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We examine whether tax-motivated income shifting by U.S. multinational corporations affects information asymmetry. Using a new firm-year measure of income shifting and a two-stage least squares approach, we find income shifting is positively associated with four measures of information asymmetry. Cross-sectional tests reveal that this effect is more pronounced for firms with large differences between foreign and domestic earnings growth. Using SFAS 131 to improve identification and establish evidence consistent with a causal relation between income shifting and information asymmetry, we demonstrate that the adverse impact of income shifting on information asymmetry is concentrated in firms that discontinue geographic earnings disclosures. Overall, our study provides evidence that significant consequences of information asymmetry are associated with tax-motivated income shifting.

Purpose Prior literature shows that income shifting is widely performed by multinational groups, but no research as yet has studied alignment between controlling and minority interests on tax avoidance in multinational groups with high ownership concentration. This study aims to analyze the effect of high ownership concentration on cross-jurisdictional tax-motivated income shifting. Design/methodology/approach To test the hypotheses, this study focuses on European multinational groups. Data are collected on European parent firms and each subsidiary. The model considers the natural logarithm of profit before tax and tax incentive. Findings Findings show that subsidiaries shift income for tax avoidance purposes. The alignment of shareholders’ interests and ownership concentration leads to higher levels of tax avoidance through subsidiaries’ infra-group transactions. High ownership concentration decreases the influence of minority interests and allows parent company shareholders to choose a tax avoidance strategy more freely. Practical implications The results suggest that taxation levels need to be harmonized to reduce the incentive for tax avoidance and the incentive of governments to reduce their statutory tax rate, to shift profits inwards and reduce outward flow. Without international coordination, this approach may lead to the unevenness of legislative frameworks around the world, and bring significant disadvantages for some countries, influencing economic growth and business development. Originality/value This study extends prior findings showing that tax-motivated income shifting as a method of tax avoidance in European multinational groups is stronger in groups with high levels of ownership concentration. This means that managers have the incentive to shift income between subsidiaries for tax and ownership benefits in favor of the parent company’s shareholders and against minority interests.

PurposeAlthough tax-motivated income shifting has been widely explored, no studies have as yet analyzed the association between ownership structure and management decisions about income shifting. The ownership structure of multinational groups is characterized by different levels of minority interests, and our aim is to establish whether income shifting is explained by the aim of expropriation of minorities, as well as taxation avoidance.Design/methodology/approachWe collect data on a sample of European parent companies located in five countries and their foreign subsidiaries, and run a multivariate regression based on the Huizinga and Laeven (2008) model.FindingsOur results support the idea of minority expropriation, finding evidence of ownership-motivated income shifting. We also find that the level of minority protection affects ownership-motivated income shifting, and that, when both are present, expropriation is statistically significant.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough the study looks at a wide range of subsidiaries, a limitation may be that it examines only firms having parent companies in five European countries. Further research would overcome this limitation and extend the literature and take into account other income-shifting contextual variables. Our results may lead regulators to pay more attention to the protection of minority interests.Practical implicationsThis research offers insights to companies and investors, and should help them to make better-informed decisions and evaluate the best contexts for investments.Originality/valueThis study enriches the literature on income shifting by revealing that it can be caused by factors other than the desire to avoid taxation. It suggests that ownership structure is crucial.

In income classification shifting, firms shift recurring income components (in core earnings) that are income reducing to items commonly assumed to be nonrecurring (special items) to increase core earnings, which are used by analysts and investors to forecast future earnings and value a firm. Some special items tend to extend over multiple quarters and are more amenable to classification shifting because it is easier to shift core expenses into those items (continuous special items). Nevertheless, as the recurrence of special items increases, the market perceives them more like recurring earnings components (Cready et al. in Account Rev 85(5):1577–1615, 2010), which reduces the benefits of classification shifting. Therefore, we hypothesize that when special items are continuous and first in a sequence of quarterly continuous special items, firms are more likely to use them to shift income than when continuous special items are last in the series. Our results confirm our expectations. The findings highlight that the location of a continuous special item in a sequence of continuous special items affects the likelihood of income classification shifting.

This study examines income-shifting between tax bases among the owners of privately held businesses. The dual income tax system in Finland offers noticeable incentives for income-shifting between wages and dividends for business owners. The dividend tax reform of 2005 enables us to study how this particular form of tax avoidance reacts to an exogenous change in tax rates. Our results support highly active income-shifting behavior. We find that the income-shifting effect is homogeneous across different owners and firms. However, we find that the size of the tax incentive affects the size of the response, suggesting that costs related to incomeshifting are important.

This paper critically surveys the large and growing literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates using tax return data. First, we provide a theoretical framework showing under what assumptions this elasticity can be used as a sufficient statistic for efficiency and optimal tax analysis. We discuss what other parameters should be estimated when the elasticity is not a sufficient statistic. Second, we discuss conceptually the key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of the elasticity of taxable income using the example of the 1993 top individual income tax rate increase in the United States to illustrate those issues. Third, we provide a critical discussion of selected empirical analyses of the elasticity of taxable income in light of the theoretical and empirical framework we laid out. Finally, we discuss avenues for future research.

The issue of tax-motivated income shifting within multinational firms – or 'base erosion and profit shifting' (BEPS) – has attracted increasing global attention in recent years. This paper provides a survey of the empirical literature on this topic. Its emphasis is on reviewing and elucidating what is known about the magnitude of BEPS. The paper discusses different empirical approaches to identifying income shifting, describes existing data sources, and summarises the findings of the empirical literature. A major theme that emerges from this survey is that in the more recent empirical literature, which uses new and richer sources of data, the estimated magnitude of BEPS is typically much smaller than that found in earlier studies. The paper seeks to provide a framework within which to conceptualise this magnitude and its implications for policy. It concludes by highlighting the importance of existing legal and economic frictions as constraints on BEPS and by discussing possible ways in which future research might model these frictions more precisely.

The introduction of the 2006 Norwegian shareholder income tax was announced in advance, and it increased top marginal tax rates on individual dividend income from zero to 28%. We document strong timing effects on dividend payout on a large panel of non-listed corporations, with a surge of dividends prior to 2006 and a sharp drop after. Mature firms are more likely to pay dividends, and high asset growth increases the probability of retaining all earnings. Intertemporal income shifting through the timing of dividends seems to be a drain on internal equity and cause increases in the corporations’ debt–equity ratios. The debt ratios drop sharply after the implementation of the reform.