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The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was introduced in 2015 with its 16 th goal which has targeted enhancing the concepts of the rule of law and universal access to justice. This goal, along with the current trend of directing investment projects towards sustainable development, has brought the mechanisms for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) into the spotlight in the realm of global investment. Recently, based on a different vision that was supported, especially by the European Union, a new approach to ISDS emerged that is characterized by fundamental differences from the well-known approach represented in the ICSID system. Whereas providing facilities to settle and arbitrate the investment disputes between a state member and investors belonging to another state member over several decades by the ICSID system made it a key player in the administration of the ISDS system. The fundamental differences adopted by the new EU’s model represent a serious challenge to the ICSID system. Especially if this new system proves to be effective and widely used and inserted in future international investment agreements (IIAs), the ICSID will be required to make adjustments that are compatible with this new system. Due to the complexity of the process of amendment to the ICSID convention, as it requires unanimous consent by all member states, the present paper, by analysing some historical stations of the functional and administrative context of the ICSID, examines the flexibility of the ICSID convention to establish a protocol that includes the features of the new system without resorting to amending the convention. The paper concludes that the ICSID enjoys the flexibility necessary to establish this protocol. Finally, the paper presents the motives and benefits envisioned for the establishment of this protocol.

The current inclination to direct investment efforts towards sustainable development, coupled with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, unveiled in 2015, which included the 16th goal of granting equal access to justice and reinforcing the rule of law on a universal level, has brought investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms to the forefront of global investment discussions. The ICSID has carried out a crucial role in overseeing the ISDS system, offering arbitration facilities for disputes between investors and states for over six decades. However, the ISDS system has faced criticism in recent years. In response, a new Investment Court System (ICS) implemented by the EU that aims to address these concerns by establishing a permanent court formed with judges who have been appointed by member states in advance and are distributed to disputes in a rotating and random manner. It also limits the parties’ freedom to opt the applicable law and considers that the substantive provisions in investment agreements are the applicable law to the raised disputes and inserts an appellate mechanism review for law and fact matters as well. The paper discusses the relationship between the ICS and the ICSID system in the light of sustainable development and examines a possible compromise between both systems by considering the ICS as inter se modification of the ICSID convention based on investigation of its compatibility with requirements of the VCLT. Ultimately, the paper finds that recognizing the ICS as an amendment between some parties to the ICSID convention does not conflict with the VCLT.

The dichotomy between jurisdiction and admissibility developed in public international law has drawn much attention from arbitrators and judges in recent years. Inspired by Paulsson's ‘tribunal versus claim’ lodestar, attempts have been made to transpose the distinction from public international law to investment treaty arbitration, yielding a mixed reception from tribunals. Remarkably, a second leap of transposition has found firmer footing in commercial arbitration, culminating in the prevailing view of the common law courts in England, Singapore and Hong Kong that arbitral decisions on admissibility are non-reviewable. However, this double transposition from international law to commercial arbitration is misguided. First, admissibility is a concept peculiar to international law and not embodied in domestic arbitral statutes. Second, its importation into commercial arbitration risks undermining the fundamental notion of jurisdiction grounded upon the consent of parties. Third, the duality of ‘night and day’ postulated by Paulsson to distinguish between reviewable and non-reviewable arbitral rulings is best reserved to represent the basic dichotomy between jurisdiction and merits.

The out-of-court dispute resolution is an area of law that is coming into focus from EU law, through international treaties to national laws. In recent decades, this dynamic field of law has begun to establish itself as an important alternative to judicial dispute resolution. This is reflected in the adoption of various legal norms, with the Singapore Convention being one of the most recent significant additions to the sources of law. Out-of-court dispute resolution encompasses a wide variety of dispute resolution methods, with arbitration and mediation being the most important, as these are the only two methods of out-of-court dispute resolution that are regulated by a number of generally binding legal regulations (as well as many others). The multitude and diversity of legal regulation of arbitration and mediation, their interrelationships and mutual influence are the subject of this article..

This article explores the terms “BRI dispute” and “BRI jurisprudence”. It undertakes a practical and theoretical analysis that considers whether “BRI disputes” have distinct and visible characteristics and are capable of being identified in a legal sense. This is important since practitioners – arbitration centres and law firms – use the term broadly and without specific criteria. By exploring the customary usage and the approach of legal scholars to the term, presenting examples of “BRI disputes” and examining their unique features, and constructing a theoretical approach (utilizing the concepts of ratione materiae, ratione loci, ratione temporis, and ratione personae; and considering the jurisprudence of the ICSID), this article moves from a broad to a narrow analysis to develop both a definition and a system of registration of “BRI disputes” for use by academics, practitioners, and policymakers.

