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The rising tensions in disputed waters in Southeast Asia have caused policymakers to diverge their maritime diplomatic strategy to include maritime constabulary forces. The use of coastguards and other non-military vessels are an emerging trend in the maritime diplomatic strategy of Southeast Asian states, including in the high-profile case of the North Natuna Seas, to which scholars pay little attention. This article contends that (1) contemporary maritime diplomacy in Southeast Asia positions the utilization of maritime constabulary forces (coastguards, maritime law enforcement agencies) as its primary maritime diplomatic strategy; (2) Vietnam’s coercive turn in its maritime disputed areas was a deliberate attempt to balance a coercive-cooperative stance against Indonesia in the North Natuna Seas, following its traditional coercive maritime diplomatic stance against China, and; (3) Vietnam’s utilization of maritime constabulary forces as a measure to solidify its sovereign claims coincided with the benefits of tactical military flexibility and non-escalatory means to achieve its aims in the Natuna Seas. This empirical explanatory research delves into the development of Vietnam’s coastguards and maritime law enforcement agencies by interpreting the secondary data from the Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative between 2021–2022 on cases relating to suspicious maneuvers conducted by the Vietnamese Fisheries Resource Surveillance vessels safeguarding the conduct of Vietnamese IUUF.

After some two decades of growing partnership between Seoul and Tehran, South Korea’s bilateral relationship with Iran reached a bottom of absolute gloom under the leadership of Moon Jae-in. Most of his presidency coincided with the administration of Donald Trump who followed a relatively contrasting approach toward the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues. Washington’s Pyongyang and Tehran policies were naturally bound to create opportunities as well as troubles for the Moon-led Korean government’s dealing with North Korea and Iran. Arguing from a perspective of strategic choice, this study asserts that Moon almost forfeited the ROK’s commercial interests in Iran for the sake of advancing his North Korean agenda. As a corollary, the South Korean–Iranian ties sank to an all-time low, culminating in unprecedented diplomatic tensions between the two countries over the issue of Iran’s oil incomes frozen in Seoul. The Mideast country’s subsequent resort to gunboat diplomacy by seizing a Korean oil tanker in the Persian Gulf did also little to break the gridlock over the dilemma of blocked assets because any satisfactory and lasting solution regarding this intractable trouble largely hinged on resolving the fate of Iran’s nuclear deal between Tehran and Washington.

This article examines the articulation among the categories of territorial expansion, civilizational discourse and the geopolitical use of naval power in Spanish America in the second half of the nineteenth century. Studying the Chilean experience allows us to illuminate our understanding of imperialist dynamics and how these were readapted in other spaces, but to fulfill similar purposes. In general, the historiography on imperialism and “informal empire” has assumed a center-periphery logic in its analyses of geopolitical relations between the powers and the rest of the territories, but the adoption of colonial logics in postcolonial countries has not been studied. This phenomenon is explored through the analysis of territorial expansion processes, legitimizing strategies such as the use of civilizing discourse by peripheral nations and the assimilation of practices such as “gunboat diplomacy” in countries that traditionally do not figure as first-order powers. Este articulo examina la articulación entre las categorías de expansión territorial, discurso civilizatorio y el uso geopolítico del poder naval en Hispanoamérica en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX. Estudiar la experiencia chilena permite iluminar nuestra comprensión de las dinámicas imperialistas y como estas fueron readaptadas en otros espacios, pero para cumplir propósitos similares. En general, la historiografía sobre el imperialismo y el imperio informal han asumido una lógica de centro-periferia en sus exámenes de las relaciones geopolíticas entre las potencias y el resto de los territorios, pero no se han estudiado las adopciones de lógicas coloniales en los países poscoloniales. Este fenómeno es estudiado a través del análisis de procesos de expansión territorial, estrategias legitimadoras como el uso del discurso civilizatorio por naciones periféricas y la asimilación de prácticas como la de la “diplomacia de las cañoneras” en países que tradicionalmente no figuran como potencias de primer orden

