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238 result(s) for "Hide-and-seek"
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Find me : a hide-and-seek book
With simple text and colorful illustrations the reader is invited engage with this hide-and-seek picture book that can be read from front to back and from back to front.
HIDE AND SEEK
This response takes up the final question offered by David Lurie's essay: “In the end, is it ever possible to write a fully nonallegorical history of writing's origins?” by considering the nature of allegory, its relationship to hiding and invisibility, and the material quality of its character when invoked to describe an origin.
A notion of prominence for games with natural-language labels
We study games with natural-language labels (i.e., strategic problems where options are denoted by words), for which we propose and test a measurable characterization of prominence. We assume that-ceteris paribus-players find particularly prominent those strategies that are denoted by words more frequently used in their everyday language. To operationalize this assumption, we suggest that the prominence of a strategy-label is correlated with its frequency of occurrence in large text corpora, such as the Google Books corpus (\"n-gram\" frequency). In testing for the strategic use of word frequency, we consider experimental games with different incentive structures (such as incentives to and not to coordinate), as well as subjects from different cultural/linguistic backgrounds. Our data show that frequently-mentioned labels are more (less) likely to be selected when there are incentives to match (mismatch) others. Furthermore, varying one's knowledge of the others' country of residence significantly affects one's reliance on word frequency. Overall, the data show that individuals play strategies that fulfill our characterization of prominence in a (boundedly) rational manner.
Lyla in the loop. Season 1, Episode 9, Un-make a mess ; Hide and go Stu
Lyla and Luke clean their room with a little “help” from Stu. / Lyla, Luke, Everett and Stu play hide and seek in the apartment ... until they lose Stu.
Fun with pets : a pop-up book
Join Little Bunny and her best friends as they play a game of hide-and-seek! With five big flaps and a surprise pop-up behind each one, this book is full of animal fun.
Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases
When a firm can recognize its previous customers, it may use information about their past purchases to price discriminate. We study a model with a monopolist and a continuum of heterogeneous consumers, where consumers have the ability to maintain their anonymity and avoid being identified as past customers, possibly at a cost. When consumers can freely maintain their anonymity, they all individually choose to do so, which results in the highest profit for the monopolist. Increasing the cost of anonymity can benefit consumers but only up to a point, after which the effect is reversed. We show that if the monopolist or an independent third party controls the cost of anonymity, it often works to the detriment of consumers.