Explore the vast range of titles available.

Multiple severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants with higher transmission potential have been emerging globally, including SARS-CoV-2 variants from the United Kingdom and South Africa. We report 4 travelers from Brazil to Japan in January 2021 infected with a novel SARS-CoV-2 variant with an additional set of mutations.

In December, 2019, the newly identified severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in Wuhan, China, causing COVID-19, a respiratory disease presenting with fever, cough, and often pneumonia. WHO has set the strategic objective to interrupt spread of SARS-CoV-2 worldwide. An outbreak in Bavaria, Germany, starting at the end of January, 2020, provided the opportunity to study transmission events, incubation period, and secondary attack rates. A case was defined as a person with SARS-CoV-2 infection confirmed by RT-PCR. Case interviews were done to describe timing of onset and nature of symptoms and to identify and classify contacts as high risk (had cumulative face-to-face contact with a confirmed case for ≥15 min, direct contact with secretions or body fluids of a patient with confirmed COVID-19, or, in the case of health-care workers, had worked within 2 m of a patient with confirmed COVID-19 without personal protective equipment) or low risk (all other contacts). High-risk contacts were ordered to stay at home in quarantine for 14 days and were actively followed up and monitored for symptoms, and low-risk contacts were tested upon self-reporting of symptoms. We defined fever and cough as specific symptoms, and defined a prodromal phase as the presence of non-specific symptoms for at least 1 day before the onset of specific symptoms. Whole genome sequencing was used to confirm epidemiological links and clarify transmission events where contact histories were ambiguous; integration with epidemiological data enabled precise reconstruction of exposure events and incubation periods. Secondary attack rates were calculated as the number of cases divided by the number of contacts, using Fisher's exact test for the 95% CIs. Patient 0 was a Chinese resident who visited Germany for professional reasons. 16 subsequent cases, often with mild and non-specific symptoms, emerged in four transmission generations. Signature mutations in the viral genome occurred upon foundation of generation 2, as well as in one case pertaining to generation 4. The median incubation period was 4·0 days (IQR 2·3–4·3) and the median serial interval was 4·0 days (3·0–5·0). Transmission events were likely to have occurred presymptomatically for one case (possibly five more), at the day of symptom onset for four cases (possibly five more), and the remainder after the day of symptom onset or unknown. One or two cases resulted from contact with a case during the prodromal phase. Secondary attack rates were 75·0% (95% CI 19·0–99·0; three of four people) among members of a household cluster in common isolation, 10·0% (1·2–32·0; two of 20) among household contacts only together until isolation of the patient, and 5·1% (2·6–8·9; 11 of 217) among non-household, high-risk contacts. Although patients in our study presented with predominately mild, non-specific symptoms, infectiousness before or on the day of symptom onset was substantial. Additionally, the incubation period was often very short and false-negative tests occurred. These results suggest that although the outbreak was controlled, successful long-term and global containment of COVID-19 could be difficult to achieve. All authors are employed and all expenses covered by governmental, federal state, or other publicly funded institutions.

Transmission of multidrug-resistant Candida auris infection has been reported in the USA. To better understand its emergence and transmission dynamics and to guide clinical and public health responses, we did a molecular epidemiological investigation of C auris cases in the USA. In this molecular epidemiological survey, we used whole-genome sequencing to assess the genetic similarity between isolates collected from patients in ten US states (California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma) and those identified in several other countries (Colombia, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Venezuela). We worked with state health departments, who provided us with isolates for sequencing. These isolates of C auris were collected during the normal course of clinical care (clinical cases) or as part of contact investigations or point prevalence surveys (screening cases). We integrated data from standardised case report forms and contact investigations, including travel history and epidemiological links (ie, patients that had shared a room or ward with a patient with C auris). Genetic diversity of C auris within a patient, a facility, and a state were evaluated by pairwise differences in single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). From May 11, 2013, to Aug 31, 2017, isolates that corresponded to 133 cases (73 clinical cases and 60 screening cases) were collected. Of 73 clinical cases, 66 (90%) cases involved isolates related to south Asian isolates, five (7%) cases were related to South American isolates, one (1%) case to African isolates, and one (1%) case to east Asian isolates. Most (60 [82%]) clinical cases were identified in New York and New Jersey; these isolates, although related to south Asian isolates, were genetically distinct. Genomic data corroborated five (7%) clinical cases in which patients probably acquired C auris through health-care exposures abroad. Among clinical and screening cases, the genetic diversity of C auris isolates within a person was similar to that within a facility during an outbreak (median SNP difference three SNPs, range 0–12). Isolates of C auris in the USA were genetically related to those from four global regions, suggesting that C auris was introduced into the USA several times. The five travel-related cases are examples of how introductions can occur. Genetic diversity among isolates from the same patients, health-care facilities, and states indicates that there is local and ongoing transmission. US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Plasmodium falciparum infection was diagnosed in a 3-month-old baby in Portugal by optical microscopy. The mother had had malaria in Angola 13 months earlier, before she emigrated to Portugal. She remained asymptomatic throughout and after pregnancy. We confirmed the diagnosis of an imported malaria case and congenital transmission using molecular techniques.

