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Non-technical summaryGlobal income inequality and energy consumption inequality are related. High-income households consume more energy than low-income ones, and for different purposes. Here, we explore the global household energy consumption implications of global income redistribution. We show that global income inequality shapes not only inequalities of energy consumption but the quantity and composition of overall energy demand. Our results call for the inclusion of income distribution into energy system models, as well as into energy and climate policy.Technical summaryDespite a rapidly growing number of studies on the relationship between inequality and energy, there is little research estimating the effect of income redistribution on energy demand. We contribute to this debate by proposing a simple but granular and data-driven model of the global income distribution and of global household energy consumption. We isolate the effect of income distribution on household energy consumption and move beyond the assumption of aggregate income–energy elasticities. First, we model expenditure as a function of income. Second, we determine budget shares of expenditure for a variety of products and services by employing product-granular income elasticities of demand. Subsequently, we apply consumption-based final energy intensities to product and services to obtain energy footprint accounts. Testing variants of the global income distribution, we find that the ‘energy costs’ of equity are small. Equitable and inequitable distributions of income, however, entail distinct structural change in energy system terms. In an equitable world, fewer people live in energy poverty and more energy is consumed for subsistence and necessities, instead of luxury and transport.Social media summaryEquality in global income shifts household energy footprints towards subsistence, while inequality shifts them towards transport and luxury.

In this study, we elucidate the income redistribution effects of the proposal to incorporate the Bend Points mechanism of the U.S. OASDI into the Korean National Pension Scheme (BP-KNPS Proposal) through a micro-simulation analysis using individual data from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS). In addition to examining the effects of introducing the BP-KNPS Proposal into the current National Pension Scheme (NPS), we also consider the impact of this scheme being combined with the 5th National Pension Comprehensive Plan (Draft), announced by Korea's Ministry of Health and Welfare on 30 October 2023. When the BP-KNPS Proposal is introduced into the current NPS, the Mean Log Deviation (MLD) of the net transfer amount (lifetime pension benefits minus lifetime pension contributions) for regular employees decreases from 0.2022863 to 0.1929960. Similarly, the MLD for self-employed and irregular workers decreases from 0.2046127 to 0.1721433, indicating a reduction in income inequality. Furthermore, when the BP-KNPS Proposal is combined with the 5th National Pension Comprehensive Plan (Draft), the effects are mixed. The proposals to increase the pension contribution rate and adjust the rate increase speed via generation lead to a reduction in income inequality compared to the current NPS when combined with the BP-KNPS Proposal. However, the proposals to raise the pensionable age result in increased income inequality, similar to the outcomes under the current system. This finding suggests that the triple burden identified by literature review - the reduction in benefits due to disparities in contribution periods and life expectancy, and the raised pensionable age - has a greater impact on low-income participants than the inequality-reducing effects of the BP-KNPS Proposal.

It is the focus of social security system reform at this stage in China to promote the transition of basic endowment insurance for urban employees from provincial overall planning level to national overall planning level, which is of great significance to the realization of fair and efficient of economic development. Based on the micro data of China Household Finance Survey 2017 (CHFS2017), this paper first establishes a personal wage prediction model to estimate the distribution of personal lifetime wage income, then designs two pension collection and payment plans of “direct national overall planning” and “indirect national overall planning”, and establishes an actuarial model of pension to calculate the present value of personal lifetime contribution, lifetime claim and lifetime real wage income after pension adjustment under different overall planning levels. Finally, the income gap index and net benefit rate index are used to measure the change of the whole income gap and the transfer of pension benefits. The results show that on the whole, the basic endowment insurance for urban employees does have a significant income redistribution effect, and its income adjustment effect is positively related to the overall planning level and intensity of the system. Under the current provincial overall planning level, the income redistribution effects of the system are as follows: the high-income group transfers to the low-income group, the young generation to the elderly generation, the female insured person to the male insured person, and the non-state-owned economic unit to the state-owned economic unit. With the improvement of the overall planning level and strengthening of intensity, there are differences in the changes of benefits among different groups.

