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The Swedish welfare model is gradually losing its former characteristics. Notable is the extensive privatization of provision and the emerging privatization of funding, primarily through new and half-private services in health care, education, and elderly care. The clearest example of this trend is the rise of private health insurance, which is now signed by every tenth person of working age. This article points out different types of regulations that have provoked the rise of private health insurance, and discusses types of regulations that could potentially slow privatization. Further, this article analyzes three official welfare investigation reports. These reports avoid the decisive regulations they are supposed to discuss, and sometimes go against directives to do so. I argue that regulations for private health insurance have occurred without much debate, while every potential regulation against private health insurance is very much disputed by industry interests and many of the political parties.

War--or the threat of war--usually strengthens states as governments tax, draft soldiers, exert control over industrial production, and dampen internal dissent in order to build military might. The United States, however, was founded on the suspicion of state power, a suspicion that continued to gird its institutional architecture and inform the sentiments of many of its politicians and citizens through the twentieth century. In this comprehensive rethinking of postwar political history, Aaron Friedberg convincingly argues that such anti-statist inclinations prevented Cold War anxieties from transforming the United States into the garrison state it might have become in their absence. Drawing on an array of primary and secondary sources, including newly available archival materials, Friedberg concludes that the \"weakness\" of the American state served as a profound source of national strength that allowed the United States to outperform and outlast its supremely centralized and statist rival: the Soviet Union. Friedberg's analysis of the U. S. government's approach to taxation, conscription, industrial planning, scientific research and development, and armaments manufacturing reveals that the American state did expand during the early Cold War period. But domestic constraints on its expansion--including those stemming from mean self-interest as well as those guided by a principled belief in the virtues of limiting federal power--protected economic vitality, technological superiority, and public support for Cold War activities. The strategic synthesis that emerged by the early 1960s was functional as well as stable, enabling the United States to deter, contain, and ultimately outlive the Soviet Union precisely because the American state did not limit unduly the political, personal, and economic freedom of its citizens. Political scientists, historians, and general readers interested in Cold War history will value this thoroughly researched volume. Friedberg's insightful scholarship will also inspire future policy by contributing to our understanding of how liberal democracy's inherent qualities nurture its survival and spread.

Why is the United States the only advanced capitalist country with no labor party? This question is one of the great enduring puzzles of American political development, and it lies at the heart of a fundamental debate about the nature of American society. Tackling this debate head-on, Robin Archer puts forward a new explanation for why there is no American labor party--an explanation that suggests that much of the conventional wisdom about \"American exceptionalism\" is untenable. Conventional explanations rely on comparison with Europe. Archer challenges these explanations by comparing the United States with its most similar New World counterpart--Australia. This comparison is particularly revealing, not only because the United States and Australia share many fundamental historical, political, and social characteristics, but also because Australian unions established a labor party in the late nineteenth century, just when American unions, against a common backdrop of industrial defeat and depression, came closest to doing something similar. Archer examines each of the factors that could help explain the American outcome, and his systematic comparison yields unexpected conclusions. He argues that prosperity, democracy, liberalism, and racial hostility often promoted the very changes they are said to have obstructed. And he shows that it was not these characteristics that left the United States without a labor party, but, rather, the powerful impact of repression, religion, and political sectarianism.

This paper incorporates the role of race into our understanding of the hidden welfare state by exploring the implications of racialization of hidden welfare state programs for mass attitudes. We explain how traditional welfare programs have been racialized historically and the implications of that racialization on attitudes towards welfare programs. We then discuss how the same fate could befall hidden programs for the poor if “unearthed” as hidden welfare state scholars have suggested. Finally, we carry out an experiment racializing a hidden welfare state program in the same way that traditional welfare state programs have been racialized historically. Our analysis finds that only when the hidden welfare state program is described using traditional racial stereotypes, support for the program drops significantly among racially resentful. Our findings suggest that the inclusion of race into the hidden welfare state narrative alters our understanding of attitudes towards some of these programs.

Parliamentary obstruction, popularly known as the \"filibuster,\" has been a defining feature of the U.S. Senate throughout its history. In this book, Gregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler explain how the Senate managed to satisfy its lawmaking role during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when it lacked seemingly essential formal rules for governing debate. What prevented the Senate from self-destructing during this time? The authors argue that in a system where filibusters played out as wars of attrition, the threat of rule changes prevented the institution from devolving into parliamentary chaos. They show that institutional patterns of behavior induced by inherited rules did not render Senate rules immune from fundamental changes. The authors' theoretical arguments are supported through a combination of extensive quantitative and case-study analysis, which spans a broad swath of history. They consider how changes in the larger institutional and political context--such as the expansion of the country and the move to direct election of senators--led to changes in the Senate regarding debate rules. They further investigate the impact these changes had on the functioning of the Senate. The book concludes with a discussion relating battles over obstruction in the Senate's past to recent conflicts over judicial nominations.

