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"Hominidae - psychology"
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Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent’s action in a false-belief test
Human social life depends on theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. A signature of theory of mind, false belief understanding, requires representing others’ views of the world, even when they conflict with one’s own. After decades of research, it remains controversial whether any nonhuman species possess a theory of mind. One challenge to positive evidence of animal theory of mind, the behavior-rule account, holds that animals solve such tasks by responding to others’ behavioral cues rather than their mental states. We distinguish these hypotheses by implementing a version of the “goggles” test, which asks whether, in the absence of any additional behavioral cues, animals can use their own self-experience of a novel barrier being translucent or opaque to determine whether another agent can see through the same barrier. We incorporated this paradigm into an established anticipatory-looking false-belief test for great apes. In a between-subjects design, apes experienced a novel barrier as either translucent or opaque, although both looked identical from afar. While being eye tracked, all apes then watched a video in which an actor saw an object hidden under 1 of 2 identical boxes. The actor then scuttled behind the novel barrier, at which point the object was relocated and then removed. Only apes who experienced the barrier as opaque visually anticipated that the actor would mistakenly search for the object in its previous location. Great apes, therefore, appeared to attribute differential visual access based specifically on their own past perceptual experience to anticipate an agent’s actions in a false-belief test.
Journal Article
Mothers and others : the evolutionary origins of mutual understanding
Somewhere in Africa, more than a million years ago, a line of ape began to rear their young differently than their Great Ape ancestors. From this form of care came new ways of engaging and understanding each other. How such singular human capacities evolved, and how they have kept us alive for generations, is revealed in this book.
Book
An abundance of developmental anomalies and abnormalities in Pleistocene people
Diverse developmental abnormalities and anomalous features are evident in the Pleistocene Homo fossil record, varying from minor but rare dental, vertebral, and carpal variants to exceptional systemic disorders. There are currently 75 documented anomalies or abnormalities from 66 individuals, spanning the Pleistocene but primarily from the Late Pleistocene Middle and Upper Paleolithic with their more complete skeletal remains. The expected probabilities of finding these variants or developmental disorders vary from <5% to <0.0001%, based on either recent human incidences or relevant Pleistocene sample distributions. Given the modest sample sizes available for the skeletal or dental elements in question, especially if the samples are appropriately limited in time and geography, the cumulative multiplicative probability of finding these developmental changes is vanishingly small. These data raise questions regarding social survival abilities, differing mortuary treatments of the biologically unusual, the role of ubiquitous stress among these Pleistocene foragers, and their levels of consanguinity. No single factor sufficiently accounts for the elevated level of these developmental variants or the low probability of finding them in the available paleontological record.
Journal Article
Ravens parallel great apes in flexible planning for tool-use and bartering
The ability to flexibly plan for events outside of the current sensory scope is at the core of being human and is crucial to our everyday lives and society. Studies on apes have shaped a belief that this ability evolved within the hominid lineage. Corvids, however, have shown evidence of planning their food hoarding, although this has been suggested to reflect a specific caching adaptation rather than domain-general planning. Here, we show that ravens plan for events unrelated to caching—tool-use and bartering—with delays of up to 17 hours, exert self-control, and consider temporal distance to future events. Their performance parallels that seen in apes and suggests that planning evolved independently in corvids, which opens new avenues for the study of cognitive evolution.
