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OrientationThe introduction of various incentive schemes in the South African workplace creates incentive-induced employee productivity spillovers but could differ between industries and geographic areas.Research purposeThe aim of the study was to determine the industry and geographic nature of incentive-induced employee productivity spillovers to inform managerial decision-making on intrinsic and extrinsic motivators.Motivation for the studyThe introduction of incentive schemes is an important motivator of employee productivity in the workplace. For this study, it was deemed important to indicate whether incentive-induced employee productivity spillovers differ between industries and geographic areas by taking into consideration firm-size, firm-profitability, different incentive schemes, trade union presence, employee age and skill levels.Research approach/design and methodFixed-effect panel data estimations were computed to predict incentive-induced employee productivity spillover effects based on secondary firm-based data sets.Main findingsIncentive scheme-induced employee productivity spillover effects were generally similar for all the different industry and geographic areas. The spillovers increased with greater firm-sizes, higher profitability levels, introduction of greater levels of monetary-based incentive schemes (especially for unionised employee segments), and allocation of incentive schemes to the middle- age employee grouping (35 years–55 years) as well as higher skilled employees.Practical/managerial implicationsThe effective introduction of incentive schemes in the workplace is an important mechanism for creating positive employee productivity spillover effects and it is generally common for all firms irrespective of the industry or geographic area.Contribution/value-addImproved understanding of incentive-induced employee productivity spillovers in the South African workplace will enable the effective alignment of incentive schemes with firm profitability.

This paper considers the problem of motivating the reduction of project duration. The duration cuts of project works and the corresponding costs are given. A group incentive scheme is used to compensate for the costs. In this scheme, all works are partitioned into groups and a unified incentive scheme is applied for each group. Two types of unified incentive schemes are studied for groups, namely, linear and jump ones. The problem is to partition all project works into groups and choose an appropriate incentive scheme for each group by minimizing the total incentive fund. Solution algorithms are proposed based on determining the shortest path in the network. Special cases are also analyzed (partition with the minimum number of groups and partition with the maximum number of groups).

The aim of this article is to determine the impact that various incentive schemes have on employee productivity in the South African workplace. A firm-based model is used to estimate the dimensional relationships (different skill levels, gender-mix, firm size, firm-sponsored training incentives) of the incentive scheme-employee productivity link. The main conclusions of the study are, firstly, that finance-based incentive schemes (especially performance-linked bonus schemes) have a greater positive impact on employee productivity for the higher-skilled segment, secondly, that non-financial incentives (especially consultative committee incentive schemes) have a greater positive impact on employee productivity for the lower-skilled segment, and, finally, that greater female participation in the workplace and the awarding of incentive schemes is important if general employee productivity is to be enhanced.

Agents’ decisions to exert effort depend on the incentives and the potential costs involved. So far, most of the attention has been on the incentive side. However, our laboratory experiments underline that both the incentive and the cost side can be used separately to shape work performance. In our experiment, subjects work on a real-effort slider task. Between treatments, we vary the incentive scheme used for compensating workers. Additionally, by varying the available outside options, we explore the role of implicit costs of effort in determining workers’ performance. We observe that incentive contracts and implicit costs interact in a nontrivial manner. In general, performance decreases as implicit costs increase. Yet the magnitude of the reaction differs across incentive schemes and across the offered outside options, which, in turn, alters estimated output elasticities. In addition, comparisons between incentive schemes crucially depend on the implicit costs. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

Incentives for improving research productivity at universities prevail in global academia. However, the rationale, methodology, and impact of such incentives and consequent evaluation regimes are in need of scrutinization. This paper explores the influences of financial and career-related publishing incentive schemes on research cultures. It draws on an analysis of 75 interviews with academics, senior university administrators, and journal editors from China, a country that has seen widespread reliance on international publication counts in research evaluation and reward systems. The study focuses on humanities and social sciences (HSS) as disciplinary sites, which embody distinct characteristics and have experienced the introduction of incentive schemes in China since the early 2000s. Findings reveal tensions between internationalization and indigenization, quality and quantity, integrity and instrumentalism, equity and inequity in Chinese academia. In particular, we argue that a blanket incentive scheme could reinforce a managerial culture in higher education, encourage performative objectification of academics, and jeopardize their agency. We thereby challenge 'one-size-fits-all' policymaking, and suggest instead that institutions should have the opportunity to adopt an ethical and 'human-oriented' approach when developing their research incentives and evaluation mechanisms. (HRK / Abstract übernommen).

