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Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation?
Previous research in economics shows that compensation based on the pay-for-performance principle is effective in inducing higher levels of effort and productivity. On the other hand, research in psychology argues that performance-based financial incentives inhibit creativity and innovation. How should managerial compensation be structured if the goal is to induce managers to pursue more innovative business strategies? In a controlled laboratory setting, we provide evidence that the combination of tolerance for early failure and reward for long-term success is effective in motivating innovation. Subjects under such an incentive scheme explore more and are more likely to discover a novel business strategy than subjects under fixed-wage and standard pay-for-performance incentive schemes. We also find evidence that the threat of termination can undermine incentives for innovation, whereas golden parachutes can alleviate these innovation-reducing effects.
This paper was accepted by David Hsu, entrepreneurship and innovation.
Journal Article
Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?
Explicit economic incentives designed to increase contributions to public goods and to promote other pro-social behavior sometimes are counterproductive or less effective than would be predicted among entirely self-interested individuals. This may occur when incentives adversely affect individuals' altruism, ethical norms, intrinsic motives to serve the public, and other social preferences. The opposite also occurs—crowding in—though it appears less commonly. In the fifty experiments that we survey, these effects are common, so that incentives and social preferences may be either substitutes (crowding out) or complements (crowding in). We provide evidence for four mechanisms that may account for these incentive effects on preferences: namely that incentives may (i) provide information about the person who implemented the incentive, (ii) frame the decision situation so as to suggest appropriate behavior, (iii) compromise a control averse individual's sense of autonomy, and (iv) affect the process by which people learn new preferences. An implication is that the evaluation of public policy must be restricted to allocations that are supportable as Nash equilibria when account is taken of these crowding effects. We show that well designed fines, subsidies, and the like minimize crowding out and may even do the opposite, making incentives and social preferences complements rather than substitutes.
Journal Article
Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects face the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is a piece rate, a tournament, or a revenue-sharing scheme. We find that output is higher in the variable-payment schemes compared to the fixed-payment scheme. This difference is largely driven by productivity sorting. In addition, different incentive schemes systematically attract individuals with different attitudes, such as willingness to take risks and relative self-assessment as well as gender, which underlines the importance of multidimensional sorting.
Journal Article
The Role of CEO's Personal Incentives in Driving Corporate Social Responsibility
In this study, we explore the role of Chief Executive Officers' (CEOs') incentives, split between monetary (based on both bonus compensation and changes in the value of the CEO's portfolio of stocks and options) and non-monetary (career concerns, incoming/departing CEOs, and power and entrenchment), in relation to corporate social responsibility (CSR). We base our analysis on a sample of 597 US firms over the period 2005–2009. We find that both monetary and non-monetary incentives have an effect on CSR decisions. Specifically, monetary incentives designed to align the CEO's and shareholders' interests have a negative effect on CSR and non-monetary incentives have a positive effect on CSR. The study has important implications for the design of executive remuneration (compensation) plans, as we show that there are many levers that can affect the CEO's decisions with regard to CSR. Our evidence also confirms the prominent role of the CEO in relation to CSR decisions, while also recognizing the complexity of factors affecting CSR. Finally, we propose a research design that takes into account endogeneity issues arising when examining compensation variables.
Journal Article
0682 Evaluation Of An Incentive-based Intervention To Improve 90-day Adherence In Pap-naive Patients
Abstract
Introduction
Although PAP therapy is the gold standard treatment for obstructive sleep apnea, adherence to treatment is suboptimal. Without sustained therapy adherence, patients are at risk of serious negative health outcomes. The objective of this study was to test whether a digitally delivered monetary and social reward program helped patients new to PAP therapy. Financial incentive schemes are effective in helping patients adhere to difficult medication or therapy plans. Additionally, there is an abundance of evidence that social support is a critical component to long-term health behavior change.
Methods
This prospective, randomized, single site pilot is evaluating the effectiveness of an app-based intervention in helping patients adhere to PAP therapy. The financial incentive design leverages loss aversion, and the social incentive design leverages the strength of close ties and variable reinforcement. The primary endpoint is mean PAP usage at 3 months. Secondary endpoints include Medicare compliance, change in functional status, and baseline scores of perceived disease severity, claustrophobia, coping skills, and health literacy as moderators of the intervention’s effectiveness. Study recruitment is ongoing, with an expected sample size of 150 subjects.
Results
Of the 132 subjects enrolled, 56% are male, 61% are Caucasian, and 65% are married. The mean age is 49.6 ± 12.0 years and mean BMI is 32.4 ± 8.4 kg/m2. Additional demographics such as income level, education level, and number of children along with the primary and secondary endpoints will be presented. A subgroup analysis of the primary endpoint will be generated for subjects identified as strugglers within the first 3 days of usage.
Conclusion
The results of this study will provide insight into methods such as financial and social incentives delivered via a smartphone on initial compliance with PAP therapy, as well as provide more information on the behavioral change associated with beginning PAP therapy.
Support
ResMed
Journal Article