Foreign investors' fear of expropriation led to the emergence of the idea of new ways of protection and adequate treatment of foreign investments on the international level. Primarily, the home countries wanted to protect their interests and became the main proponents of the creation of bilateral investment agreements. Developing countries that aspire to become and remain part of international economic flows, had to provide additional protection to investors, as investment host countries. They saw bilateral investment agreements as an opportunity to attract foreign direct investment. They provide a certain standard in the treatment and protection of investments and thus influence the creation of an environment that favors the transfer of capital from one country to another. In modern economic conditions, there are almost no entities that are absolutely risk-averse. For this reason, bilateral investment agreements are counted on to play one of the key roles in minimizing the risks of investing in developing countries.

Purpose - This theme will be addressed through main points: Special Nature of Investment Disputes and its methods of peaceful settlement. International legal framework governing Arbitration in investment disputes: A. Multilateral legal framework. B. Bilateral legal framework/Investment promotion and protection agreementsTypes of arbitration in investment disputes. The Egyptian experience in investment disputes arbitration. The National legal framework. Egypt on the map of investment disputes in the world. A case study. Conclusion: Results related to the legal framework regulating investment disputes in Egypt. Results related to The arbitration cases against Egypt. Design/methodology/approach - The researcher investigates the subject of international arbitration in investment disputes in the framework of voluntary theory, which is based on the premise that the satisfaction of people who are addressing the international legal norm is the basis of the same rule. In other words, the basis of international law is based on the satisfaction of the State and other international legal persons Both, and then express or implied consent. Findings - Despite the availability of domestic and regional arbitration mechanisms in Egypt represented by a large number of cases. Research limitations/implications - The theme for the study primarily on Egypt and the international arbitration of investment disputes, through theoretical and practical study of disputes arbitration which Egypt is a party defendant in which to focus on what was issued in which the provisions of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, in an attempt to find out the reasons for the verdicts image released it, where it came mostly against Egypt, and whether these judgments against them in investment disputes due to reasons related to the legal framework of the arbitration process, or for reasons of bodies of arbitration issued by those provisions, or to the defense, which represents the Egyptian party, or to the circumstances Economic and political (which represents the investment climate). Originality/value - The proposed solutions to improve the conditions and factors surrounding the arbitration disputes that Egypt is waging against foreign investors, whether they are initially alleged or accused of drafting agreements and contracts, through amending the relevant legislation and laws, selecting arbitration bodies and defense bodies.

What is the appropriate forum for the settlement of foreign investment disputes? Is it the host State's judicial system or the international arbitration system? How could one resolve the conflict between an investment agreement, which asserts the exclusive jurisdiction of the domestic courts, and an international treaty to which the host State and the investor's state of nationality are parties, which gives the investor the discretion of choosing between domestic adjudication and international arbitration? How may a delicate balance between domestic and international dispute resolution mechanisms be struck, ensuring that the forum selection is made on some clear and workable principles? This article argues that the practice of forum selection with respect to foreign investment disputes has evolved a pragmatic jurisprudence which, based on fundamental principles of international law, envisages the employment of various criteria to ensure finality of awards and discourage duplicative litigation. This article shows how, in order to ensure access to international arbitration, investor-state arbitration jurisprudence has adopted an interpretation of \"fork in the road\" and \"waiver\" provisions in investment treaties with a view to preserving, as far as possible, the jurisdiction of international arbitral tribunals. It examines how tribunals have resorted to the \"triple identity\" test or the \"fundamental basis\" test in determining whether a particular investment dispute is more appropriate for settlement at domestic level or through international arbitration. In the process, questions concerning the determination of jurisdiction, nature of the dispute and the governing law aid the development of the law of forum selection and serve to resolve investment disputes with certainty and finality.

This paper analyzes how a country’s formal institutional quality impacts the performance of listed companies across different Latin American countries (namely, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Chile) and industries. Latin America provides a unique setting to address this question due to the region’s high institutional instability. The sample consists of 571 large listed companies, with a total of 8576 observations, for the period 2004–2019. Results show that the quality of a country’s formal institutions is positively related to firm performance, measured through two alternative variables (ROA and Tobin’s Q). Additionally, countries that are signatories of the ICSID agreement provide companies with a more stable environment in which to do business, which ultimately has a positive impact on their performance. However, as the number of cases recorded before the ICSID increases, the relationship turns negative. The paper provides a more comprehensive understanding of formal institutions by considering six alternative governance dimensions. Moreover, international arbitration is found to be a substitute for formal institutions in Latin American countries.