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"INFORMATION DISCLOSURE"
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More Than You Wanted to Know
Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure-requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well.More Than You Wanted to Knowsurveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices?
Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers' panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite.
Timely and provocative,More Than You Wanted to Knowtakes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.
eBook
Whistleblowers, leakers, and their networks : from Snowden to samizdat
\"Using conceptual innovations and case studies, this book clarifies the much-discussed but understudied phenomena of leaking and whistleblowing, with a particular focus on the collaborative networks that make the extraction and publication of secrets possible\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Blockchain’s role in e-commerce sellers’ decision-making on information disclosure under competition
In e-commerce, sellers can disclose product information (such as quality, size information, function, and so on) to make consumers understand the products. However, in the process of information disclosure, consumers often fall into information distortion or information loss. Because of its immutability and traceability, blockchain can help e-commerce sellers improve information disclosure and ensure the efficiency of information transmission. We study a duopoly competitive e-commerce market in which two e-commerce sellers compete in information disclosure. According to whether to apply blockchain, we divide the sellers’ decision-making into four research scenarios (NN, BN, NB, BB). Based on the above four scenarios, we get the market demand of different products depending on the consumer utility, and further establish the game model in the competitive environment. This paper explores the impact of blockchain on information disclosure and consumer surplus, and achieves the Nash equilibrium of blockchain application for both sides. In the expansion model, we study e-commerce sellers’ risk aversion and capital constraints, and further explore their impact on blockchain in practice. Finally, combining with blockchain’s characteristics, we also analyze the impact of the application of blockchain at other aspects on the supply chain. We find that when consumers' trust in information is low or the cost of blockchain applications is low, all e-commerce sellers in competition will adopt blockchain. In addition, when consumers have low trust in information, it will be difficult to achieve complete equilibrium in the application of blockchain as their risk aversion increases. For capital constrained sellers, when the cost of blockchain application is low, it will be difficult to achieve full equilibrium for blockchain applicants as the bank financing rate increases.
Journal Article
Competing with Privacy
We analyze the implications of consumer privacy for competition in the marketplace. Firms compete for consumer information and derive revenues both from consumer purchases as well as from disclosing consumer information in a secondary market. Consumers choose which firm to patronize and how much personal information to provide it with. We show that firms maximize profits by focusing on a single revenue source and competing at the extensive rather than the intensive margin, outperforming competitors by attracting a larger customer base. We also show that competition drives the provision of services with a low level of consumer information disclosure (high level of privacy), but higher competition intensity in the marketplace need not improve privacy when consumers exhibit low willingness to pay. Our findings are relevant to the business models of Internet firms and contribute to inform the regulatory debate on consumer privacy.
This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.
Journal Article
Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions under which full and no revelation are optimal. Assuming further that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type, I provide conditions under which interval revelation is optimal. Finally, I show that the expected utilities are not monotonic in the precision of the receiver's private information.
Journal Article
Whistleblowers : Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden and others
Whistleblowers are both celebrated and reviled. They expose illegal or unconscionable actions by a government official or organization, the dangerous practices or financial fraud of a corporation, or the perjury of a high-profile witness. The reasons that motivate whistleblowers are as diverse as the crimes and misdeeds they expose. Through articles written at the time of events, this book introduces readers to some of the most famous whistleblowers in recent history. These include Mark Felt, aka \"Deep Throat,\" whose information helped uncover the Watergate scandal; Chelsea Manning, who, as Bradley Manning, shared classified documents revealing unsavory, untruthful, and potentially illegal activity by the United States government in the Middle East; and Grigory Rodchenkov, the doctor who exposed Russia's state-sponsored doping program.
Book
Can Environmental Information Disclosure Improve Energy Efficiency in Manufacturing? Evidence from Chinese Enterprises
Improving the energy efficiency of enterprises is one of the key means to solve the problem of energy shortage. It is of great significance to investigate how environmental information disclosure (EDI) promotes the green total factor energy efficiency (GTFEE) of enterprises. Based on this, this study calculates the GTFEE of enterprises by combining the database of Chinese manufacturing and the pollutant emission of industrial enterprises and investigates the impact of EDI on the GTFEE of manufacturing industries by using a difference-in-difference model. The following is found: (1) EDI can significantly promote the manufacturing enterprises’ GTFEE, and the results are still valid after a series of robustness tests; (2) Mechanism analysis shows that EDI can improve the GTFEE of manufacturing enterprises by promoting technological innovation and optimizing energy structure; (3) The heterogeneity analysis shows that EID is more positive on firms’ GTFEE in the eastern than western regions. The positive impact is greater for non-state-owned, low-energy consumption, export, and polluting enterprises. The findings of this paper provide a theoretical basis and practical enlightenment for the government to promote the green development transformation of enterprises.
Journal Article