Ridesharing platforms compensate drivers using a fixed commission system that does not systematically reward effective drivers, which reduces platform engagement. Unsurprisingly, driver transaction activity is intermittent and service unpredictable. Influenced by agency theory, we propose a variable commission that jointly accounts for drivers’ transactions and service performance. To alleviate disengagement, we propose a customer-oriented engagement framework that challenges the notion of the sole monetary focus of drivers. We compare the effects of variable and fixed commission schemes on consequences such as driver net revenue and referral value, mediated by attitudinal outcomes. In a 3-month cluster-randomized field experiment with 3,367 ridesharing drivers across 16 cities and two population tiers, we show improvements in driver satisfaction and emotional connectedness accentuated by goal-oriented feedback. Variable commission with goal-oriented feedback translates to a 24.5% rise in revenue, a 19.5% increase in referral value, and a 43.21% lower churn. A cost–benefit analysis reinforces these results.

Various operational communication models are using Delay-Tolerant Network as a communication tool in recent times. In such a communication paradigm, sometimes there are disconnections and interferences as well as high delays like vehicle Ad hoc networks (VANETs). A new research mechanism, namely, the vehicle Delay-tolerant network (VDTN), is introduced due to several similar characteristics. The store-carry-forward mechanism in VDTNs is beneficial in forwarding the messages to the destination without end-to-end connectivity. To accomplish this task, the cooperation of nodes is needed to forward messages to the destination. However, we cannot be sure that all the nodes in the network will cooperate and contribute their computing resources for message forwarding without any reward. Furthermore, there are some selfish nodes in the network which may not cooperate to forward the messages, and are inclined to increase their own resources. This is one of the major challenges in VDTNs and incentive mechanisms are used as a major solution. This paper presents a detailed study of the recently proposed incentive schemes for VDTNs. This paper also gives some open challenges and future directions for interested researchers in the future.

This study describes the result of six transportation demand management (TDM) implementations in three major traffic concentration periods of 2009–2010 with an expressway pre-registration and incentive scheme for electronic toll collection (ETC) vehicles in order to mitigate traffic congestion of the Tomei Expressway in Japan. The new TDM scheme offers an incentive to a limited number of pre-registered target travelers selected by drawings, from the viewpoint of reducing revenue loss, after confirming the eligibility of their travel as specified by the new TDM scheme with the ETC data. This scheme is considered more useful than the early applied TDM scheme with toll discount. The operator can control the total cost in the new TDM scheme, avoiding the large revenue loss incurred by the operator because of the toll discount in the early TDM scheme. The new scheme also has the advantage of easily conducting web surveys of the registrants’ behavioural changes with regard to the TDM scheme. The characteristics of travelers’ behavioural changes and the implementation effects of the TDM scheme are described.

In federated learning (FL)‐assisted Internet of Things (IoT) systems, FL trains models using datasets on various client devices without sending the datasets to a centralized server. This approach enhances the accuracy and reliability of models while preserving the privacy of client devices. However, FL implementations face challenges, such as single point of server failure and lack of incentives. To address the server failure issue, a backup server can be added. Meanwhile, each FL client has varying data quality and motivations to participate, leading to differences in the quality of local models uploaded to the server. To motivate clients to contribute more, we designed a novel incentive mechanism based on the Stackelberg game. This mechanism allocates rewards based on the quality of the models each client uploads, rather than the amount of data trained. We separately modelled the utilities of the server and the clients, allowing the server to rationally allocate rewards based on each client's contribution to model training. After analysing the utilities, we transform the game into two optimization problems and develop an algorithm whose per‐round complexity scales linearly with the number of clients under fixed numerical tolerances. The obtained equilibrium matches exhaustive search within numerical precision while significantly reducing computation.

Electric vehicles (EV) are able to support the transition of sectors towards sustainability. The operation of these vehicles with renewable energies saves local and global emissions. Furthermore, fluctuating renewable energies can be integrated in existing energy systems by using electric vehicles for grid services. Thus, implementation of advantages requires market establishment of electric vehicles. The article provides a review on potentials of market development by comparing and studying costs of electric and conventional vehicles as well as effects of financial measures on costs of EV. These cost comparisons are based on market data and predictions of cost developments for private consumers in Germany. Costs are analysed by an economic model of Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), aiming to display financial proportionality between vehicles in different years of acquisition (2010 to 2030). In a further step, external financial measures are analysed and integrated in the cost model as one possibility to enhance and secure the market introduction. Findings demonstrate that higher costs of acquisition of electric vehicles cannot be compensated by lower costs of operation. While mobility costs of conventionally vehicles stay constant or even increase during the considered years, mobility costs of electric vehicles significantly decrease especially in the upcoming years. In all cases mobility costs of electric vehicles exceed costs of conventional vehicles, but differences are reduced from 19€ct in 2010 to 3€ct in 2030. Cost decreases of the battery have high influence on the increasing financial comparability of EV. Concerning financial measures especially a differentiation of energy prices and a compensation of grid services can help to decrease total costs of EV and to manage a shift from fossil energy resources to electricity in the mobility sector. The existing tax exemption for EV compensates only a little fraction (about 6%) of the cost difference. This highlights the importance of research on incentive schemes to support market integration of EV and thereby the integration of renewable energies in the mobility sector. This integration is supported by the possibility of storing surplus fluctuating renewable energy in the batteries of EV.