Explore the vast range of titles available.

Ghana has committed politically, legislatively, and fiscally to providing universal health insurance coverage for its population with the intent of reducing financial barriers to utilization of health care.. However, under current cost and enrollment projections the system will not be financially sustainable in the long term, so there is more work to do. This book provides an important evidence-based review of the current performance of Ghana's health system and options for reform. As such, it provides an overall picture of the Ghana health sector, how things were and how things have changed, as well as a situational analysis of the performance of the health delivery and health financing systems using the latest available data. Finally, it discusses key reform issues and options in the context of the country's likely fiscal space. An important and valuable contribution of this book is its examination of how Ghana is performing compared to its neighboring countries and compared to other countries with similar incomes and health spending, providing global benchmarks for Ghana's health system performance.

Strategic purchasing of health services involves a continuous search for the best ways to maximize health system performance by deciding which interventions should be purchased, from whom these should be purchased, and how to pay for them. In such an arrangement, the passive cashier is replaced by an intelligent purchaser that can focus scarce resources on existing and emerging priorities rather than continuing entrenched historical spending patterns. Having experimented with different ways of paying providers of health care services, countries increasingly want to know not only what to do when paying providers, but also how to do it, particularly how to design, manage, and implement the transition from current to reformed systems. 'Designing and Implementing Health Care Provider Payment Systems: How-To Manuals' addresses this need. The book has chapters on three of the most effective provider payment systems: primary care per capita (capitation) payment, case-based hospital payment, and hospital global budgets. It also includes a primer on a second policy lever used by purchasers, namely, contracting. This primer can be especially useful with one provider payment method: hospital global budgets. The volume's final chapter provides an outline for designing, launching, and running a health management information system, as well as the necessary infrastructure for strategic purchasing.

Many countries that subscribe to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have committed to ensuring access to basic health services for their citizens. Health insurance has been considered and promoted as the major financing mechanism to improve access to health services, as well as to provide financial risk protection. In Africa, several countries have already spent scarce time, money, and effort on health insurance initiatives. Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Tanzania are just a few of them. However, many of these schemes, both public and private, cover only a small proportion of the population, with the poor less likely to be covered. In fact, unless carefully designed to be pro-poor, health insurance can widen inequity as higher income groups are more likely to be insured and use health care services, taking advantage of their insurance coverage. The purpose of this handbook is to provide policy makers and health insurance designers with practical, action-oriented support that will deepen their understanding of health insurance concepts, help them identify design and implementation challenges, and define realistic steps for the development and scaling up of equitable, efficient, and sustainable health insurance schemes. The handbook takes policy makers and health insurance designers through a step-by-step series of considerations and tasks that need to be achieved. The handbook's philosophy is to not be dogmatic, ideological, or prescriptive. This handbook was prepared to be used in a six-day regional workshop. Clearly, health insurance design is an intensive political and technical process that takes much longer than six days. The expectation for the workshop is that by the end of the week, each team has a clear idea of next steps that they could take back home to engage other stakeholders and move toward scaling up and improving the performance of health insurance in their country.

Background Primary care providers (PCPs) are essential to increasing access to office-based buprenorphine medication treatment for opioid use disorder (B-MOUD). Barriers to B-MOUD prescribing are well-documented, but there is little information regarding incentives to overcome these barriers. Objective To identify optimal incentives for PCPs to promote B-MOUD prescribing and compare incentive preferences across provider and practice characteristics. Design We surveyed PCPs using best-worst scaling (BWS) to prioritize seven potential incentives for B-MOUD prescribing (monetary compensation, paid vacation, protected time, professional development, reduced workload, service recognition, clinical resources). We then used a direct elicitation approach to determine preferred incentive levels (e.g., monetary thresholds) and types (e.g., specific clinical resources). Participants Primary care physicians and advanced practice providers (APPs) at a large Department of Veterans Affairs healthcare system. Main Measures B-MOUD prescribing incentive preferences and relative preference levels using descriptive statistics and conditional logistic regression with relative importance scale transformation (coefficients sum to 100, higher coefficient=greater importance). Key Results Fifty-three PCPs responded (73% response), including 47% APPs and 36% from community-based clinics. Reduced workload (relative importance score=26.8), protected time (18.7), and clinical resources (16.8) were significantly more preferred ( P s < 0.001) than professional development (10.5), paid vacation (10.3), or service recognition (1.5). Relative importance of monetary compensation varied between physicians (12.6) and APPs (17.5) and between PCPs located at a medical center (11.4) versus community clinic (22.3). APPs were more responsive than physicians to compensation increases of $5000 and $12,000 but less responsive to $25,000; trends were similar for medical center versus community clinic PCPs. The most frequently requested clinical resource was on-demand consult access to an addiction specialist. Conclusions Interventions promoting workload reductions, protected time, and clinical resources could increase access to B-MOUD in primary care. Monetary incentives may be additionally needed to improve B-MOUD prescribing among APPs and within community clinics.

