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"INSTITUTION"
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The bankers' new clothes
2014,2013
What is wrong with today's banking system? The past few years have shown that risks in banking can impose significant costs on the economy. Many claim, however, that a safer banking system would require sacrificing lending and economic growth.The Bankers' New Clothesexamines this claim and the narratives used by bankers, politicians, and regulators to rationalize the lack of reform, exposing them as invalid.
Admati and Hellwig argue we can have a safer and healthier banking system without sacrificing any of the benefits of the system, and at essentially no cost to society. They show that banks are as fragile as they are not because they must be, but because they want to be--and they get away with it. Whereas this situation benefits bankers, it distorts the economy and exposes the public to unnecessary risks. Weak regulation and ineffective enforcement allowed the buildup of risks that ushered in the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Much can be done to create a better system and prevent crises. Yet the lessons from the crisis have not been learned.
Admati and Hellwig seek to engage the broader public in the debate by cutting through the jargon of banking, clearing the fog of confusion, and presenting the issues in simple and accessible terms.The Bankers' New Clothescalls for ambitious reform and outlines specific and highly beneficial steps that can be taken immediately.
Individualism, pro-market institutions, and national innovation
2021
Previous research suggests that both formal institutions (e.g., pro-market institutions) and informal institutions (e.g., individualistic cultural values) are critical drivers of innovation. Most studies, however, consider the independent role of either formal or informal institutions. We contribute to this gap in the literature by exploring the potential interaction between informal institutions, measured by Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism index, and formal institutions, measured by the Economic Freedom of the World index (i.e., pro-market institutions). Using cross-sectional data for a diverse sample of 84 countries, we find that both individualism and pro-market institutions are positively associated with innovation. However, the extent to which pro-market institutions promote innovation depends largely on how individualistic a country is and vice versa. For example, more individualistic countries tend to be more innovative, but even the most individualistic countries have below-average levels of innovation when their formal institutional environment lacks market support. At the same time, our findings suggest that the most innovative countries tend to have both strong pro-market institutions and individualistic cultural values.
Journal Article
Official guide to the Smithsonian
The Smithsonian Institution holds more than 142 million artifacts and specimens in its trust. This colorful guide to the museums and galleries on the National Mall, in the Washington metropolitan area, and in New York City presents an enormous amount of history and pertinent museum information, ensuring a rewarding visit. Each detailed section presents the history of the museums and offers a fully illustrated, gallery-by-gallery tour. All the practical information--location, hours, phone numbers, public transportation, services, tours, dining, gift shops, special attractions for children, web site addresses--is also included. With so much to see and do, this is the definitive source of all the information in one place. -- Publisher.
Rents and economic development
2019
We present the approach to comparative economic development of Why Nations Fail. Economic prosperity requires inclusive economic institutions—those which create broad based incentives and opportunities in society. Extractive economic institutions, which lack these properties, create poverty. Variation in economic institutions is created by differences in political institutions. Inclusive economic institutions are the result of political choices which arise under inclusive political institutions: a strong state and a broad distribution of power in society. When either of these conditions fails one has extractive political institutions that lead to extractive economic institutions. We relate our analysis to Tullock’s notion of ‘rent seeking’.
Journal Article
Does social trust affect international contracting? Evidence from foreign bond covenants
2022
Building on rational choice institutionalism theory and Williamson’s (J Econ Lit 38(3): 595–613, 2000) four-level social analysis framework, we investigate the influence of the informal institution of social trust on debt contract design in an international setting. Using a sample of non-U.S. firms that issue bonds in the U.S. debt market, we find that Yankee bond creditors impose fewer covenants on bond issuers domiciled in countries with a high degree of social trust. We further show that the inverse relationship between debt covenants and the informal institution of social trust is more pronounced for firms from countries with weak formal institutions, as well as for firms with poor corporate governance and greater information opacity. These findings are robust to endogeneity tests, within-country analysis, various empirical models and measures of trust, and alternative hypotheses. We also show that, while a lower level of informal social trust is associated with higher borrowing costs, this relationship weakens when formal covenants are added to the debt contract (i.e., a substitution effect). Our paper contributes to the international business literature by providing new insights into the role of informal institutions (social trust) in cross-border debt contracting.
Journal Article