According to conventional wisdom, big business wields enormous influence over America's political agenda and is responsible for the relatively limited scale of the country's social policies. InStuck in Neutral, however, Cathie Jo Martin challenges that view, arguing that big business has limited involvement in social policy and in many instances desires broader social interventions. Combining hundreds of in-depth interviews with careful quantitative analysis, Martin shows that there is strong support among managers for government-sponsored training, health, work, and family initiatives to enhance workers' skills and productivity. This support does not translate into political action, surprisingly, because big firms are not organized to intervene effectively. Every large company has its own staff to deal with government affairs, but overarching organizations for the most part lobby ineffectively for the collective interests of big business in the social realm. By contrast, small firms, which cannot afford to lobby the government directly, rely on representative associations to speak for them. The unified voice of small business comes through much more clearly in policy circles than the diverse messages presented by individual corporations, ensuring that the small-business agenda of limited social policy prevails. A vivid portrayal of the interplay between business and politics,Stuck in Neutraloffers a fresh take on some of the most controversial issues of our day. It is a must read for anyone interested in the past, present, and future of the American welfare state and political economy.

Despite costing hundreds of billions of dollars and subsidizing everything from homeownership and child care to health insurance, tax expenditures (commonly known as tax loopholes) have received little attention from those who study American government. This oversight has contributed to an incomplete and misleading portrait of U.S. social policy. Here Christopher Howard analyzes the \"hidden\" welfare state created by such programs as tax deductions for home mortgage interest and employer-provided retirement pensions, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit. Basing his work on the histories of these four tax expenditures, Howard highlights the distinctive characteristics of all such policies. Tax expenditures are created more routinely and quietly than traditional social programs, for instance, and over time generate unusual coalitions of support. They expand and contract without deliberate changes to individual programs.

This study produces the first-ever analysis in Nigeria on the asymmetric response of petroleum product prices to international crude oil prices by employing the hidden cointegration approach on quarterly data spanning from 1973Q1 to 2020Q2. After the preliminary tests of data description, unit root analysis and cointegration test, we find that positive and negative components of both the crude oil and petroleum prices move together in the long run. The result suggests evidence of long-run asymmetry in Nigeria. The empirical findings from both the long-run and short-run results show that petroleum prices in Nigeria respond asymmetrically to changes in crude oil prices. Specifically, the outcomes from the study reveal that positive changes (increase) in crude oil prices produce a larger and stronger effect on petroleum prices than the effect of negative changes (decrease) in crude oil prices indicating evidence of an asymmetric relationship between the two prices in Nigeria. Thus, the findings confirm the existence of the rocket and feather hypothesis in the retail energy market in Nigeria. Overall, the study finds convincing evidence to support the hypothesis of “rocket and feather” in the pass-through effect of crude oil prices on petroleum prices in Nigeria. The study advocates for more government intervention in the energy market to reduce the welfare loss associated with an increase in crude oil prices on the citizens.

We employ unique administrative data from Moscow to obtain a direct estimate of hidden incomes. Our approach is based on comparing employer-reported earnings to market values of cars owned by the corresponding individuals and their households. We detect few hidden earnings in most foreign-owned firms and larger firms, especially state-owned enterprises in heavily regulated industries. The same empirical strategy indicates that up to 80 percent of earnings of car owners in the private sector are hidden, especially in smaller companies and industries such as trade and services, where cash flows are easier to manipulate. We also find considerable hidden earnings in government services. Our approach sheds new light on the decline in the gross domestic product (GDP) in Russia after the collapse of communism and subsequent recovery; in particular, we argue that a good deal of these changes might represent changes in income reporting rather than actual changes in GDP.

This paper reviews some central issues that arise in theorizing about tax evasion decisions and the hidden economy. It starts from the Allingham and Sandmo (J. Public Econ. 1:323–338, 1972 ) modeling of the tax evasion decision as a choice under uncertainty based on expected utility maximization and risk aversion. It goes on to discuss alternative specifications of the taxpayer’s preferences with particular regard to the explanation of the extensive margin, i.e. the decision on whether or not to engage in tax evasion. It extends the model to the case of variable labor supply with work in both official and black labor markets. It then considers the application of the theory to taxes on wealth and income from capital, indirect tax evasion, and smuggling. It also includes a consideration of general equilibrium effects and of the problems that evasion causes for the theory of optimal income and commodity taxes. It concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of tax evasion for economic policy in the welfare state.