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Work Flows investigates the emergence of \"flow\" as a crucial metaphor within Russian labor culture since 1870. Maya Vinokour frames concern with fluid channeling as immanent to vertical power structures-whether that verticality derives from the state, as in Stalin's Soviet Union and present-day Russia, or from the proliferation of corporate monopolies, as in the contemporary Anglo-American West. Originating in pre-revolutionary bio-utopianism, the Russian rhetoric of liquids and flow reached an apotheosis during Stalin's First Five-Year Plan and re-emerged in post-Soviet \"managed democracy\" and Western neoliberalism. The literary, philosophical, and official texts that Work Flows examines give voice to the Stalinist ambition of reforging not merely individual bodies, but space and time themselves. By mobilizing the understudied thematic of fluidity, Vinokour offers insight into the nexus of philosophy, literature, and science that underpinned Stalinism and remains influential today. Work Flows demonstrates that Stalinism is not a historical phenomenon restricted to the period 1922-1953, but a symptom of modernity as it emerged in the twentieth century. Stalinism's legacy extends far beyond the bounds of the former Soviet Union, emerging in seemingly disparate settings like post-Soviet Russia and Silicon Valley.

This book pulls together experts in the fields of economics and Russian culture, all participants in the Samuel P. Huntington Memorial Symposium on Culture, Cultural Change and Economic Development, a follow-up to the 1999 Cultural Values and Human Progress Symposium at Harvard University. As the sequel to the 2001 volume Culture Matters, it discusses modernization, democratization, economic, and political reforms in Russia and asserts that these reforms can happen through the reframing of cultural values, attitudes, and institutions. (Cover design by Katie Makrie.)

A number of indices exist to calculate lifespan variation, each with different underlying properties. Here, we present new formulae for the response of seven of these indices to changes in the underlying mortality schedule (life disparity, Gini coefficient, standard deviation, variance, Theil's index, mean logarithmic deviation, and interquartile range). We derive each of these indices from an absorbing Markov chain formulation of the life table, and use matrix calculus to obtain the sensitivity and the elasticity (i.e., the proportional sensitivity) to changes in age-specific mortality. Using empirical French and Russian male data, we compare the underlying sensitivities to mortality change under different mortality regimes to determine the conditions under which the indices might differ in their conclusions about the magnitude of lifespan variation. Finally, we demonstrate how the sensitivities can be used to decompose temporal changes in the indices into contributions of age-specific mortality changes. The result is an easily computable method for calculating the properties of this important class of longevity indices.

Through the looking-glass of Russian national cinema, Pride and Panic explores Russia's anxious adjustment towards the expansion of Western culture. Russian film is shown, in both its creation and perception, to expose the intriguing dynamics of societal psychological conditions. Using specific film examples, the book delves into the subterranean recesses of Russian national consciousness, exposing an internal ambivalence and complex cultural reaction towards the rise of the West. These fears, fantasies and tremulous anxieties are examined through the representation of the West in films by both established and lesser-known Russian directors. Using a highly original and unorthodox approach, the author parallels the shifting dynamics of attitudes and identity in Russia, caused by globalization, to stages of development in an individual human psyche. The book cohesively unveils the psychological turmoil experienced by Russia towards a change in global relations. A text of particular interest to scholars, students and readers involved with contemporary film and, in particular, Russian cinema and culture.

A decade after the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China established their formidable alliance in 1950, escalating public disagreements between them broke the international communist movement apart. InThe Sino-Soviet Split, Lorenz Lüthi tells the story of this rupture, which became one of the defining events of the Cold War. Identifying the primary role of disputes over Marxist-Leninist ideology, Lüthi traces their devastating impact in sowing conflict between the two nations in the areas of economic development, party relations, and foreign policy. The source of this estrangement was Mao Zedong's ideological radicalization at a time when Soviet leaders, mainly Nikita Khrushchev, became committed to more pragmatic domestic and foreign policies. Using a wide array of archival and documentary sources from three continents, Lüthi presents a richly detailed account of Sino-Soviet political relations in the 1950s and 1960s. He explores how Sino-Soviet relations were linked to Chinese domestic politics and to Mao's struggles with internal political rivals. Furthermore, Lüthi argues, the Sino-Soviet split had far-reaching consequences for the socialist camp and its connections to the nonaligned movement, the global Cold War, and the Vietnam War. The Sino-Soviet Splitprovides a meticulous and cogent analysis of a major political fallout between two global powers, opening new areas of research for anyone interested in the history of international relations in the socialist world.