We use a tailor-made survey on a Swedish sample to investigate how individuals’ relative income affects their demand for redistribution. We first document that a majority misperceive their position in the income distribution and believe that they are poorer, relative to others, than they actually are. We then inform a subsample about their true relative income and find that individuals who are richer than they initially thought demand less redistribution. This result is driven by individuals with prior right-of-center political preferences who view taxes as distortive and believe that effort, rather than luck, drives individual economic success.

We theoretically illustrate how the aversion to unfairness triggers an unselfish though rational demand for redistribution. This leads the well-off to demand positive tax rates and the \"poor\" to reject extreme progressivity. We prove that the \"rich\" and the \"poor\" adjust their demand for redistribution in opposite ways when their sensitivity to fairness increases: while agents with above average expected income raise their demand for redistribution, agents with below average income lower it. We then provide empirical evidence of these behaviors using a nationally representative survey from Italy. The estimates confirm that a stronger aversion to unfair distributive outcomes is associated with a higher support for redistribution by individuals with high income and to a lower demand for redistribution by those with low income.

Why is the difference in redistribution preferences between the rich and the poor high in some countries and low in others? In this article, we argue that it has a lot to do with the rich and very little to do with the poor. We contend that while there is a general relative income effect on redistribution preferences, the preferences of the rich are highly dependent on the macrolevel of inequality. The reason for this effect is not related to immediate tax and transfer considerations but to a negative externality of inequality: crime. We will show that the rich in more unequal regions in Western Europe are more supportive of redistribution than the rich in more equal regions because of their concern with crime. In making these distinctions between the poor and the rich, the arguments in this article challenge some influential approaches to the politics of inequality.

We investigate the relationship between inequality, redistribution, and growth using a recently-compiled dataset that distinguishes clearly between market (pre-tax and transfer) and net (post tax and transfer) inequality, and allows us to calculate redistributive transfers for a large number of advanced and developing countries. Across a variety of estiWe mation methods, data samples, and robustness checks, we find: (1) lower net inequality is robustly correlated with faster and more durable growth, controlling for the level of redistribution; (2) redistribution appears benign in terms of its impact on growth, except when it is extensive; and (3) inequality seems to affect growth through human capital accumulation and fertility channels.

Income inequality in the USA has increased over the past four decades. Socioeconomic gaps in survival have also increased. Life expectancy has risen among middle-income and high-income Americans whereas it has stagnated among poor Americans and even declined in some demographic groups. Although the increase in income inequality since 1980 has been driven largely by soaring top incomes, the widening of survival inequalities has occurred lower in the distribution—ie, between the poor and upper-middle class. Growing survival gaps across income percentiles since 2001 reflect falling real incomes among poor Americans as well as an increasingly strong association between low income and poor health. Changes in individual risk factors such as smoking, obesity, and substance abuse play a part but do not fully explain the steeper gradient. Distal factors correlated with rising inequality including unequal access to technological innovations, increased geographical segregation by income, reduced economic mobility, mass incarceration, and increased exposure to the costs of medical care might have reduced access to salutary determinants of health among low-income Americans. Having missed out on decades of income growth and longevity gains, low-income Americans are increasingly left behind. Without interventions to decouple income and health, or to reduce inequalities in income, we might see the emergence of a 21st century health-poverty trap and the further widening and hardening of socioeconomic inequalities in health.

The distribution of wealth in the United States and countries around the world is highly skewed. How does visible economic inequality affect well-off individuals’ support for redistribution? Using a placebo-controlled field experiment, I randomize the presence of poverty-stricken people in public spaces frequented by the affluent. Passersby were asked to sign a petition calling for greater redistribution through a “millionaire’s tax.” Results from 2,591 solicitations show that in a real-world-setting exposure to inequality decreases affluent individuals’ willingness to redistribute. The finding that exposure to inequality begets inequality has fundamental implications for policymakers and informs our understanding of the effects of poverty, inequality, and economic segregation. Confederate race and socioeconomic status, both of which were randomized, are shown to interact such that treatment effects vary according to the race, as well as gender, of the subject.

We present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are “last-place averse.” Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. In modified dictator games, participants randomly placed in second-to-last place are the most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below. Last-place aversion suggests that low-income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them. Using survey data, we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase. Similarly, in the General Social Survey, those above poverty but below median income support redistribution significantly less than their background characteristics would predict.