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The available data on the health insurers participating in the Affordable Care Act exchanges reveal patterns of market entry and exit that are consistent with natural competitive processes separating out firms that are best suited to adapt to a new market. The results of the 2016 election portend a vigorous 2017 debate about the future of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Both President Donald Trump and large fractions of the Republican majority party in the House and Senate campaigned on an explicit pledge to repeal and replace the ACA. At least part of the impetus for these promises is a general belief that the ACA’s state-based insurance marketplaces are unworkable and are resulting in higher prices and fewer choices. In 2016, the ACA marketplaces facilitated coverage purchases for approximately 13 million people nationwide. 1 But many prominent national insurers have struggled in . . .

Experience in European health insurance exchanges indicates that even with the best risk-adjustment formulas, insurers have substantial incentives to engage in risk selection. The potentially most worrisome form of risk selection is skimping on the quality of care for underpriced high-cost patients-that is, patients for whom insurers are compensated at a rate lower than the predicted health care expenses of these patients. In this article we draw lessons for the United States from twenty years of experience with health insurance exchanges in Europe, where risk selection is a serious problem. Mistakes by European legislators and inadequate evaluation criteria for risk selection incentives are discussed, as well as strategies to reduce risk selection and the complex trade-offamong selection (through quality skimping), efficiency, and affordability. Recommended improvements to the risk-adjustment process in the United States include considering the adoption of risk adjusters used in Europe, investing in the collection of data, using a permanent form of risk sharing, and replacing the current premium \"band\" restrictions with more flexible restrictions. Policy makers need to understand the complexities of regulating competitive health insurance markets and to prevent risk selection that threatens the provision of good-quality care for underpriced high-cost patients.

The US Supreme Court's ruling on the Affordable Care Act in 2012 allowed states to opt out of the health reform law's Medicaid expansion. Since that ruling, fourteen governors have announced that their states will not expand their Medicaid programs. We used the RAND COMPARE microsimulation to analyze how opting out of Medicaid expansion would affect coverage and spending, and whether alternative policy options-such as partial expansion of Medicaid-could cover as many people at lower costs to states. With fourteen states opting out, we estimate that 3.6 million fewer people would be insured, federal transfer payments to those states could fall by $8.4 billion, and state spending on uncompensated care could increase by $1 billion in 2016, compared to what would be expected if all states participated in the expansion. These effects were only partially mitigated by alternative options we considered. We conclude that in terms of coverage, cost, and federal payments, states would do best to expand Medicaid. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

The design of the Affordable Care Act's online health insurance Marketplaces can improve how consumers make complex health plan choices. We examined the choice environment on the state-based Marketplaces and HealthCare.gov in the third open enrollment period. Compared to previous enrollment periods, we found greater adoption of some decision support tools, such as total cost estimators and integrated provider lookups. Total cost estimators differed in how they generated estimates: In some Marketplaces, consumers categorized their own utilization, while in others, consumers answered detailed questions and were assigned a utilization profile. The tools available before creating an account (in the window-shopping period) and afterward (in the real-shopping period) differed in several Marketplaces. For example, five Marketplaces provided total cost estimators to window shoppers, but only two provided them to real shoppers. Further research is needed on the impact of different choice environments and on which tools are most effective in helping consumers pick optimal plans.

The state-based and federally facilitated health insurance Marketplaces, or exchanges, enrolled more than eight million people during the first open enrollment period, which ended March 31, 2014. There is significant variation in how states have designed and implemented their Marketplaces. We examined how premiums varied with states' involvement in the Marketplaces through governance, plan management authority, and strategy during the first year that the exchanges have been open. State-based Marketplaces using \"clearinghouse\" plan management models had significantly lower adjusted average premiums for all plans within each metal level compared to state-based Marketplaces using \"active purchaser\" models and the federally facilitated and partnership Marketplaces. Clearinghouse management models are those in which all health plans that meet published criteria are accepted. Active purchaser models are those in which states negotiate premiums, provider networks, number of plans, and benefits. Our baseline estimates provide valuable benchmarks for evaluating future performance of states' involvement in governance, plan management, and regulatory authority of the insurance Marketplaces.

