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There are more than 215 million international migrants in the world. Recorded remittances received by developing countries, estimated to be US$325 billion in 2010, far exceed the volume of official aid flows and constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in many developing countries. Migration and remittances factbook 2011 provides a comprehensive picture of emigration, skilled emigration, immigration, and remittance flows for 210 countries and 15 country groups, drawing on authoritative, publicly available data. The current edition of the factbook updates the information in the popular 2008 edition with additional data for 71 countries collected from various sources, including national censuses, labor force surveys, population registers, and other national sources. In addition, it provides selected socioeconomic characteristics such as population, labor force, age dependency ratio, gross national income (GNI) per capita, and poverty headcount for each country and regional grouping. More frequent and timely monitoring of migration and remittance trends can provide policy makers, researchers, and the development community with the tools to make informed decisions. The factbook makes an important contribution to this effort by providing the latest available data and facts on migration and remittance trends worldwide in a comprehensive and readily accessible format.

This article proposes an indirect method to validate existing estimates of immigrants' stock from the Spanish municipal population register, which some believe might be over-counting immigrants who double register in different municipalities or fail to deregister when leaving the country. The proposed method uses two pieces of information: births to immigrants and their fertility rates. Data on births by parents' origin come from the Spanish birth registry; fertility rates are estimated with data from the 2007 National Immigrant Survey. For female immigrants, the indirect estimate does not differ significantly from the count in the register, which can be taken as a validation of both sources. Among men, however, the population register counts 15% more immigrants than the indirect estimate, and this difference is statistically significant. Western European men and women, and Romanian men are immigrant groups with substantial and statistically significant excess count in the population register compared to this article's estimate. The opposite pattern, i.e. ratio of register-toestimated number of immigrants lower than one, is found for Ecuadorian men and women and African men, suggesting that these groups might be under-counted in the population register, although the observed differentials are not statistically significant. Cet article propose une méthode indirecte pour valider les décomptes du nombre d'immigrés en Espagne établis à partir des registres municipaux de population, qui pourraient surestimer le nombre d'immigrés du fait de doubles enregistrements et de défauts de radiation en cas de départ du pays. La méthode proposée utilise deux types d'informations : le nombre de naissances issues d'immigrés et leurs taux de fécondité. Les statistiques de naissances par origine des parents proviennent de l'état civil espagnol ; les taux de fécondité sont estimés à partir de l'Enquête nationale sur les immigrés de 2007. Pour les femmes, l'estimation indirecte ne diffère pas significativement du décompte dans le registre, ce qu'on peut considérer comme une validation des deux sources. Pour les hommes, le registre de population dénombre 15 % d'immigrés de plus que l'estimation indirecte, avec un écart statistiquement significatif. Comparés aux estimations proposées dans cet article, les dénombrements des hommes et femmes provenant d'Europe occidentale et des hommes de Roumanie présentent un excédent important et statistiquement significatif. À l'inverse, le rapport dénombrement /estimation est inférieur à 1 pour les hommes et femmes d'Equateur et les hommes d'Afrique, ce qui suggère un sousenregistrement de ces groupes par le registre de population, bien que les écarts ne soient pas statistiquement significatifs. Este artículo propone un método de estimación indirecta para validar las cifras de inmigrantes en España establecidas a partir de los registros municipales de población, que podrían sobreestimar el número de inmigrantes a causa de las inscripciones dobles y de la ausencia de supresión del registro en caso de salida del país. El método propuesto utiliza dos tipos de información: el número de nacimientos de los inmigrantes y sus tasas de fecundidad. Las estadísticas de nacimientos según el origen de los padres provienen del estado civil; las tasas de fecundidad han sido estimadas a partir de la Encuesta nacional sobre los inmigrantes de 2007. Para las mujeres, la estimación indirecta no difiere significativamente de las cifras del registro, lo que se puede considerar como una validación de las dos fuentes. Para los hombres, la cifra del registro de población es 15% más elevada que la estimación indirecta, con une diferencia estadísticamente significativa (intervalo de confianza [4%-26%]). Comparadas con las estimaciones propuestas en este articulo, las cifras del registro para los hombres y las mujeres proviniendo de Europa occidental y para los hombres de Rumania presentan un excedente importante y estadísticamente significativo [26% à 35%]. Al contrario, para los hombres y mujeres de Ecuador y para los hombres de África el registro de población da resultados inferiores a las estimaciones indirectas, lo que sugiere un subregistro de estos grupos, aunque las diferencias no sean estadísticamente significativas.

Immigrants tend to be more negatively affected by economic crisis than natives, particularly when governments apply strict immigration controls. With the onset of the financial crisis in the latter half of 2008, there were widespread concerns: would migrants return to sending countries and communities in large numbers, adding further economic woes to countries already facing difficulties? Would remittance flows slow and potentially cease? The literature offers little guidance on these questions. It is always a challenge to collect data, analyze, interpret, and make recommendations as the phenomenon under study is still unfolding to reveal new turns and twists. The most recent financial crisis and its repercussions are yet to be completed, and scholars have only begun processing the event. This volume is an effort to bring together in one place fresh thinking and evidence from around the world on the outcomes of mobility in the context of global financial crisis. This book is perhaps the first comprehensive study of remittances during the financial crisis and is a timely addition to the literature. It comes at a time when countries are grappling with the global financial crisis and it's after effects. The resilience of remittances is good news for developing countries, but leveraging remittances for socioeconomic development remains a key challenge. The studies in this book identify and discuss key patterns observed in remittance practices across the world and possibilities for the future.