Since its outbreak in December 2019, the novel coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) has spread to 191 countries and caused millions of deaths. Many countries have experienced multiple epidemic waves and faced containment pressures from both domestic and international transmission. In this study, we conduct a multiscale geographic analysis of the spread of COVID-19 in a policy-influenced dynamic network to quantify COVID-19 importation risk under different policy scenarios using evidence from China. Our spatial dynamic panel data (SDPD) model explicitly distinguishes the effects of travel flows from the effects of transmissibility within cities, across cities, and across national borders. We find that within-city transmission was the dominant transmission mechanism in China at the beginning of the outbreak and that all domestic transmission mechanisms were muted or significantly weakened before importation posed a threat. We identify effective containment policies by matching the change points of domestic and importation transmissibility parameters to the timing of various interventions. Our simulations suggest that importation risk is limited when domestic transmission is under control, but that cumulative cases would have been almost 13 times higher if domestic transmissibility had resurged to its precontainment level after importation and 32 times higher if domestic transmissibility had remained at its precontainment level since the outbreak. Our findings provide practical insights into infectious disease containment and call for collaborative and coordinated global suppression efforts.

Based on notification data the impact of the COVID-19 lockdown in Switzerland was assessed. While the incidence of tick-borne encephalitis almost doubled as compared to 2016-2019, a reduction in all other infectious diseases was recorded. The lowest reduction rates (<25%) were noted for legionellosis, hepatitis A, chlamydia infection and gonorrhoea.

Abstract Background The aim was to assess factors affecting disease severity in imported P. falciparum and non-falciparum malaria. Methods We reviewed medical records from 2793/3260 (85.7%) of all episodes notified in Sweden between 1995 and 2015 and performed multivariable logistic regression. Results Severe malaria according to WHO 2015 criteria was found in P. falciparum (9.4%), P. vivax (7.7%), P. ovale (5.3%), P. malariae (3.3%), and mixed P. falciparum episodes (21.1%). Factors associated with severe P. falciparum malaria were age <5 years and >40 years, origin in nonendemic country, pregnancy, HIV, region of diagnosis, and health care delay. Moreover, oral treatment of P. falciparum episodes with parasitemia ≥2% without severe signs at presentation was associated with progress to severe malaria with selected criteria. In non-falciparum, age >60 years, health care delay and endemic origin were identified as risk factors for severe disease. Among patients originating in endemic countries, a higher risk for severe malaria, both P. falciparum and non-falciparum, was observed among newly arrived migrants. Conclusions Severe malaria was observed in P. falciparum and non-falciparum episodes. Current WHO criteria for severe malaria may need optimization to better guide the management of malaria of different species in travelers and migrants in nonendemic areas. We investigated risk factors for severe malaria in approximately 2700 cases of imported malaria. We identified variables associated with severity of P. falciparum and non-falciparum infections that need to be considered in the management of malaria in travelers and migrants.

We report an imported case of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant P.1 detected in an asymptomatic traveler who arrived in Italy on an indirect flight from Brazil. This case shows the risk for introduction of SARS-CoV-2 variants from indirect flights and the need for continued SARS-CoV-2 surveillance.

Abstract Background With more countries exiting lockdown, public health safety requires screening measures at international travel entry points that can prevent the reintroduction or importation of the severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus-2. Here, we estimate the number of cases captured, quarantining days averted and secondary cases expected to occur with screening interventions. Methods To estimate active case exportation risk from 153 countries with recorded coronavirus disease-2019 cases and deaths, we created a simple data-driven framework to calculate the number of infectious and upcoming infectious individuals out of 100 000 000 potential travellers from each country, and assessed six importation risk reduction strategies; Strategy 1 (S1) has no screening on entry, S2 tests all travellers and isolates test-positives where those who test negative at 7 days are permitted entry, S3 the equivalent but for a 14 day period, S4 quarantines all travellers for 7 days where all are subsequently permitted entry, S5 the equivalent for 14 days and S6 the testing of all travellers and prevention of entry for those who test positive. Results The average reduction in case importation across countries relative to S1 is 90.2% for S2, 91.7% for S3, 55.4% for S4, 91.2% for S5 and 77.2% for S6. An average of 79.6% of infected travellers are infectious upon arrival. For the top 100 exporting countries, an 88.2% average reduction in secondary cases is expected through S2 with the 7-day isolation of test-positives, increasing to 92.1% for S3 for 14-day isolation. A substantially smaller reduction of 30.0% is expected for 7-day all traveller quarantining, increasing to 84.3% for 14-day all traveller quarantining. Conclusions The testing and isolation of test-positives should be implemented provided good testing practices are in place. If testing is not feasible, quarantining for a minimum of 14 days is recommended with strict adherence measures in place.

PurposeMalaria keeps on being a serious global health threat, especially in many tropical countries, where it is endemic. Also in non-endemic countries, like Spain, malaria is an issue that requires attention due to the presence of imported cases.MethodsThis is a retrospective study, including all patients diagnosed with malaria at Severo Ochoa University Hospital from 2006 to 2022, being classified according to: (I) their type of stay in an endemic area as visiting friends and relatives (VFR), migrants of recent arrival (MRA), or tourism and business (T&B), and (II) the mode of presentation as microscopic (MM) or submicroscopic (SMM) malaria.ResultsIn this study, 132 patients (23.7% of all suspected) were diagnosed with malaria. The PCR was the most sensitive technique (99.2%), followed by antigen detection (78.8%) and microscopy (75%), with Plasmodium falciparum being the predominant species (94.7%). VFR was the largest group infected with malaria (69.7%), mostly symptomatic (98.2%) and presenting MM (90.2%). Instead, MRA patients (25%) presented milder (47.4%) or no symptoms (31.6%) and higher cases of SMM (42.4%). Coinfection with another imported pathogen was present in 19 patients (14.4%), being MRA more frequently coinfected (30.3%)ConclusionThis study shows the need for establishing systems for VFRs to attend pre-travel consultations to reduce malaria imported risk. In the case of MRA, screening for imported diseases should be conducted upon their arrival. Finally, we highlight two cases of co-infection with imported viruses, showing that presence of symptoms resembling malaria from another imported pathogen does not exclude malaria.