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People often hold extreme political attitudes about complex policies. We hypothesized that people typically know less about such policies than they think they do (the illusion of explanatory depth) and that polarized attitudes are enabled by simplistic causal models. Asking people to explain policies in detail both undermined the illusion of explanatory depth and led to attitudes that were more moderate (Experiments 1 and 2). Although these effects occurred when people were asked to generate a mechanistic explanation, they did not occur when people were instead asked to enumerate reasons for their policy preferences (Experiment 2). Finally, generating mechanistic explanations reduced donations to relevant political advocacy groups (Experiment 3). The evidence suggests that people's mistaken sense that they understand the causal processes underlying policies contributes to political polarization.

Key Points A powerful approach to study self-consciousness has been to target brain mechanisms that process bodily signals (bodily self-consciousness). Bodily self-consciousness depends on three factors: self-identification with the body, self-location and the first-person perspective. Visuotactile and visuovestibular conflicts that induce changes in bodily self-consciousness have been tested using video, virtual reality and robotic devices. Experimental changes in illusory self-identification with a fake or virtual body are associated with changes in touch and pain perception, as well as physiological changes. Activity in the bilateral premotor cortex and posterior parietal cortex that is probably due to the activation of multisensory neurons integrating visual and somatosensory signals has been associated with self-identification. Neurological data in patients with heautoscopy reveal that damage to the left temporoparietal cortex leads to abnormal self-identification and self-location. Activity in the temporoparietal cortex and posterior parietal cortex that is probably due to the activation of multisensory neurons integrating vestibular, visual and tactile signals has been associated with self-location and the first-person perspective. Neurological data in patients with out-of-body experiences reveal that damage to the right temporoparietal cortex (posterior superior temporal gyrus) leads to abnormal self-location and first-person perspective. The interaction of these multisensory signals with other bodily signals, especially those related to interoceptive signals, and their respective importance for bodily self-consciousness and consciousness in general should be targeted by future research. Future neuro-rehabilitation procedures for amputees, stroke patients and patients with spinal cord injury are likely to benefit from the described automatized multisensory stimulations between augmented artificial bodies and residual own-body signals. Bodily self-consciousness includes the conscious experience of identifying with the body, of where 'I' am in space, and of the perspective from where 'I' perceive the world. Olaf Blanke discusses the cortical mechanisms that underlie these experiences, highlighting data from neuroimaging, neurology and virtual reality. Recent research has linked bodily self-consciousness to the processing and integration of multisensory bodily signals in temporoparietal, premotor, posterior parietal and extrastriate cortices. Studies in which subjects receive ambiguous multisensory information about the location and appearance of their own body have shown that these brain areas reflect the conscious experience of identifying with the body (self-identification (also known as body-ownership)), the experience of where 'I' am in space (self-location) and the experience of the position from where 'I' perceive the world (first-person perspective). Along with phenomena of altered states of self-consciousness in neurological patients and electrophysiological data from non-human primates, these findings may form the basis for a neurobiological model of bodily self-consciousness.

The rubber hand illusion is a perceptual illusion in which participants experience an inanimate rubber hand as belonging to their own body. The illusion is elicited by synchronously stroking the rubber hand and the participant’s real hand, which is hidden from sight. The feeling of owning the rubber hand is accompanied by changes in hand position sense (proprioception), so that when participants are asked to indicate the location of their (unseen) hand, they indicate that it is located closer to the rubber hand. This “proprioceptive drift” is the most widely used objective measure of the rubber hand illusion, and from a theoretical perspective, it suggests a close link between proprioception and the feeling of body ownership. However, the critical question of whether a causal relationship exists between changes in hand position sense and changes in limb ownership is unknown. Here we addressed this question by devising a novel setup that allowed us to mechanically manipulate the position of the participant’s hand without the participant noticing, while the rubber hand illusion was being elicited. Our results showed that changing the sensed position closer to or farther away from the rubber hand did not change the strength of the rubber hand illusion. Thus, the illusion is not dependent on changes in hand position sense. This finding supports models of body ownership and central body representation that hold that proprioceptive drift and the subjective illusion are related to different central processes.

Anecdotal evidence indicates that people believe that morality is declining 1 , 2 . In a series of studies using both archival and original data ( n  = 12,492,983), we show that people in at least 60 nations around the world believe that morality is declining, that they have believed this for at least 70 years and that they attribute this decline both to the decreasing morality of individuals as they age and to the decreasing morality of successive generations. Next, we show that people’s reports of the morality of their contemporaries have not declined over time, suggesting that the perception of moral decline is an illusion. Finally, we show how a simple mechanism based on two well-established psychological phenomena (biased exposure to information and biased memory for information) can produce an illusion of moral decline, and we report studies that confirm two of its predictions about the circumstances under which the perception of moral decline is attenuated, eliminated or reversed (that is, when respondents are asked about the morality of people they know well or people who lived before the respondent was born). Together, our studies show that the perception of moral decline is pervasive, perdurable, unfounded and easily produced. This illusion has implications for research on the misallocation of scarce resources 3 , the underuse of social support 4 and social influence 5 . We show that the perception of moral decline is pervasive, perdurable, unfounded and easily produced, and suggest that this illusion has implications for research on the misallocation of scarce resources, the underuse of social support and social influence.

