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This paper examines the impact of hedge fund activism on corporate tax avoidance. We find that relative to matched control firms, businesses targeted by hedge fund activists exhibit lower tax avoidance levels prior to hedge fund intervention, but experience increases in tax avoidance after the intervention. Moreover, findings suggest that the increase in tax avoidance is greater when activists have a successful track record of implementing tax changes and possess tax interest or knowledge as indicated by their Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 13D filings. We also find that these greater tax savings do not appear to result from an increased use of high-risk and potentially illegal tax strategies, such as sheltering. Taken together, the results suggest that shareholder monitoring of firms, in the form of hedge fund activism, improves tax efficiency.

We identify flight-to-safety (FTS) days for twenty-three countries using only stock and bond returns and a model averaging approach. FTS days comprise less than 2% of the sample and are associated with a 2.7% average bond-equity return differential and significant flows out of equity funds and into government bond and money market funds. FTS represents flights to both quality and liquidity in international equity markets, but mainly a flight to quality in the U. S. corporate bond market. Emerging markets, endowment funds, and hedge funds perform poorly during FTS, whereas hedge funds appear to vary their systematic exposures prior to an FTS.

Financial economics and corporate governance have long focused on the agency problems between corporate managers and shareholders that result from the dispersion of ownership in large publicly traded corporations. In this paper, we focus on how the rise of institutional investors over the past several decades has transformed the corporate landscape and, in turn, the governance problems of the modern corporation. The rise of institutional investors has led to increased concentration of equity ownership, with most public corporations now having a substantial proportion of their shares held by a small number of institutional investors. At the same time, these institutions are controlled by investment managers, which have their own agency problems vis-à-vis their own beneficial investors. We develop an analytical framework for understanding the agency problems of institutional investors, and apply it to examine the agency problems and behavior of several key types of investment managers, including those that manage mutual funds—both index funds and actively managed funds—and activist hedge funds. We show that index funds have especially poor incentives to engage in stewardship activities that could improve governance and increase value. Activist hedge funds have substantially better incentives than managers of index funds or active mutual funds. While their activities may partially compensate, we show that they do not provide a complete solution for the agency problems of other institutional investors.

We examine the impact of hedge fund activism (HFA) on the investment efficiency of target firms. We find that target firms’ investment efficiency improves after the active involvement of hedge funds. This improvement is mainly evident for HFA campaigns with investment strategy-related reforms as one of the main stated objectives. Among investment strategy-related HFA campaigns, the changes in investment efficiency are more pronounced when hedge funds obtain board representation or privately settle with target firms. HFA improves the investment efficiency of target firms by mitigating overinvestment rather than underinvestment problems. Additional tests reveal that target firms with no resistance to HFA and higher free cash flow accommodate this improvement in investment efficiency following HFA. Overall, our findings highlight the role of HFA as a governance mechanism in improving investment efficiency and influencing managers to reduce overinvestment.

Using a large hand-collected data set from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the United States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two-thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational. The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism. Our analysis provides important new evidence on the mechanisms and effects of informed shareholder monitoring.

Classifying mandatory 13F stockholding filings by manager type reveals that hedge fund strategies are mostly contrarian, and mutual fund strategies are largely trend following. The only institutional performers—the two thirds of hedge fund managers that are contrarian—earn alpha of 2.4% per year. Contrarian hedge fund managers tend to trade profitably with all other manager types, especially when purchasing stocks from momentum-oriented hedge and mutual fund managers. Superior contrarian hedge fund performance exhibits persistence and stems from stock-picking ability rather than liquidity provision. Aggregate short sales further support these conclusions about the style and skill of various fund manager types. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance .

We show that, motivated by sensation seeking, hedge fund managers who own powerful sports cars take on more investment risk but do not deliver higher returns, resulting in lower Sharpe ratios, information ratios, and alphas. Moreover, sensation-seeking managers trade more frequently, actively, and unconventionally, and prefer lottery-like stocks. We show further that some investors are themselves susceptible to sensation seeking and that sensation-seeking investors fuel the demand for sensation-seeking managers. While investors perceive sensation seekers to be less competent, they do not fully appreciate the superior investment skills of sensation-avoiding fund managers.

Examining the effect of hedge fund activism on gender diversity, we find that the number of female directors decreases after a firm is targeted by hedge fund activism. Using the employment history data from BoardEx, we find that activist hedge funds are more likely to appoint people with finance backgrounds to the boards of target firms. And the newly appointed finance background directors are almost all male because of the lack of diversity in the finance industry. The lack of gender diversity of the hedge funds’ networks and the lack of qualified female directors in the local area also help explain the impact of hedge fund activism on gender diversity on the board.

This paper examines determinants and consequences of hedge fund activism, focusing on activist directors, i.e., directors appointed in response to activist demands. Using a sample of 3,259 activism events from 2004 to 2016, we identify 1,623 activist directors. Compared to other newly appointed directors, these activist directors tend to be younger, more likely to have finance and accounting skills, and less likely to be female. We find that the likelihood of acquiring board representation is associated with weaker market performance or lower payout ratios. Following the appointment of an activist director, we find evidence of increased divestiture, decreased acquisition activity, higher CEO turnover, increased leverage, higher payouts, and reduced investment. Our analysis of data on activists’ stated demands also shows that activist directors are effective in helping activists achieve their goals, consistent with the notion that board representation is an important mechanism for activists to bring about desired changes. Finally, we find positive abnormal returns of 1% when an activist director is appointed and a 3.2%-point increase in return on assets over the subsequent five years with an activist-affiliated director.

This paper provides evidence on the incidence, characteristics, and performance of activist engagements across countries. We find that the incidence of activism is greatest with high institutional ownership, particularly for U.S. institutions. We use a sample of 1,740 activist engagements across 23 countries and find that almost one-quarter of engagements are by multi-activists engaging the same target. These engagements perform strikingly better than single activist engagements. Engagement outcomes, such as board changes and takeovers, vary across countries and significantly contribute to the returns to activism. Japan is an exception, with high initial expectations and low outcomes.