In the course of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term, many of the doctrines and ideas associated with Eurasianism have moved to the center of public political discourses in Russia. Eurasianism, both Russian and non-Russian, is politically active —influential and contested— in debates about identity, popular culture or foreign policy narratives. Deploying a variety of theoretical frameworks and perspectives, the essays in this volume work together to shed light on both Eurasianism’s plasticity and contemporary weight, and examine how its tropes and discourses are appropriated, interpreted, modulated and deployed politically, by national groups, oppositional forces (left or right), prominent intellectuals, artists, and last but not least, government elites. In doing so, this collection addresses essential themes and questions currently shaping the Post-Soviet world and beyond.

The 2014 Ukrainian crisis has highlighted the pro-Russia stances of some European countries, such as Hungary and Greece, and of some European parties, mostly on the far-right of the political spectrum. They see themselves as victims of the EU \"technocracy\" and liberal moral values, and look for new allies to denounce the current \"mainstream\" and its austerity measures. These groups found new and unexpected allies in Russia. As seen from the Kremlin, those who denounce Brussels and its submission to U.S. interests are potential allies of a newly re-assertive Russia that sees itself as the torchbearer of conservative values. Predating the Kremlin's networks, the European connections of Alexander Dugin, the fascist geopolitician and proponent of neo-Eurasianism, paved the way for a new pan-European illiberal ideology based on an updated reinterpretation of fascism. Although Dugin and the European far-right belong to the same ideological world and can be seen as two sides of the same coin, the alliance between Putin's regime and the European far-right is more a marriage of convenience than one of true love. This unique book examines the European far-right's connections with Russia and untangles this puzzle by tracing the ideological origins and individual paths that have materialized in this permanent dialogue between Russia and Europe.

The reforms of Russian Tsar Peter I (1682–1725) touched all spheres of life, including the Church. The purpose of this paper is to bring into focus his approach to the reform of monasticism. It reflects on Peter’s personal remarks as reported both by his Russian and his foreign interlocutors, his legislation, including law drafts, and practical measures such as the All-Joking, All-Drunken Synod. The principal conclusion is that it was this Russian ruler who was the first to call into question the very existence of monasticism and who came close to the ultimate dissolution of monasteries. He did not abolish monasticism not because it was a too radical step but because he devised measures of reform to raise its standards and improve its public utility. His treatment of the monastic tradition should be interpretated not as secularization but rather as modernization. Peter’s personal “monachophobia” is best understood as a modernizing impulse. His objective was the creation of a “modern” state whose Church and clergy represented contemporary values. Traditional, unreformed monasticism presented an obstacle in his progress towards this goal. The legacy of Peter’s policy was an increasing monachophobia in Russia apparent from the 18th century onwards.

The article attempts to analyse the perception of the future of post-revolutionary Russia and the prospects for Polish-Russian relations by the political elites of the reborn Polish state in the last weeks of 1918. Overall, Polish elites differed in many respects in their assessments of Russia, and the above-mentioned issues were often instrumentalised for the purposes of the current political struggle in the country. This does not change the fact that there was a far-reaching consensus in Poland at that time on at least some fundamental issues relating to Russian affairs. At the end of 1918, there was a widespread belief that Bolshevism was bound to collapse and that before this happens, the Republic would be exposed to significant threats related to communism and revolutionary upheavals not only in the vast areas of the former Tsarist Empire, but possibly also in Germany. With the exception of a few socialist activists, the majority of Polish elites rejected both the theory and practice of the Soviet rule. At that time, there was no belief in the democratisation of Russia and it was expected that a regime would be established in this country that would be closer to the pre-revolutionary realities than to the model of governance symbolised by Alexander Kerensky. Contrary to popular opinion, and despite different assessments of the longterm prospects of Polish-Russian relations made by Dmowski and Piłsudski, the territorial visions of both outstanding statesmen from the end of 1918 can hardly be considered contradictory. However, they undoubtedly defined the maximum plan of Polish eastern policy in different ways.