A Guide to Competitive Vouchers in Health provides a broad outline of the problems health systems face, the rationale behind government intervention particularly in the form of subsidies, and the different ways that governments and donors subsidize health care. The guide provides readers with an understanding of the concept of competitive voucher schemes in health; the advantages competitive voucher schemes might offer as an instrument to delivery subsidies; circumstances where competitive voucher schemes are better suited than other instruments to deliver subsidies; and steps to follow when designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating a competitive voucher scheme. Aimed at raising awareness among policymakers about voucher schemes, this book helps identify situations where vouchers may better achieve health objectives and provides guidance on the choices available and the decisions to be made. It highlights some of the pitfalls that voucher schemes have experienced to date, as well as the wide variation in format that a voucher scheme can take depending upon the health problems being addressed and the objectives that the policy-maker wishes to achieve.

Vietnam's successes in the health sector are remarkable. Between 2000 and 2005, Vietnam achieved reductions in mortality rates for all ages, while some of its neighbors saw little change or even increases. To date, its infant and under-five mortality rates are comparable to those of countries with substantially higher per capita incomes. According to the data assembled in 'Health Financing and Delivery in Vietnam', the country continues to perform strongly in the sector, but its health care system is facing new challenges, as do those of other countries. By international standards, for example, a large percentage of Vietnamese households make out-of-pocket health care payments that exceed a reasonable fraction of their income. The country has been expanding the breadth of health insurance coverage, but questions remain on how to further expand coverage, how to decrease health care costs, and how to increase the overall quality of care. 'Health Financing and Delivery in Vietnam' reviews the country's successes and the challenges it faces, and suggests some options for further reforming the country's health system. These include the issue of stewardship—what different parts of government (for example, the Health Ministry and the health insurer) should be doing at each level of government, and what different levels of government (for example, the central government and the provincial government) ought to be doing. 'Health Financing and Delivery in Vietnam' will be of interest to readers working in the areas of public health and social analysis and policy.

Although mandatory health insurance programs are being proposed or expanded in many developing countries, relatively little attention has been given to how these programs are governed. The available literature focuses almost exclusively on operational features that are important but will necessarily change over time—such as eligibility, benefit packages, and premiums. Governing Mandatory Health Insurance instead looks at the institutional and political forces that affect the behavior of such programs within their social and historical contexts and how five dimensions of governance—coherent decision-making structures, stakeholder participation, transparency and information, supervision and regulation, and consistency and stability—can influence the long-term performance of health insurance programs in terms of coverage, financial protection, efficiency, and sustainability. Governing Mandatory Health Insurance addresses these issues by drawing on the experiences of four countries—Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, and the Netherlands. It shows how governance works in these countries and extracts lessons for developing countries with mandatory health insurance programs, focusing on the mechanisms for assuring solvency, financial protection, and health care services of good quality.

As an awardee of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Colorectal Cancer Control Program, the California Department of Public Health partnered with Neighborhood Healthcare to implement evidence-based interventions and provider incentives (incentives offered to support staff, e.g., medical assistants, phlebotomists, front office staff, lab technicians) to improve colorectal cancer screening uptake. The objective of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness and cost of the provider incentive intervention implemented by Neighborhood Healthcare to increase colorectal cancer screening uptake. We collected and analyzed process and cost data to assess fecal immunochemical test (FIT) kit return rates to the health centers and the number of completed FIT kits. We estimated the costs of the preexisting interventions and the new interventions. Analyses were conducted for two time periods: preimplementation and implementation. Most Neighborhood Healthcare health centers experienced an increase in the percentage of FIT kit returns (average of 3.6 percentage points) and individuals screened (an average increase of 111 FIT kits per month) from the baseline period through the implementation period. The cost of the incentive intervention for each additional screen was $66.79. In conclusion, the results indicate that incentive programs can have an overall positive impact on both the percentage of FIT kits returned and the number of individuals screened.

Global budget (GB) arrangements have become a popular method worldwide to control the rise in healthcare expenditures. By guaranteeing hospital funding, payers hope to eliminate the drive for increased production, and incentivize providers to deliver more efficient care and lower utilization. We evaluated the introduction of GB contracts by certain large insurers in Dutch hospital care in 2012 and compared health care utilization to those insurers who continued with more traditional production-based contracts, i.e., cost ceiling (CC) contracts. We used the share of GB hospital funding per postal code region to study the effect of contract types. Our findings show that having higher share of GB financing was associated with lower growth in treatment intensity, but it was also associated with higher growth in the probability of having at least one hospital visit. While the former finding is in line with our expectation, the latter is not and suggests that hospital visits may take longer to respond to contract incentives. Our study covers the years of 2010-2013 (2 years before and 2 years following the introduction of the new contracts). Therefore, our results capture only short-term effects.

Abrupt jumps in reimbursement tariffs have been shown to lead to unintended effects in physicians’ behavior. A sudden change in tariffs at a pre-defined point in the treatment can incentivize health care providers to prolong treatment to reach the higher tariff, and then to discharge patients once the higher tariff is reached. The Dutch reimbursement schedule in hospital rehabilitation care follows a two-threshold stepwise-function based on treatment duration. We investigated the prevalence of strategic discharges around the first threshold and assessed whether their share varies by provider type. Our findings suggest moderate response to incentives by traditional care providers (general and academic hospitals, rehabilitation centers and multicategorical providers), and strong response by profit-oriented independent treatment centers. When examining the variation in response based on the financial position of the organization, we found a higher probability of manipulation among providers in financial distress. Our findings provide multiple insights and possible indicators to identify provider types that may be more prone to strategic behavior.