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Survival, the IISS's bimonthly journal, challenges conventional wisdom and brings fresh, often controversial, perspectives on strategic issues of the moment. In this issue: Anatol Lieven argues that strong and legitimate states remain central to any efforts to limit climate change and mitigate diseases such as coronavirus, and to maintain Western democracy Oriana Skylar Mastro warns that hereditary autocratic regimes such as North Korea's are prone to sudden collapse, something for which policymakers should be prepared Shelby Butt and Daniel Byman contend that Russia's attempts to undermine the West include supporting white-supremacist and other far-right groups And eight more thought-provoking pieces, as well as our regular book reviews and noteworthy column

New insights into how contemporary civilian and military leaders make decisions. Inescapable Entrapments? reevaluates the role of the military in foreign policy by comparing the decision-making processes behind British and Dutch military action in Afghanistan. Drawing on more than one hundred interviews, this study finds that neither the military nor the government influenced the other to act; rather, the decision to deploy troops to Afghanistan emerged organically from a series of prior transnational commitments.

Between 1945 and 1950, the United States had a global nuclear monopoly. The A-bomb transformed the nation's strategic airpower and saw the Air Force displace the Navy at the front line of American defense. InTo Kill Nations, Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period (1950-1965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined air-atomic strategy. The shift to mutually assured destruction (MAD) via general nuclear exchange steadily took precedence in strategic thinking and budget allocations. Soon American nuclear-armed airborne bomber fleets shaped for conventionally defined-if implausible, then impossible-victory were supplanted by missile-based forces designed to survive and punish. The Air Force receded from the forefront of American security policy. Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of ballistic missiles.

Anything but a detached theorist, Clausewitz was as fully engaged in the intellectual and cultural currents of his time as in its political and military conflicts. Late-eighteenth century thought helped shape the analytic methods he developed for the study of war. The essays in this volume follow his career in a complex military society, together with that of other students of war, both friends and rivals, providing a broad perspective that leads to significant documents so far unknown or ignored. They add to our understanding of Clausewitz's early ideas and their expansion into a comprehensive theory that continues to challenge our thinking about war today.

War is changing.Unlike when modern military doctrine was forged, the United States no longer mobilizes massive land forces for direct political gain.Instead, the US fights small, overseas wars by global mandate to overthrow dictators, destroy terrorist groups, and broker regional peace.

Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy-that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political aims, and the degree of military or operational innovation it contains. He then examines these components of doctrine from the perspectives of organization theory and balance of power theory, taking into account the influence of technology and geography. Looking at interwar France, Britain, and Germany, Posen challenges each theory to explain the German Blitzkrieg, the British air defense system, and the French Army's defensive doctrine often associated with the Maginot Line. This rigorous comparative study, in which the balance of power theory emerges as the more useful, not only allows us to discover important implications for the study of national strategy today, but also serves to sharpen our understanding of the origins of World War II.

In Dying to Learn, Michael Hunzeker develops a novel theory to explain how wartime militaries learn. He focuses on the Western Front, which witnessed three great-power armies struggle to cope with deadlock throughout the First World War, as the British, French, and German armies all pursued the same solutions-assault tactics, combined arms, and elastic defense in depth. By the end of the war, only the German army managed to develop and implement a set of revolutionary offensive, defensive, and combined arms doctrines that in hindsight represented the best way to fight. Hunzeker identifies three organizational variables that determine how fighting militaries generate new ideas, distinguish good ones from bad ones, and implement the best of them across the entire organization. These factors are: the degree to which leadership delegates authority on the battlefield; how effectively the organization retains control over soldier and officer training; and whether or not the military possesses an independent doctrinal assessment mechanism. Through careful study of the British, French, and German experiences in the First World War, Dying to Learn provides a model that shows how a resolute focus on analysis, command, and training can help prepare modern militaries for adapting amidst high-intensity warfare in an age of revolutionary technological change.

This handbook examines key aspects of the development of the global history of warfare and the changing patterns of warfare over time. Although scholarship has long eschewed a chronological narrative of the evolution of warfare that privileges the Western experience, global histories of warfare have had difficulty avoiding an overemphasis on the West. The present volume is a collection of themes rather than a history per se; it provides important perspectives on the emergence of warfare as a global historical experience from the ancient past to the present day. Drawing together numerous experts, it tells a broader, more inclusive story of the global, human experience with wars and warfare. The 35 chapters are organised in eight thematic Parts: Part I: Origins of Warfare Part II: Polities and Armed Forces in the Pre-Modern Era Part III: Steppe Nomads of Eurasia Part IV: Naval Warfare and Piracy in the Pre-Industrial World Part V: The Impact of Gunpowder Part VI: Transition from Industrial to Total War Part VII: Wars of Decolonisation and Cold War Part VIII: Postmodern/New Wars These Parts offer an overview of the global experience of warfare to help readers understand how the wars and the militaries we see today have been shaped by historical developments across the globe. This handbook will be of great interest to students of military history, naval history, strategic studies and world history in general.

An engaging guide to the various ways in which war is now waged-and how to adapt to this new reality Hybrid War, Grey Zone Warfare, Unrestricted War: today, traditional conflict-fought with guns, bombs, and drones-has become too expensive to wage, too unpopular at home, and too difficult to manage. In an age when America threatens Europe with sanctions, and when China spends billions buying influence abroad, the world is heading for a new era of permanent low-level conflict, often unnoticed, undeclared, and unending. Transnational crime expert Mark Galeotti provides a comprehensive and ground-breaking survey of the new way of war. Ranging across the globe, Galeotti shows how today's conflicts are fought with everything from disinformation and espionage to crime and subversion, leading to instability within countries and a legitimacy crisis across the globe. But rather than suggest that we hope for a return to a bygone era of \"stable\" warfare, Galeotti details ways of surviving, adapting, and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by this new reality.

The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia to America’s invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.