The Freedom of Navigation Program is the U.S. foreign diplomacy for challenging other nations' excessive maritime claim defined by Washington since late 1970s or, more precisely, early 1980s. This policy is basically directed by the executive directives granted by the President of the United States. All the tasks of this program are jointly conducted by the State Department, Department of Defense and Department of Transportation and later by the Department of Homeland Security after the Coast Guard was shifted to the DHS after 911. Nonetheless, the whole program known as the FONOP, Freedom of Navigation Operations, is directed and oversighted by the U.S. National Security Advisor. The author would like to examine the true intention and influences of the FONOP from all the policy directives and statements ever expressed by the U.S. government in various forms. All the annual reports regarding the actual practices of this FONOP policy will also be reviewed in order to understand the realities through substantial policy implementations. The basic research methodology of this paper is the document survey. By comparing and interpreting various U.S. government documents, the author will try to identify the true intention of this policy and the categories of excessive maritime claims and their corresponding claimants, which are the targeted nations by the U.S. FONOP. Whether the State Department has ever well-coordinated with the United States armed forces delivered by the Pentagon or Coast Guard is another aspect the author of this research paper would like to grasp in this paper. Whether the FONOP may link with events ever happened in various periods of time as a part of integrated diplomacy towards specific nation is another research interest that the author would like to discuss. The author will also focus on the gap between the open statements that have been released by the Pentagon and the actual executive directives granted by the President of the United States, and particularly, whether the diplomacy that has been associated with the military operations could be appropriate or not. There are many general misperceptions regarding the FONOP. Especially, the widely agreed international law principle of the freedom of high sea that contains the concept of freedom of navigation and other legitimate privileges is not consistent with the ideas shown by the US FONOP as it always openly stated. Washington executed the FONOP according to its own interpretation of the international law but not under any common understanding ever achieved in the international society. That is, the FONOP is basically related to the U.S. national interest, not the international justice at all. In recent years, the South China Sea is the focus for the United States to exercise its FONOP. The author would like examine whether any constructive results have been created by the U.S. FONOP that enhance the international welfares as many people still misperceived these so far. The author expects all the readers of this research paper will eventually have a more comprehensive perception of the US FONOP policy as a statecraft exercised by the U.S. government, never an effort to secure the regional stability or the collective interest of any party in the region.

How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible. Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.

In the early 20th Century, the Taft administration and the Qing Empire developed a working relationship that went beyond transactional \"Dollar Diplomacy\" to include military engagement. Military and official visits, arms contracts, and opportunities for military education signaled a shift away from both President Theodore Roosevelt's pro-Japanese policies and the Qing Empire's isolation from the international order. The massacre of over three hundred Chinese at Torreon, Mexico in May 1911 inadvertently assisted this rapprochement, which presented the Qing Dynasty with an opportunity to demonstrate power and influence when it dispatched the cruiser Hai Qi to the Caribbean. The swift response to the massacre shows that Qing diplomats were capable of using an integrated and mutually reinforcing set of legal, diplomatic, and military tools to attain their political objectives. The incident also demonstrates that the Taft administration was willing to allow a foreign military vessel to coerce Mexico for monetary gain in a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Qing Empire's very effective use of gunboat diplomacy revealed a highly competent Chinese government, as well as how u.s. officials arranged a sophisticated rapprochement with Imperial China in the 1909-1912 period.

This article aims to re-evaluate the visit of the battleship USS Missouri to Turkey on 5-6 April 1946, to ascertain whether or not it might be considered an early attempt on the part of the United States to challenge the Soviet Union. Greater historical clarity than previously possible has been achieved through the use of hitherto unreleased documents from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic. Moreover, this article aims to achieve a more balanced and comprehensive analysis by integrating the systemic factors with the actions of crucial actors at the individual level based on new archival evidence. By doing this, the main argument emerges whereby the United States displayed its power against the Soviets via the visit of the USS Missouri only in hindsight; while the decision to send home the exhumed body of the late Turkish ambassador Mehmet Münir Ertegün was the action of an individual. However, due to the advent of the Cold War, the dynamics shaping Turkey's search for security and ultimately the containment policy of the United States, has loaded the event with more meaning than was originally intended, turning a 'diplomatic courtesy' into 'gunboat diplomacy'.

The book description for \"Deterrence and Defense\" is currently unavailable.

In the international arena, vulture investors' acquire the distressed or defaulted debt of sovereign issuers and try to make a profit on that investment by suing the debtor to demand that it pay as originally promised. As the derogatory name attached to them shows, vultures have been widely disparaged as being greedy, harming poor nations and peoples, treating other bondholders unfairly, interfering with orderly sovereign debt restructurings, afflicting the sovereign debt market, and harming the society of the debtor nation, as well as the nation that hosts the sovereign debt market. This article describes the basic operation of vulture funds and the legal environment in which sovereign lending and borrowing proceed. It articulates the case against vulture investors, but proceeds to rebut each of the criticisms. More specifically, this article argues that, far from harming other actors, the activity of vulture investors actually helps other bondholders and makes the sovereign debt market function better than it otherwise would.

Is China currently acting as a de facto fundraiser for the US? A real challenge is always to optimize the (moral, political and financial) costs in meeting the national strategic objectives. In this case, it would be a resolute Beijing’s turn towards green technology, coupled with the firm buildup of the Asian multilateralism. Without a grand rapprochement to the champions of multilateralism in Asia, which are Indonesia, India and Japan, there is no environment for China to seriously evolve and emerge as a formidable, lasting and trusted global leader. Consequently, what China needs in Asia is not a naval race of 1908, but the Helsinki process of 1975.