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We present results from a randomized evaluation of a teacher performance pay program implemented across a large representative sample of government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. At the end of 2 years of the program, students in incentive schools performed significantly better than those in control schools by 0.27 and 0.17 standard deviations in math and language tests, respectively. We find no evidence of any adverse consequences of the program. The program was highly cost effective, and incentive schools performed significantly better than other randomly chosen schools that received additional schooling inputs of a similar value.

Financial incentives have shown strong positive short-run effects for problematic health behaviors that likely stem from time inconsistency. However, the effects often disappear once incentive programs end. This paper analyzes the results of a large-scale workplace field experiment to examine whether self-funded commitment contracts can improve the long-run effects of an incentive program. A four-week incentive program targeting use of the company gym generated only small lasting effects on behavior. Those that also offered a commitment contract at the end of the program, however, showed demand for commitment and significant long-run changes, detectable even several years after the incentive ended.

This article is intended to supplement rather than replace earlier reviews of research on survey incentives, especially those by Singer (2002); Singer and Kulka (2002); and Cantor, O'Hare, and O'Connor (2008). It is based on a systematic review of articles appearing since 2002 in major journals, supplemented by searches of the Proceedings of the American Statistical Association's Section on Survey Methodology for unpublished papers. The article begins by drawing on responses to open-ended questions about why people are willing to participate in a hypothetical survey. It then lays out the theoretical justification for using monetary incentives and the conditions under which they are hypothesized to be particularly effective. Finally, it summarizes research on how incentives affect response rates in cross-sectional and longitudinal studies and, to the extent information is available, how they affect response quality, nonresponse error, and cost-effectiveness. A special section on incentives in Web surveys is included.

As global policy makers and school leaders look for ways to improve student performance, financial incentives programs for teachers have become increasingly popular. This article describes a school-based randomized trial in over 200 New York City public schools designed to better understand the impact of teacher incentives. I find no evidence that teacher incentives increase student performance, attendance, or graduation, nor do I find evidence that these incentives change student or teacher behavior. If anything, teacher incentives may decrease student achievement, especially in larger schools. The article concludes with a speculative discussion of theories to explain these stark results.

The literature on the private provision of public goods suggests an inverse relationship between incentives to contribute and group size. We find, however, that after an exogenous reduction of group size at Chinese Wikipedia, the nonblocked contributors decrease their contributions by 42.8 percent on average. We attribute the cause to social effects: contributors receive social benefits that increase with both the amount of their contributions and group size, and the shrinking group size weakens these social benefits. Consistent with our explanation, we find that the more contributors value social benefits, the more they reduce their contributions after the block. (JEL H41, L17, L82)

We study how agents respond to performance incentives according to key personality traits (conscientiousness and neuroticism) through a field experiment offering financial incentives for improving maternal and neonatal health outcomes to rural Indian doctors. More conscientious providers performed better--but improved less--under performance incentives. The effect of the performance incentives was also smaller for providers with higher levels of neuroticism. Our results contribute to a growing body of empirical research on heterogeneous responses to incentives and have implications for worker selection.

This study draws on three different, yet complementary, theories of motivation, which we combine in an interactive manner, to explain the mechanisms that underlie the exchange between knowledge providers and recipients and ultimately impact performance. More specifically, we use incentive, goal-setting-social cognitive, and social motivation theories to examine knowledge sharing within dyads and its influence on individual performance. One hundred and twenty participants functioning as interdependent manager dyads completed a strategic decision-making simulation. Hierarchical regression and random coefficient modeling techniques were used to test hypothesized relationships. Results demonstrated that the effect of group-oriented incentive systems on the knowledge provider was enhanced when more positive norms for knowledge sharing existed among dyad members. The recipient's self-efficacy had a stronger relationship with performance goals when the recipient trusted the provider. Finally, self-set goals and knowledge sharing had both direct and interactive effects on individual performance. We argue that these findings constitute a useful advance in middle-range motivation (Landy and Becker 1987, Pinder 1984) theory pertaining to knowledge sharing and utilization.

This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentive schemes using data from a social experiment that randomized 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students into three treatment groups and a control group. Treatment 1 provides individual incentives for performance on curriculum-based mathematics tests to students only, treatment 2 to teachers only, and treatment 3 gives both individual and group incentives to students, teachers, and school administrators. Program impact estimates reveal the largest average effects for treatment 3, smaller impacts for treatment 1, and no impact for treatment 2.

This paper investigates how expected and actual questionnaire length affects cooperation rates and a variety of indicators of data quality in web surveys. We hypothesized that the expected length of a web-based questionnaire is negatively related to the initial willingness to participate. Moreover, the serial position of questions was predicted to influence four indicators of data quality. We hypothesized that questions asked later in a web-based questionnaire will, compared to those asked earlier, be associated with (a) shorter response times, (b) higher item-nonresponse rates, (c) shorter answers to open-ended questions, and (d) less variability to items arranged in grids. To test these assumptions, we manipulated the stated length (10, 20, and 30 minutes) and the position of questions in an online questionnaire consisting of randomly ordered blocks of thematically related questions. As expected, the longer the stated length, the fewer respondents started and completed the questionnaire. In addition, answers to questions positioned later in the questionnaire were faster, shorter, and more uniform than answers to questions positioned near the beginning.

Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations, reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent. We study sabotage in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads. Additionally, we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name \"sabotage.\" Communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output. If sabotage is not possible, the principals choose tournament incentives more often. This paper was accepted by Peter Wakker, decision analysis.