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This essay addresses the climate-change externality—its sources, its potential impacts, and the policy tools that are available to stem the rising tides and damages that this externality will likely bring to humans and the natural world. It draws upon my writings in the area, most of which are cited in the references.

In this article, we review a growing empirical literature on the effects of personal taxation on the geographic mobility of people and discuss its policy implications. We start by laying out the empirical challenges that prevented progress in this area and then discuss how recent work has made use of new data sources and quasi-experimental approaches to credibly estimate migration responses. This body of work has shown that certain segments of the labor market, especially high-income workers and professions with little location-specific human capital, may be quite responsive to taxes in their location decisions. When considering the implications for tax policy design, we distinguish between uncoordinated and coordinated tax policy. We highlight the importance of recognizing that mobility elasticities are not exogenous, structural parameters. They can vary greatly depending on the population being analyzed, the size of the tax jurisdiction, the extent of tax policy coordination, and a range of non-tax policies. While migration responses add to the efficiency costs of redistributing income, we caution against over-using the recent evidence of (sizeable) mobility responses to taxes as an argument for less redistribution in a globalized world.

This paper analyzes the transfer pricing of multinational firms. Intrafirm prices may systematically deviate from arm’s-length prices for two motives: pricing to market and tax avoidance. Using French firm-level data on arm’s-length and intrafirm export prices, we find that the sensitivity of intrafirm prices to foreign taxes is reinforced once we control for pricing-to-market determinants. Most important, we find no evidence of tax avoidance if we disregard tax haven destinations. Tax avoidance through transfer pricing is economically sizable. The bulk of this loss is driven by the exports of 450 firms to ten tax havens.

This paper develops theory suggesting that, relative to purely domestic firms, multinational enterprises (MNE) have greater incentives and strategic and operational means to respond to expanding carbon emissions constraints. We test our resulting hypotheses with data on changes in carbon emissions by over 6,000 industrial plants during Phase 2 (2008–2012) of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme. We find that MNE maintain: (1) consistent carbon reductions across institutional contexts, and (2) an overall carbon performance edge over domestic firms. The carbon performance gap between MNEs and domestic firms narrowed, however, in host countries transitioning towards more stringent market regulatory systems. By demonstrating that the effects of national and international carbon regulations on firm behavior interact in important ways with each other and with firm characteristics, this paper deepens understanding of how institutions are likely to shape the ongoing energy transition towards a low-carbon economy.

This article shows that official statistics substantially underestimate the net foreign asset positions of rich countries because they fail to capture most of the assets held by households in offshore tax havens. Drawing on a unique Swiss data set and exploiting systematic anomalies in countries’ portfolio investment positions, I find that around 8% of the global financial wealth of households is held in tax havens, three-quarters of which goes unrecorded. On the basis of plausible assumptions, accounting for unrecorded assets turns the eurozone, officially the world’s second largest net debtor, into a net creditor. It also reduces the U.S. net debt significantly. The results shed new light on global imbalances and challenge the widespread view that after a decade of poor-to-rich capital flows, external assets are now in poor countries and debts in rich countries. I provide concrete proposals to improve international statistics.

This paper provides a quantitative review of the empirical literature on profit-shifting behaviour of multinational firms. We synthesize the evidence from 27 studies and find a substantial response of profit measures to international tax rate differentials. Accounting for confounding factors by means of meta-regressions, we predict a tax semi-elasticity of subsidiary pre-tax profits of about 0.8. Moreover, we disentangle the tax response by means of financial planning from the transfer pricing and licensing channel. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that transfer pricing and licensing are the dominant profit-shifting channels. Ce mémoire fournit une revue quantitative de la littérature empirique sur le comportement de déplacement des profits desfirmes plurinationales. On synthétise les résultats de 27 études et on découvre qu’il existe une réponse substantielle des mesures de profit aux différentiels dans les taux d’imposition entre nations. Tenant compte des facteurs confusionnels grâce aux méta-régressions, on prédit une semi-élasticité des impôts des profits avant-taxes desfiliales de l’ordre de 0,8. De plus, on déméle la composante de la réponse fiscale attribuable á la planification financiére de celle attribuable aux prix de cession interne et à la concession de licences. Des calculs préliminaires suggérent que ce sont à les canaux principaux de déplacement des profits.

U.S. industrial firms invest heavily in noncash, risky financial assets such as corporate debt, equity, and mortgage-backed securities. Risky assets represent 40% of firms' financial portfolios, or 6% of total book assets. We present a formal model to assess the optimality of this behavior. Consistent with the model, risky assets are concentrated in financially unconstrained firms holding large financial portfolios, are held by poorly governed firms, and are discounted by 13% to 22% compared to safe assets. We conclude that this activity represents an unregulated asset management industry of more than $1.5 trillion, questioning the traditional boundaries of nonfinancial firms.

What has driven the dramatic rise in U.S. corporate cash? Using non-public data, we show that the run-up is not uniform across firms but is concentrated in the foreign subsidiaries of multinational firms. Standard precautionary motives explain only domestic cash holdings, not these burgeoning foreign cash balances. Falling foreign tax rates, coupled with relaxed restrictions on income shifting, are the root of the changing foreign cash patterns. Firms with intellectual property have the greatest ability to shift income to low tax jurisdictions, and their foreign subsidiaries are where we observe the largest accumulations of cash.

We use a shock to the public scrutiny of firm subsidiary locations to investigate whether that scrutiny leads to changes in firms' disclosure and corporate tax avoidance behavior. ActionAid International, a nonprofit activist group, levied public pressure on noncompliant U.K. firms in the FTSE 100 to comply with a rule requiring U.K. firms to disclose the location of all of their subsidiaries. We use this setting to examine whether the public pressure led scrutinized firms to increase their subsidiary disclosure, decrease tax avoidance, and reduce the use of subsidiaries in tax haven countries compared to other firms in the FTSE 100 not affected by the public pressure. The evidence suggests that the public scrutiny sufficiently changed the costs and benefits of tax avoidance such that tax expense increased for scrutinized firms. The results suggest that public pressure from outside activist groups can exert a significant influence on the behavior of large, publicly traded firms. Our findings extend prior research that has had little success documenting an empirical relation between public scrutiny of tax avoidance and firm behavior.

Calculating the consequences of global public bads such as climate change or pandemics helps uncover the scale, distribution and structure of their economic burdens. As violent conflict affects billions of people worldwide, whether directly or indirectly, this article sets out to estimate its global macro-economic repercussions. Using a novel methodology that accounts for multiple dimensions of war, the article finds that, in the absence of violent conflict since 1970, the level of global GDP in 2014 would have been, on average, 12% higher. When disaggregating these results by conflict type, civil conflicts are estimated to have been the costliest by far. Income growth is found to be altered up to four years following the end of a conflict, although the direction of this relationship depends on the intensity and type of conflict. Countries also suffer significantly from fighting in neighbouring countries, thereby showing the importance of mitigating spillovers rapidly. The largest absolute losses associated with violence emanate from Asia, while many high-income economies are found to benefit economically from participating in conflicts on foreign soil. This analysis thus shows that, despite some evidence of a faster post-conflict growth and possible benefits for external participants, violent conflict leads to net global losses that linger long after peace is achieved, reducing the peace dividend. The article concludes by discussing public policy options to strengthen the benefits of peace as a global public good.