When evaluating information, we cannot always rely on what has been presented as truth: Different sources might disagree with each other, and sometimes there may be no underlying truth. Accordingly, we must use other cues to evaluate information—perhaps the most salient of which is consensus. But what counts as consensus? Do we attend only to surface-level indications of consensus, or do we also probe deeper and consider why sources agree? Four experiments demonstrated that individuals evaluate consensus only superficially: Participants were equally confident in conclusions drawn from a true consensus (derived from independent primary sources) and a false consensus (derived from only one primary source). This phenomenon was robust, occurring even immediately after participants explicitly stated that a true consensus was more believable than a false consensus. This illusion of consensus reveals a powerful means by which misinformation may spread.

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) has been widely used to investigate the bodily self in healthy individuals. The aim of the present study was to extend the use of the RHI to examine the bodily self in eating disorders (EDs). The RHI and self-report measures of ED psychopathology [the Eating Disorder Inventory - 3 (EDI-3) subscales of Drive for Thinness, Bulimia, Body Dissatisfaction, Interoceptive Deficits, and Emotional Dysregulation; the 21-item Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21); and the Self-Objectification Questionnaire (SOQ)] were administered to 78 individuals with an ED and 61 healthy controls. Individuals with an ED experienced the RHI significantly more strongly than healthy controls on both perceptual (i.e. proprioceptive drift) and subjective (i.e. self-report questionnaire) measures. Furthermore, both the subjective experience of the RHI and associated proprioceptive biases were correlated with ED psychopathology. Approximately 23% of the variance for embodiment of the fake hand was accounted for by ED psychopathology, with interoceptive deficits and self-objectification significant predictors of embodiment. These results indicate that the bodily self is more plastic in people with an ED. These findings may shed light on both aetiological and maintenance factors involved in EDs, particularly visual processing of the body, interoceptive deficits, and self-objectification.

A classical question in philosophy and psychology is if the sense of one's body influences how one visually perceives the world. Several theoreticians have suggested that our own body serves as a fundamental reference in visual perception of sizes and distances, although compelling experimental evidence for this hypothesis is lacking. In contrast, modern textbooks typically explain the perception of object size and distance by the combination of information from different visual cues. Here, we describe full body illusions in which subjects experience the ownership of a doll's body (80 cm or 30 cm) and a giant's body (400 cm) and use these as tools to demonstrate that the size of one's sensed own body directly influences the perception of object size and distance. These effects were quantified in ten separate experiments with complementary verbal, questionnaire, manual, walking, and physiological measures. When participants experienced the tiny body as their own, they perceived objects to be larger and farther away, and when they experienced the large-body illusion, they perceived objects to be smaller and nearer. Importantly, despite identical retinal input, this \"body size effect\" was greater when the participants experienced a sense of ownership of the artificial bodies compared to a control condition in which ownership was disrupted. These findings are fundamentally important as they suggest a causal relationship between the representations of body space and external space. Thus, our own body size affects how we perceive the world.

The current study comprises the first systematic meta-analysis of weight illusions. We obtained descriptive data from studies in which subjective heaviness estimates were made for pairs or groups of objects that had the same mass and different volumes (size–weight illusion; SWI) or different apparent material properties (material–weight illusion; MWI). Using these data, we calculated mean effect sizes to represent illusion strength. Other study details, including stimulus mass, volume, density, and degree of visual and somatosensory access to the stimuli were also recorded to quantify the contribution of these variables to effect sizes for the SWI. The results indicate that the SWI has a larger mean effect size than the MWI and that the former is consistent in strength when information about stimulus size is gained through somatosensory channels, regardless of visual access. The SWI is weaker when only the visual system provides size information. Effect sizes for the SWI were larger when there was a greater difference in volume across the stimuli. There was also a positive correlation between SWI strength and the difference in physical density across the different experimental stimuli, even after controlling for volume differences. Together, we argue that these findings provide support for theories of weight illusions that are based on conceptual expectancies as well as those that are based on bottom-up processing of physical density. We further propose that these processes, which have been considered dichotomously in the past, may not be mutually exclusive from each other and could both contribute to our perception of weight when we handle objects in everyday life.

This article reviews research using the Deese/Roediger—McDermott (DRM) associative memory illusion, whereby people falsely remember words that were not presented. This illusion has broadly influenced basic theories of memory in cognitive psychology and neuroscience and naturally raises the question as to how these theories apply to more complex autobiographical memories. Some applicability is evident from research linking individual differences in the DRM illusion to false autobiographical memories (e.g., misremembering public events) and fantastic autobiographical beliefs (e.g., memories from past lives). But which aspects generalize? Here it is argued that a process—oriented approach is needed in order to answer this question. Many productive years of DRM research indicate that multiple and often opposing psychological processes cause even the most basic false memories. In light of these discoveries, more researchers need to use methods that isolate these component processes if the goal is to understand false memories both in the lab and in life.

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterised by differences in unimodal and multimodal sensory and proprioceptive processing, with complex biases towards local over global processing. Many of these elements are implicated in versions of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), which were therefore studied in high-functioning individuals with ASD and a typically developing control group. Both groups experienced the illusion. A number of differences were found, related to proprioception and sensorimotor processes. The ASD group showed reduced sensitivity to visuotactile-proprioceptive discrepancy but more accurate proprioception. This group also differed on acceleration in subsequent reach trials. Results are discussed in terms of weak top-down integration and precision-accuracy trade-offs. The RHI appears to be a useful tool for investigating multisensory processing in ASD.