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The interpretations of sustainability are varied. In most cases, the focus is on reinterpretations and transformations of human attitudes towards the natural environment and certain (unacceptable) social practices and conditions, i.e. the task would be to shape these spheres of human existence in the interests of sustainability. However, the creation and widespread use of the Internet is fundamentally changing human life that is no longer confined to the natural and social spheres. Web life, as a third sphere of human existence created by the universal use of the Internet, is also a component of human condition, both in itself and through its interactions with the natural and social spheres. It is essential to take this into account: the sustainability of these “three spheres” should be addressed together. The continuous construction of web life can be decisive for the sustainability of the whole human existence.

Today, in a Western secular context, the affective phenomenon of religious zeal is often associated, or even identified, with religious intolerance, violence, and fanaticism. Even if the zealots’ devotion remains restricted to their private lives, “we” as Western secularists still suspect them of a lack of reason, rationality, and autonomy. However, closer consideration reveals that religious zeal is an ethically and politically ambiguous phenomenon. In this article, I explore the question of how this ambiguity can be explained. I do so by drawing on Paul Ricœur’s theory of affective fragility and tracing back the ambiguity of religious zeal to a dialectic inherent to human affectivity and existence itself. According to Ricœur, human affectivity is constituted by the two poles of vital and spiritual desires which are mediated by the thymos. As I show, this theory helps us to understand that religious zeal as a spiritual desire is neither plainly good nor plainly bad, but ambiguous. Moreover, it enables us to acknowledge the entanglement of abstraction and concretion that is inherent to the phenomenon of religious zeal. Finally, this theory helps us to understand why religious zeal, as one possible expression of the human quest for the infinite, is both a promise and a threat. In conclusion, human existence is tragic not in that we necessarily fail, but in that no matter which path we take with regard to our spiritual desires—that of affirmation, rejection, or moderation—we are and remain fallible.

The concept and activity of obedience can be regarded as fundamental to human existence as well as to Christian religion. The focus of this study was to investigate the occurrence of this concept in the Gospel of John. Of the two well-known Greek nouns ὑπακοή and ἀπειθέω (translated as ‘obedience’), and the two related verbs ὑπακούω and ἀπειθέω (translated as ‘obedient’), only ἀπειθέω occurs once (3:36) in the Gospel of John. The verb τηρέω has been used several times and not consistently translated because of diverse literary contexts. The objective of this study was to point out how the Gospel of John is filled with the obedience concept and how it was implied from different perspectives. The following themes associated with obedience will be discussed: (1) obedience to God as Father, (2) the essence of obedience – to love, (3) various expressions of obedience, (4) the ability to obey, (5) Christian obedience is to become like Jesus and (6) the rewards of being obedient. Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: The concept and activity, ‘obedience’, are understood as a virtue fundamental to human existence, as well as fundamentally essential and important for the Christian religion. This article investigates the occurrence of ‘obedience’ in the Gospel of John. To experience God’s blessings and enjoy God’s communion, God should be obeyed.

This contribution is located in the field of Historical Theology. It gives an overview (post-World War II) of the philosophical-theological discourse on technology and humanity, articulated by academics who were members and ordained ministers of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika (NHKA). It serves to illustrate the close relationship between theology and philosophy within the theological tradition of the NHKA. The author concludes that there is a growing realisation that it is not primarily about technology anymore, but about humanity. In theology, there is a fundamental concern for the well-being of humanity. Theologians would forsake their responsibility if they would stay quiet on something, which is not only transforming our world view and morality, but humanity itself.ContributionThe current discourse on technology tends to be dominated by economists, engineers, information technology specialists, jurists and medical specialists. As a result, technology takes the centre stage, emphasising the benefits of technological progress. Because of the radical impact of technology on humanity, disciplines such as history, philosophy, sociology, psychology and theology are becoming increasingly important discussion partners.

I discuss the argument of Persson and Savulescu that moral enhancement ought to accompany cognitive enhancement, as well as briefly addressing critiques of this argument, notably by John Harris. I argue that Harris, who believes that cognitive enhancement is largely sufficient for making us behave more morally, might be disposing too easily of the great quandary of our moral existence: the gap between what we do and what we believe is morally right to do. In that regard, Persson and Savulescu's position has the potential to offer more. However, I question Persson and Savulescu's proposal of compulsory moral enhancement (a conception they used to promote), proposing the alternative of voluntary moral enhancement.

Theorists of narrative have been divided into those who conceive of narrative primarily as a cognitive instrument for imposing meaningful order onto the real and those who consider it to be primarily an ontological category that characterizes the human way of being in the world, that is, something constitutive of human existence. These can be called respectively the epistemological and ontological position on the significance of narrative for human existence. Galen Strawson, in turn, has made an influential distinction between descriptive and normative positions on the narrativity of experience. In this essay, I suggest that even though these conceptual differentiations are helpful to a certain extent, such binary terms may also prevent us from paying adequate attention to complex interconnections between the ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimension of the relation between narrative and human existence. I argue that the question of the significance of narrative for human existence can be formulated with an emphasis on any of these philosophical dimensions but that the answers involve implicit assumptions concerning all three dimensions. In the debate on narrative and human existence, particularly undertheorized has been the role of tacit ontological assumptions concerning what is counted as real. In disentangling the debate, I argue that both experience and narrative are phenomena constituted by interpretative activity; while it is important not to conflate experience and narrative, it can be meaningfully said that narrative interpretations of experiences have a constitutive role in our existence. By looking at how certain novelists have dealt with this problematic, the essay also suggests how to tie the theoretical study of narrative more intimately to the study of the philosophical underpinnings of narrative forms in literary history.

This paper examines the various representations of magical realism in Rawi Hage’s Carnival (2012). It investigates the portrayal of the fictionalized imaginative situations in the novel. Further, it discusses Fly as an exilic individual who attempts to escape his chaotic and disordered society. Through his flying carpet, Fly overcomes his hardship and produces a new space for his own in order to realize what he desires. Besides, among the serious problems that face the exilic individual is the absurdist existential life in exile. Thereby, this research article explores how Fly uses a magical realist element to escape the absurdity of his existence in the diaspora. Hence, Albert Camus’ writings on absurdism and the absurdity of human existence are paramount in analyzing this character.

Bernard Reginster has argued that Nietzschean nihilism is best characterized as a “philosophical claim.” This account has inspired a number of critical responses. While Reginster's characterization presents nihilism as a purely cognitive phenomenon, involving particular beliefs about meaning and value, it is just as frequently presented by Nietzsche as a feeling-based phenomenon, a weariness with one's world that comports one negatively toward the world. How, then, should Nietzsche's reader understand the problem of nihilism in his thought? In this article, I examine Nietzsche's account of drives, affects, and the relations he establishes between them to show that nihilism must be understood not only as involving particular beliefs, but as a psychophysiological condition, which I call, following Ken Gemes and John Richardson, affective nihilism.

Although genocide and other crimes against humanity were some of the worst tragedies in human history, for most people, the tragedies were not part of their lives. To see such tragedies only in legal terms would not help people to really see victims as fellow human beings. This would likely lead to indifference to their suffering. Paul C. Santilli invites us to reconsider the humanness of the victims. Santilli proposes two shifts in perspective: shifting our attention from the criminal to the victim and subsequently from the victim to humanity. This article is a response to this challenge and considers the addition of “fostering the agency of victims”, “beyond rational solidarity,” and “ who instead of what is a human being” to the discussion.