Explore the vast range of titles available.

Islamists in a Zionist Coalition: The Political and Religious Origins  explores the decision made in 2021 by the United Arab List, the political arm of the Southern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel (SIM), to join the Israeli Zionist coalition for the first time, and specifically how and why it was possible for an Islamist movement to.

Since its establishment in the late 1970s, Israel's Islamic Movement has grown from a small religious revivalist organization focused on strengthening the faith of Muslim Palestinian citizens of Israel to a countrywide sociopolitical movement with representation in the Israeli legislature. But how did it get here? How does it differ from other Islamic movements in the region? And why does its membership continue to grow? Tilde Rosmer examines these issues in The Islamic Movement in Israel as she tells the story of the movement, its identity, and its activities. Using interviews with movement leaders and activists, their documents, and media reports from Israel and beyond, she traces the movement's history from its early days to its 1996 split over the issue of its relationship to the state. She then explores how the two factions have functioned since, revealing that while leaders of the two branches have pursued different approaches to the state, until the outlawing of the Northern Branch in 2015, both remained connected and dedicated to providing needed social, education, and health services in Israel's Palestinian towns and villages. The first book in English on this group, The Islamic Movement in Israel is a timely study about how an Islamist movement operates within the unique circumstances of the Jewish state.

The power of the “moderate” branch of the Islamic Movement (Alharaka al-Islamiyya, subsequently referred to as IM) Southern Faction (IMSF) in Israel stems from its ability to adapt to different situations, reconcile with the complex reality of being an indigenous minority in a state that defines itself a “Jewish state”, and operate within the state structure accepting democratic processes that have long been debated to clash with Islamism. Besides being represented in the Israeli Knesset since 1996, the culmination of this adaptation was the joining of the movement to the short-lived Zionist coalition government on 2 June 2021 (the government collapsed in July 2022). This historic entry of an Arab Party into a Jewish/Zionist government coalition for the first time in Israel’s history was a shocking surprise to many, not only due to the IM being an Arab–Palestinian movement but also an Islamist movement. My analysis shows that despite this reconciliation, the IM continues to emphasize religiosity, binding it to the national political struggle and identity of Israel’s Palestinian minority. For its supporters, the IMSF is seen as a meeting point of spiritual/religious needs on the one hand and material needs in the social, political, and cultural spheres on the other. However, for its opponents, mainly from the other Arab political parties, the IM had deviated from the national consensus and accepted strategies and tools to deal with the challenges facing them as a minority in Israel. And, for some others, the IM had even deviated from Islam itself. I draw on a field study that spanned several years. It is based on qualitative, extensive interviews with senior Islamist and non-Islamist leaders in Israel, as well as primary sources of the IM, including publications, leaders’ speeches, and social media. All quotes in this article are based on the author’s interviews during 2022–2024. Interviews with the following leaders and activists: IM leader Abdul-Malik Dahamsheh, sheik Ibrahim Sarsour, former MK Muhammad Hasan Ken`an, Nosiba Darwish `Issa, IM MK Eman Yassin Khatib, NDA’ chairman Sami Abu Shehadeh, secretary general of Abnaa al-Balad (Sons of the Country) Muhammad Kana`neh, and with Kufr Qare` former mayor Zuhair Yahya were conducted by in-person or by phone during summer–fall 2023. The interviews with former IMNF activist Aisha Hajjar, activist Zuhriyyeh ‘Azab, journalist Abd el-Rahman Magadleh, and DFPE member Elias Abu Oksa were conducted via What’s App, Messenger, and e-mail in 2022. The interview with political analyst Ameer Makhoul was conducted in December 2023 via Messenger. Follow-up communication was mainly through What’s App to clarify certain points. The interview questions focused on the reasons for the Islamic Movement’s division into two wings, the religious and political justifications for entering the Knesset and the coalition, the relationship between the southern wing and the main Arab parties active in the Israeli Knesset, the experience of unity with them, and the experience of its members while in the Zionist coalition. This article examines how the Islamic Movement in Israel uses religion as a tool to influence the national, cultural, political, economic, and social lives of the Arab minority in Israel. It asks: How does the Islamic Movement, religiously and politically, justify its involvement in the political game and in a Zionist government coalition, and how do Arab parties perceive this involvement? Moreover, it raises an important question about the nature of the movement: to what extent is the Islamic Movement a political Islam movement, and whether it has abandoned the basic goals of political Islam for the sake of becoming a democratic Islamic party? This article will provide significant insight into crucial aspects of the IM that have been previously overlooked. While being in a Zionist coalition gave hardly any latitude in decision making about policies, budgets were an attractive avenue for the Islamic Movement to guide public opinion and gain political support. The article comes during the ongoing war on Gaza, which will undoubtedly cast a shadow on the political climate and the political map in Israel in general and on the political work of Arab parties and the Islamic Movement in particular. Although it is too early to predict the impact of this war on the Islamic Movement and its political future, it can be assumed that the impact will be profound.

