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Several academics and practitioners have pointed out that inflation follows a seemingly exogenous statistical process, unrelated to the output gap, leading some to argue that the Phillips curve has weakened or disappeared. In this paper, we explain why this seemingly exogenous process arises, or, in other words, why it is difficult to empirically identify a Phillips curve, a key building block of the policy framework used by central banks. We show why this result need not imply that the Phillips curve does not hold—on the contrary, our conceptual framework is built under the assumption that the Phillips curve always holds. The reason is simple: if monetary policy is set with the goal of minimizing welfare losses (measured as the sum of deviations of inflation from its target and output from its potential), subject to a Phillips curve, a central bank will seek to increase inflation when output is below potential. This targeting rule will impart a negative correlation between inflation and the output gap, blurring the identification of the (positively sloped) Phillips curve. We discuss different strategies to circumvent the identification problem and present evidence of a robust Phillips curve in US data.

The sharp revisions in inflation forecasts are not rooted in analytical flaws, overly hesitant ECB policies or model failures. Energy price shocks of historic dimensions are the key factor. They have ended the prolonged phase of excessively weak inflation with risks now clearly increasing. In contrast to the United States, the euro area shows no signs of overheating or excessive wage increases. Provided second-round effects remain muted, the ECB should proceed gradually given the high war-related uncertainty and the energy-cost related drag on the economy. Monetary policy flexibility is of key importance particularly with regards to sovereign yield differentials.

A key policy question is: how high an inflation rate should central banks target? This depends crucially on the costs of inflation. An important concern is that high inflation will lead to inefficient price dispersion. Workhorse New Keynesian models imply that this cost of inflation is very large. An increase in steady-state inflation from 0% to 10% yields a welfare loss that is an order of magnitude greater than the welfare loss from business cycle fluctuations in output in these models. We assess this prediction empirically using a new data set on price behavior during the Great Inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s in the United States. If price dispersion increases rapidly with inflation, we should see the absolute size of price changes increasing with inflation: price changes should become larger as prices drift further from their optimal level at higher inflation rates. We find no evidence that the absolute size of price changes rose during the Great Inflation. This suggests that the standard New Keynesian analysis of the welfare costs of inflation is wrong and its implications for the optimal inflation rate need to be reassessed. We also find that (nonsale) prices have not become more flexible over the past 40 years.

Whereas strong demand is a key factor driving high inflation in the US, inflation in the Euro Area is mainly due to adverse external supply shocks (in Europe, energy prices are much higher due to the war in Ukraine). Standard monetary policy response to such shocks is to accommodate first-round effects, to fight spiralling inflationary expectations in order to prevent second-round effects. Long run inflation expectations — as measured by the survey of professional forecasters — still seem to be well anchored. The ECB's announced tightening intends to dampen rising household's inflation expectations. Given the current high uncertainty about the economic outlook, a soft landing calls for modest, data-dependent steps, allowing for a reversal in case the outlook worsens.

This paper examines empirically whether the measurement of trend inflation can be improved by using disaggregated data on sectoral inflation to construct indexes akin to core inflation but with a time-varying distributed lags of weights, where the sectoral weight depends on the time-varying volatility and persistence of the sectoral inflation series and on the comovement among sectors. The modeling framework is a dynamic factor model with time-varying coefficients and stochastic volatility as in Del Negro and Otrok (2008), and is estimated using U.S. data on seventeen components of the personal consumption expenditure inflation index.

In this paper, we solve a dynamic model of households' mortgage decisions incorporating labor income, house price, inflation, and interest rate risk. Using a zero-profit condition for mortgage lenders, we solve for equilibrium mortgage rates given borrower characteristics and optimal decisions. The model quantifies the effects of adjustable versus fixed mortgage rates, loan-to-value ratios, and mortgage affbrdability measures on mortgage premia and default. Mortgage selection by heterogeneous borrowers helps explain the higher default rates on adjustable-rate mortgages during the recent U.S. housing downturn, and the variation in mortgage premia with the level of interest rates.

We exploit a new multi-country historical dataset on public (government) debt to search for a systemic relationship between high public debt levels, growth, and inflation. Our main result is that whereas the link between growth and debt seems relatively weak at normal debt levels, median growth rates for countries with public debt over roughly 90% of GDP are about one percent lower than otherwise; average mean growth rates are several percent lower. We find no systematic relationship between high debt levels and inflation for advanced economies as a group (albeit with individual country exceptions including the United States). By contrast, in emerging market countries, high public debt levels coincide with higher inflation.

A large output gap accompanied by stable inflation close to its target calls for further monetary accommodation, but the zero lower bound on interest rates has robbed the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the usual tool for its provision. We examine how public statements of FOMC intentions—forward guidance—can substitute for lower rates at the zero bound. We distinguish between Odyssean forward guidance, which publicly commits the FOMC to a future action, and Delphic forward guidance, which merely forecasts macroeconomic performance and likely monetary policy actions. Others have shown how forward guidance that commits the central bank to keeping rates at zero for longer than conditions would otherwise warrant can provide monetary easing, if the public trusts it. We empirically characterize the responses of asset prices and private macroeconomic forecasts to FOMC forward guidance, both before and since the recent financial crisis. Our results show that the FOMC has extensive experience successfully telegraphing its intended adjustments to evolving conditions, so communication difficulties do not present an insurmountable barrier to Odyssean forward guidance. Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we investigate how pairing such guidance with bright-line rules for launching rate increases can mitigate risks to the Federal Reserve's price stability mandate.

Changes experienced during the globalization process also have an impact on oil prices. As a matter of fact, the change in oil prices also affects the increase in the general levels of prices. It is inevitable that we will see the measurement of these price changes in the countries most dependent on imports. In this context, Turkey, which is the sample country discussed within the framework of this study, is a country dependent on imports in terms of oil, making increases in the general levels of inflation in this country inevitable. Considered from this framework, the study investigated the relationship between oil prices and inflation for the 2004-2022 period through causality analysis. As a result of the analysis, a positive relationship was determined from oil prices to inflation. In addition, according to the results of the Granger causality test, it was determined that inflation was not the Granger cause of oil prices. In other words, within the framework of this country, the relationship between both variables is one-sided.

This study aimed to examine the asymmetric effects of exchange rates and oil prices on inflation in Egypt using the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) model. Relying on annual data during the period (1975-2023), the findings from the estimations in the long run show a negative impact of gross domestic product on inflation. While the money supply has a negative impact on inflation in both the long run and the short run, the asymmetric results indicate that positive changes in exchange rates lead to decreased inflation in both the long run and the short run, while negative changes in exchange rates result in increased inflation. Furthermore, both positive and negative changes in oil prices lead to increased inflation in the long and short run. From the study’s results, the main triggering factors of inflation in Egypt are instability in the exchange rate, oil prices, and money supply. Therefore, following a contractionary monetary policy is essential to tighten the money supply and avoid instability in the exchange rate market. Moreover, to curb inflation, the Central Bank of Egypt must ensure a stable exchange rate by attracting foreign private investment through macroeconomic policies that incentivize foreign investors.