Journal Article
Evolution of responses to (un)fairness
Humans have a deep and innate sense of fairness. Humans, however, are not the only species to react to apparent inequities. Brosnan and de Waal propose that inequity aversion can be broken down into two levels. At the most basic level, individuals react to immediate unequal distribution of a reward for equal effort expended, whereas at the second, they show the ability to accept a current unequal distribution with the expectation that over time distribution will equalize. This second level facilitates cooperation over time and requires the cognitive abilities both to assess current distribution and envision future opportunities for equalization. As cognitive abilities advanced across the primate lineage, this more complex accounting of equal distribution and cooperation may have developed into the complete sense of fairness we see in humans today. Science , this issue 10.1126/science.1251776 The human sense of fairness is an evolutionary puzzle. To study this, we can look to other species, in which this can be translated empirically into responses to reward distribution. Passive and active protest against receiving less than a partner for the same task is widespread in species that cooperate outside kinship and mating bonds. There is less evidence that nonhuman species seek to equalize outcomes to their own detriment, yet the latter has been documented in our closest relatives, the apes. This reaction probably reflects an attempt to forestall partner dissatisfaction with obtained outcomes and its negative impact on future cooperation. We hypothesize that it is the evolution of this response that allowed the development of a complete sense of fairness in humans, which aims not at equality for its own sake but for the sake of continued cooperation.
Journal Article
The emergence of emotionally modern humans: implications for language and learning
According to the Cooperative Breeding Hypothesis, apes with the life-history attributes of those in the line leading to the genus Homo could not have evolved unless male and female allomothers had begun to help mothers care for and provision offspring. As proposed elsewhere, the unusual way hominins reared their young generated novel phenotypes subsequently subjected to Darwinian social selection favouring those young apes best at monitoring the intentions, mental states and preferences of others and most motivated to attract and appeal to caretakers. Not only were youngsters acquiring information in social contexts different from those of other apes, but they would also have been emotionally and neurophysiologically different from them in ways that are relevant to how humans learn. Contingently delivered rewards to dependents who attracted and ingratiated themselves with allomothers shaped their behaviours and vocalizations and transformed the way developing youngsters learned from others and internalized their preferences. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals’.
Journal Article
Social complexity as a proximate and ultimate factor in communicative complexity
The ‘social complexity hypothesis’ for communication posits that groups with complex social systems require more complex communicative systems to regulate interactions and relations among group members. Complex social systems, compared with simple social systems, are those in which individuals frequently interact in many different contexts with many different individuals, and often repeatedly interact with many of the same individuals in networks over time. Complex communicative systems, compared with simple communicative systems, are those that contain a large number of structurally and functionally distinct elements or possess a high amount of bits of information. Here, we describe some of the historical arguments that led to the social complexity hypothesis, and review evidence in support of the hypothesis. We discuss social complexity as a driver of communication and possible causal factor in human language origins. Finally, we discuss some of the key current limitations to the social complexity hypothesis—the lack of tests against alternative hypotheses for communicative complexity and evidence corroborating the hypothesis from modalities other than the vocal signalling channel.
Journal Article
The human life history is adapted to exploit the adaptive advantages of culture
Humans evolved from an ape ancestor that was highly intelligent, moderately social and moderately dependent on cultural adaptations for subsistence technology (tools). By the late Pleistocene, humans had become highly dependent on culture for subsistence and for rules to organize a complex social life. Adaptation by cultural traditions transformed our life history, leading to an extended juvenile period to learn subsistence and social skills, post-reproductive survival to help conserve and transmit skills, a dependence on social support for mothers of large-brained, very dependent and nutrient-demanding offspring, males devoting substantial effort to provisioning rather than mating, and the cultivation of large social networks to tap pools in information unavailable to less social species. One measure of the success of the exploitation of culture is that the minimum inter-birth interval of humans is nearly half that of our ape relatives. Another measure is the wide geographical distribution of humans compared with other apes, based on subsistence systems adapted to fine-scale spatial environmental variation. An important macro-evolutionary question is why our big-brained, culture-intensive life-history strategy evolved so recently and in only our lineage. We suggest that increasing spatial and temporal variation in the Pleistocene favoured cultural adaptations. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.
Journal Article
Shared intentionality may have been favored by persistence hunting in Homo erectus
Shared intentionality is the derived hominin motivation and skills to align mental states. Research on the role of interdependence in the phylogeny of shared intentionality has only considered the archeological record of Homo heidelbergensis. But ethnographic and fossil data must be considered, too. Doing so suggests that shared intentionality may have been favored in Homo erectus to support persistence hunting.
Journal Article