This article describes changes in the ‘religious geography’ of Thailand’s Malay-dominated southern provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat since the 1960s. These have been led by a range of religious entrepreneurs returning to these parts of southern Thailand from the Middle East and South Asia. We begin by conceptualizing local Islamic diversity in ways that move beyond binaries such as the new and old schools (kaum muda–kaum tua) and accept that the vast majority of Malays in southern Thailand remain conservative, rural traditionalists. We provide relevant details about the background, overseas educational influences and the forms of religious activism pursued by leaders of local modernist, reformist and revivalist religious franchises. We also point out the different strategies pursued by these religious entrepreneurs and that the operational centres for many of these movements are located in Yala. This article argues that Middle Eastern influences in southern Thailand have been exaggerated, while South Asian influences have been overlooked, and that the Malaysian State of Kelantan has played an important role in diversifying the religious geography of these southern provinces.

In The Promise of Piety, Arsalan Khan examines the zealous commitment to a distinct form of face-to-face preaching (dawat) among Pakistani Tablighis, practitioners of the transnational Islamic piety movement the Tablighi Jamaat. This group says that Muslims have abandoned their religious duties for worldly pursuits, creating a state of moral chaos apparent in the breakdown of relationships in the family, nation, and global Islamic community. Tablighis insist that this dire situation can only be remedied by drawing Muslims back to Islam through dawat, which they regard as the sacred means for spreading Islamic virtue. In a country founded in the name of Muslim identity and where Islam is ubiquitous in public life, the Tablighi claim that Pakistani Muslims have abandoned Islam is particularly striking. The Promise of Piety shows how Tablighis constitute a distinct form of pious relationality in the ritual processes and everyday practices of dawat and how pious relationality serves as a basis for transforming domestic and public life. Khan explores both the promise and limits of the Tablighi project of creating an Islamic moral order that can transcend the political fragmentation and violence of life in postcolonial Pakistan.

Religious literacy is essential for understanding religion and for the foundation of an ideal religious identity. However, the current situation among the younger generation indicates a declining interest in religious learning and in reading classical Islamic literature. This condition presents a significant challenge, as a proper understanding of religion is crucial for fostering a peaceful and tolerant society. Through the use of a constructivist paradigm, this qualitative phenomenological study observes how a relatively understudied Islamic transnational movement in Indonesia, known as Jamaah Nur, transmits the mainstream thoughts of Said Nursi and promotes religious literacy among young Muslims. The research focuses on the Nur Semesta Foundation, as the official representative of Jamaah Nur in Indonesia, and examines how its Religious Literacy Programs are implemented and experienced by participating students. Data were collected through participatory observation, in-depth interviews with thirteen informants, and document analysis, and were then thematically analysed to identify shared meanings and lived experiences. The findings indicate that the Religious Literacy Program operates through three main initiatives: the Regular Reading Program, the Said Nursi Corner, and the Risalah Nur Press. These initiatives have proven effective in cultivating reading habits, expanding religious understanding, and influencing participants’ moral behaviour, particularly among students residing in dormitories. They also foster motivation to disseminate Said Nursi’s transformative ideas within the wider Muslim community.

This article offers a comparative analysis of authoritarian governance in Egypt and Türkiye through the lens of two pivotal state–Islamist alliances: the early partnership and eventual rupture between Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and the strategic collaboration followed by confrontation between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Gülen Movement (GM). Despite operating in different historical and institutional settings—a postcolonial military regime in Egypt and an electoral, hybrid regime in Türkiye—both leaders allied with influential religious actors during moments of transition to gain popular support and dismantle entrenched power structures. These alliances were instrumental and temporary: once religious movements developed autonomous influence, they were recast as threats and suppressed through legal, institutional, and religious mechanisms. This study traces how religious institutions like Egypt’s al-Azhar and Türkiye’s Diyanet were co-opted to delegitimize these former allies and justify state repression. While the MB pursued overt political goals and the GM functioned through civic and technocratic channels, both were ultimately excluded from the political order once they had been considered as threats to the central authority of the regime. This comparison underscores the strategic use of religion in authoritarian statecraft and the enduring tension between religious autonomy and centralized political control in Muslim-majority polities.