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I investigate whether hedge funds that supply liquidity earn superior returns. Using transaction data, I find that hedge funds following short-term contrarian strategies (i.e., liquidity suppliers) earn significantly higher returns on their equity trades and holdings. Similarly, using commercial databases, I find that hedge funds with greater exposure to a liquidity provision factor earn significantly higher excess returns and Sharpe ratios. The superior performance of liquidity-supplying hedge funds arises from strategies that are more complex than mechanical short-term reversal strategies. For example, among stocks with similar past returns, liquidity-supplying funds are more likely to trade against stocks heavily traded by constrained mutual funds and less likely to trade against stocks heavily traded by unconstrained mutual funds. The outperformance of liquidity-supplying funds is also concentrated in periods of low funding liquidity, suggesting that less-binding financial constraints contribute to their superior returns.

We examine net arbitrage trading (NAT) measured by the difference between quarterly abnormal hedge fund holdings and abnormal short interest. NAT strongly predicts stock returns in the cross-section. Across ten well-known stock anomalies, abnormal returns are realized only among stocks experiencing large NAT. Exploiting Regulation SHO, which facilitated short selling for a random group of stocks, we present causal evidence that NAT has stronger return predictability among stocks facing greater limits to arbitrage. We also find large returns for anomalies that arbitrageurs chose to exploit despite capital constraints during the 2007–09 financial crisis. We confirm our findings using daily data.

Data snooping is a major concern in empirical asset pricing. We develop a new framework to rigorously perform multiple hypothesis testing in linear asset pricing models, while limiting the occurrence of false positive results typically associated with data snooping. By exploiting a variety of machine learning techniques, our multiple-testing procedure is robust to omitted factors and missing data. We also prove its asymptotic validity when the number of tests is large relative to the sample size, as in many finance applications. To improve the finite sample performance, we also provide a wild-bootstrap procedure for inference and prove its validity in this setting. Finally, we illustrate the empirical relevance in the context of hedge fund performance evaluation.

This paper provides evidence on the incidence, characteristics, and performance of activist engagements across countries. We find that the incidence of activism is greatest with high institutional ownership, particularly for U.S. institutions. We use a sample of 1,740 activist engagements across 23 countries and find that almost one-quarter of engagements are by multi-activists engaging the same target. These engagements perform strikingly better than single activist engagements. Engagement outcomes, such as board changes and takeovers, vary across countries and significantly contribute to the returns to activism. Japan is an exception, with high initial expectations and low outcomes.

This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on firm productivity using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves production efficiency in the 3 years after intervention, with stronger improvements in business strategy-oriented interventions. Plants sold after intervention improve productivity significantly under new ownership, suggesting that capital redeployment is an important channel for value creation. Employees of target firms experience stagnation in work hours and wages despite an increase in labor productivity. Additional tests refute alternative explanations attributing the improvement to mean reversion, management's voluntary reforms, industry consolidation shocks, or activists' stock-picking abilities.

When facing hedge fund activists, target firms often fight back. Targets with agency problems and those confronting the threat of investor coordination frequently engage in hostile resistance by implementing governance changes associated with managerial entrenchment. The market negatively responds to hostile resistance, and unless hedge funds counterresist, these campaigns have worse operating performance, faster activist exit, and fewer mergers than do campaigns without hostile target resistance. By contrast, when hedge funds counterresist with proxy fights, lawsuits, or unsolicited tender offers, the impact of hostile target resistance is reversed, and these campaigns have similar outcomes to campaigns without hostile target resistance.

We study the dynamics of high-frequency market efficiency measures. We provide evidence that these measures comove across stocks and with each other, suggesting the existence of a systematic market efficiency component. In vector autoregressions, we show that shocks to funding liquidity (the TED spread), hedge fund assets under management, and a proxy for algorithmic trading are significantly associated with systematic market efficiency. Thus, stock market efficiency is prone to systematic fluctuations, and, consistent with recent theories, events and policies that impact funding liquidity can affect the aggregate degree of price efficiency.

We connect stocks through their common active mutual fund owners. We show that the degree of shared ownership forecasts cross-sectional variation in return correlation, controlling for exposure to systematic return factors, style and sector similarity, and many other pair characteristics. We argue that shared ownership causes this excess comovement based on evidence from a natural experiment—the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal. These results motivate a novel cross-stock-reversal trading strategy exploiting information contained in ownership connections. We show that long-short hedge fund index returns covary negatively with this strategy, suggesting these funds may exacerbate this excess comovement.

Research Summary This paper investigates the costs of corporate scope reduction (“refocusing”). Using data on hedge fund firms that were quasi‐exogenously driven to close funds during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, we find evidence that refocusing imposes meaningful economic costs on firms. To better understand the mechanisms behind this result, we disaggregate refocusing costs along two dimensions: the degree of relatedness between the business that was closed and its sister divisions, and the duration of time over which the costs persist. The results suggest that refocusing imposes meaningful, yet transitory, adjustment costs on firms, and destroys synergies when related businesses are closed, creating more persistent costs. Accordingly, our work contributes to the corporate strategy literature by characterizing and evaluating the costs of refocusing. Managerial Summary We examine the costs of “refocusing,” defined as multi‐business companies reducing the number of businesses they operate. Using data on hedge funds that were driven to close one or more of their funds during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, we show that refocusing imposes meaningful economic costs on companies. We find that refocusing costs are larger and persist for longer when the business that was closed is more closely related to other businesses within the company. Together, our results suggest that refocusing may destroy synergies and be difficult for organizations to manage. This implies that managers should take steps to mitigate the dislocations that may occur as the refocusing process unfolds, as well as the long‐run persistence in synergy destruction when more‐related businesses are closed.