATONIC \THEAGES\ AND THE ACADEMY OF POLEMO AND CRATES
by
Lampe, Kurt
in
Education
,
Greco-Roman antiquity
,
Historical studies (History of philosophy. History of ideas)
2013
The educational efficacy ascribed by the Theages to erotic intimacy and daemonic influence has troubled scholars, who generally consider it decadent, superstitious, and irrational. Similar concerns arise concerning the Academy of Polemo and Crates, which is the Theages' probable source. I argue that the dialogue signals how cooperative rational inquiry is compatible with erotics and daemonology through allusions to the Symposium and Theaetetus. Moreover, the most \"outrageous\" passage—the story of Aristides—is signposted as an ironic puzzle, not a straightforward representation of Socratic philosophizing. The way is thus cleared to revise our understanding of rationality in this dialogue and this period of the Academy.
Journal Article