In 2014, few health insurance plans sold in the Affordable Care Act’s Federally Facilitated Marketplaces had age-dependent tobacco surcharges, possibly because of a system glitch. The 2015 tobacco surcharges show wide variation, with more plans implementing tobacco surcharges that increase with age. This underscores concerns that older tobacco users will find postsubsidy health insurance premiums difficult to afford. Future monitoring of enrollment will determine whether tobacco surcharges cause adverse selection by dissuading tobacco users, particularly older users, from buying health insurance.

Health insurance exchanges created under the Affordable Care Act will offer coverage to people who lack employer-sponsored insurance or have incomes too high to qualify for Medicaid. However, plans offered through an exchange may include high levels of cost sharing. We surveyed families participating in unsubsidized plans offered in the Massachusetts Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, an exchange created prior to the 2010 national health reform law, and found high levels of financial burden and higher-than-expected costs among some enrollees. The financial burden and unexpected costs were even more pronounced for families with greater numbers of children and for families with incomes below 400 percent of the federal poverty level. We conclude that those with lower incomes, increased health care needs, and more children will be at particular risk after they obtain coverage through exchanges in 2014. Policy makers should develop strategies to further mitigate the financial burden for enrollees who are most susceptible to encountering higher-than-expected out-of-pocket costs, such as providing cost calculators or price transparency tools. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

In the twenty-three states that have decided against expanding Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act, uninsured adults who would have been eligible for Medicaid and have incomes at or above the federal poverty guidelines are generally eligible for Marketplace (insurance exchange) premium tax credits and plans with generous benefits. This study compared estimated out-of-pocket spending for care and premiums, as well as the financial burdens they impose, for the families of these adults under two simulation scenarios: obtaining coverage through a silver plan with subsidized cost sharing and enrolling in expanded Medicaid. Compared with Marketplace coverage, Medicaid would more than halve average annual out-of-pocket spending ($938 versus $1,948), while dramatically reducing the percentage of adults in families with out-of-pocket expenses exceeding 10 percent or 20 percent of income (6.0 percent versus 17.1 percent and 0.9 percent versus 3.7 percent, respectively). Larger reductions would be seen for families with smokers, who under Medicaid would no longer be subject to Marketplace tobacco user surcharges. Medicaid expansion may offer a greater opportunity than access to Marketplace insurance to promote the financial well-being of previously uninsured low-income adults.

The next open enrollment period for plans offered in the Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) insurance Marketplaces is set to occur between November 15, 2014, and February 15, 2015-just when many lower-income people are financially stressed by demands of the holiday season. Recent research by experimental psychologists and behavioral economists strongly suggests that when people's decision-making capacity (bandwidth) is stretched thin, either they cannot make decisions or they make poor choices. Using data from nearly a decade of US-based Internet search queries to measure population behavior, we found considerable seasonality in measures of financial stress and in when people seek out information on health insurance plans. A more opportune time for scheduling open enrollment for the ACA Marketplaces may be between February 15 and April 15-weeks when low-income people typically receive income tax refunds and Earned Income Tax Credit payments. Such lump- sum payments could be applied to pay individuals' share of premiums.

Policy makers and analysts have been voicing concerns about the increasing concentration of health care providers and health insurers in markets nationwide, including the potential adverse effect on the cost and quality of health care. The Council of Economic Advisers recently expressed its concern about the lack of estimates of market concentration in many sectors of the US economy. To address this gap in health care, this study analyzed market concentration trends in the United States from 2010 to 2016 for hospitals, physician organizations, and health insurers. Hospital and physician organization markets became increasingly concentrated over this time period. Concentration among primary care physicians increased the most, partially because hospitals and health care systems acquired primary care physician organizations. In 2016, 90 percent of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) were highly concentrated for hospitals, 65 percent for specialist physicians, 39 percent for primary care physicians, and 57 percent for insurers. Ninety-one percent of the 346 MSAs analyzed may have warranted concern and scrutiny because of their concentration levels in 2016 and changes in their concentrations since 2010. Public policies that enhance competition are needed, such as stricter enforcement of antitrust laws, reducing barriers to entry, and restricting anticompetitive behaviors.