This paper presents new findings on the main characteristics of immigrants living in OECD countries by country of origin, drawing from the updated Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2015/16. It describes migrant populations by country of destination and country of origin in 2015/16, as well as the dynamics of international migration to OECD countries since 2000/01. It also presents evidence on overall emigration rates and emigration rates of the highly educated at the regional and country levels. Finally, the paper looks at age patterns in immigrant populations.

We show that support for the Leave option in the Brexit referendum was systematically higher in regions hit harder by economic globalization. We focus on the shock of surging imports from China over the past three decades as a structural driver of divergence in economic performance across U.K. regions. An IV approach supports a causal interpretation of our finding. We claim that the effect is driven by the displacement determined by globalization in the absence of effective compensation of its losers. Neither overall stocks nor inflows of immigrants in a region are associated with higher support for the Leave option. A positive association only emerges when focusing on immigrants from EU accession countries. The analysis of individual data suggests that voters respond to the import shock in a sociotropic way, as individuals tend to react to the general economic situation of their region, regardless of their specific condition.

This paper reviews four decades of economics research on the brain drain, with a focus on recent contributions and on development issues. We first assess the magnitude, intensity, and determinants of the brain drain, showing that brain drain (or high-skill) migration is becoming a dominant pattern of international migration and a major aspect of globalization. We then use a stylized growth model to analyze the various channels through which a brain drain affects the sending countries and review the evidence on these channels. The recent empirical literature shows that high-skill emigration need not deplete a country's human capital stock and can generate positive network externalities. Three case studies are also considered: the African medical brain drain, the exodus of European scientists to the United States, and the role of the Indian diaspora in the development of India's information technology sector. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for education, immigration, and international taxation policies in a global context.

In this paper we analyze the long-run impact of immigration on employment, productivity, and its skill bias. We use the existence of immigrant communities across U.S. states before 1960 and the distance from the Mexican border as instruments for immigration flows. We find no evidence that immigrants crowded out employment. At the same time, we find that immigration had a strong, positive association with total factor productivity and a negative association with the high skill bias of production technologies. The results are consistent with the idea that immigrants promoted efficient task specialization, thus increasing TFP, and also promoted the adoption of unskilled-efficient technologies.

Stock prices and workplace mobility trace out striking clockwise paths in daily data from mid-February to late May 2020. Global stock prices fell 30% from 17 February to 12 March, before mobility declined. Over the next 11 days, stocks fell another 10 percentage points as mobility dropped 40%. From 23 March to 9 April, stocks recovered half their losses and mobility fell further. From 9 April to late May, both stocks and mobility rose modestly. This dynamic plays out across the 35 countries in our sample, with notable departures in China, South Korea and Taiwan. The size of the global stock market crash in reaction to the pandemic is many times larger than a standard asset-pricing model implies. Looking more closely at the world’s two largest economies, the pandemic had greater effects on stock market levels and volatilities in the USA than in China even before it became evident that early US containment efforts would flounder. Newspaper-based narrative evidence confirms the dominant—and historically unprecedented—role of pandemic-related developments in the stock market behavior of both countries.

Do language skills affect investment decisions? This article addresses this question by identifying the effect of English proficiency on the stock market participation of immigrants in the United States and Australia. To establish causality, we construct an instrumental variable for English proficiency by exploiting the phenomenon that younger children acquire languages more easily than older children. We find that English proficiency has a significant positive effect on stock ownership among immigrants in both countries. Moreover, we provide evidence that a reduction in information costs and an increase in trust may serve as the mechanisms underlying the language ability effect.

Markets are central to modern society, so their failures can be devastating. Here, we examine a prominent failure: price bubbles. Bubbles emerge when traders err collectively in pricing, causing misfit between market prices and the true values of assets. The causes of such collective errors remain elusive. We propose that bubbles are affected by ethnic homogeneity in the market and can be thwarted by diversity. In homogenous markets, traders place undue confidence in the decisions of others. Less likely to scrutinize others' decisions, traders are more likely to accept prices that deviate from true values. To test this, we constructed experimental markets in Southeast Asia and North America, where participants traded stocks to earn money. We randomly assigned participants to ethnically homogeneous or diverse markets. We find a marked difference: Across markets and locations, market prices fit true values 58% better in diverse markets. The effect is similar across sites, despite sizeable differences in culture and ethnic composition. Specifically, in homogenous markets, overpricing is higher as traders are more likely to accept speculative prices. Their pricing errors are more correlated than in diverse markets. In addition, when bubbles burst, homogenous markets crash more severely. The findings suggest that price bubbles arise not only from individual errors or financial conditions, but also from the social context of decision making. The evidence may inform public discussion on ethnic diversity: it may be beneficial not only for providing variety in perspectives and skills, but also because diversity facilitates friction that enhances deliberation and upends conformity.