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Koning stoelt zijn argumenten telkens op eigen interpretaties van een corpus aan oude teksten, gaande van het Gilgamesj-epos over de Homerische epen tot de Bijbel en de Thora. Daarom doet het eerder afstandelijke, neutrale perspectief dat Koning inneemt soms wat vreemd aan. Zo ziet Koning #MeToo als fundamenteel mimetisch (aansluitend bij zijn analyse van mimetische woede volgens Girard in hoofdstuk 2), tot aan de naam toe: jij bent kwaad, dus me too. Volgens mij zijn dit wel heel hoge hermeneutische eisen om te stellen aan kwade mensen, en getuigt deze eis nogmaals van Konings afstandelijke perspectief en gebrek aan empathie met de onderdrukte kwade persoon. Dan is de eis dat de kwade persoon met een goed verhaal komt voor haar woede serieus genomen wordt, wel heel hoog gegrepen. Ook de andere eis die Koning stelt, ligt moeilijk.

IntroductionSocial pain is a phenomenon where you feel pain in response to a social stimulus such as feelings of loss, exclusion, and injustice. In today’s world, people often experience unfair treatment. A special case is a situation in which the individual has aroused commitment, but there is no consequence in the form of the expected gratification.ObjectivesThe study aims to determine the impact of losing and unjust losing on the perception of pain.MethodsThe study involved 80 people who were randomly assigned to one of the following groups: win, lose, unfairly lose and control. The first three groups participated in a “paper-scissor-stone” game that was created in which they played against a false opponent. The game was constructed in such a way as to obtain the result provided for each group. The “unfairly lose” group received negative points for both a loss and a draw. The control group was only watching the play of two other players. Pre- and post-game pain thresholds and pain tolerance were tested in each group. Pain severity was also assessed. The pain was generated by a thermal stimulus using the TSA-II neuroanalyzer. Pain severity and involvement in the game were analyzed with the VAS scale.ResultsThe level of involvement in the game was identical in all three experimental groups. The lowest pain nuisance was observed after the game in the “win” group. The pain was the most strenuous in the group that was unjustly lost. In the group of “unfairly lose”, the pain tolerance threshold decreased after the game.ConclusionsFeelings of injustice can increase pain and pain sensitivity in people who, after inducing commitment, do not receive fair gratification.Disclosure of InterestE. Wojtyna Grant / Research support from: National Science Centre, A. Mucha: None Declared

Users of mental health services are at risk of becoming victims of epistemic injustice, as described by Miranda Fricker. In this thesis, I claim that they can be victims specifically of hermeneutical injustice, which can occur due to the diagnosis they receive. A psychiatric diagnosis is often taken to represent some kind of discrete disease, as if it connotes a natural kind of disease entity. I argue that many physical diseases can be understood as natural kinds in medical science. However, most psychiatric diagnostic categories cannot be so understood. They do not offer any explanation for the patient's condition. Much of modern psychiatry is based on the biomedical model of diseases. This model seeks the causes of patients' illnesses in biological abnormalities in the body. Accordingly, the receipt of a psychiatric diagnosis can convey a biomedical narrative about the nature of the patient's condition, one that tends to locate the cause of the condition in abnormal brain processes of some kind. The effect of this can be understood in terms of the self-narratives that individuals construct for themselves. I discuss several accounts of narrativity which explain how individuals gain meaning in their lives through their self-narratives. These narratives can be changed by the person's social circumstances and by extraneous events. Receiving a psychiatric diagnosis is one such event in some people's lives which can change the recipient's self-narrative about their life and their difficulties. The medicalization implicit in psychiatric diagnoses conveys a biomedical narrative which may conflict with or diminish the recipient's previous self- narratives at a time when they will be experiencing significant emotional distress and disturbance. As such, the recipient's own hermeneutical resources for making sense of their experiences can become marginalised. This can result in the recipients of psychiatric diagnoses becoming victims of hermeneutical injustice.

IntroductionWe present the case of a 19-year-old female patient treated in our hospital due to an outburst of persistent vomiting. The patient had a diagnosis of Cyclic Vomiting Syndrome (CVS), a year before the diagnosis the patient had been labeled as a somatizer and admitted into the department of psychiatry. Given her psychiatric record and the fact that CVS is a rare diagnosis we were consulted on arrival.ObjectivesCVS is an infrequent disorder of unknown etiology which shares similarities with migraine headaches. It is characterized by episodes of vomiting followed by periods of remission without active symptomatology with no organic pathology to account for the symptoms. Epistemic injustice (EI) is defined by Miranda Fricker as “a damage done to someone in their capacity as a knower”. She defined two forms of EI: testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.MethodsA case report is presented alongside a review of the relevant literature regarding CVS and epistemic injustice.ResultsOn arrival at the emergency department she tried explaining her condition, but her testimony was disregarded on the basis of her psychiatric record. It was only after the on-call psychiatrist explained the condition when she received the appropriate abortive treatment, after which she was admitted to the internal medicine department where she was followed by the liaison psychiatrist.ConclusionsCVS is a disabling disease still unknown to most clinicians in spite of the increasing quality evidence about its identification and treatment. The case highlight how cases of newly identified disease can suffer from testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.

Abstract Objective A growing body of literature shows that justice-related appraisals are significant determinants of pain-related outcomes and prolonged trajectories of recovery. We conducted a systematic review of the literature assessing the relationship between perceived injustice and pain-related outcomes in individuals with musculoskeletal pain. Design and Participants A search of published studies in English in PubMed, PsychInfo, Embase, and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews from database inception through May 2019 was performed. Search terms included “perceived injustice,” “injustice appraisals,” “perceptions of injustice,” and “pain” or “injury.” Results Thirty-one studies met inclusion criteria. Data for a total of 5,969 patients with musculoskeletal pain were extracted. Twenty-three studies (71.9%) reported on individuals with persistent pain lasting over three months, and 17 studies (53.1%) reported on individuals with injury-related musculoskeletal pain. Significant associations were found between perceived injustice and pain intensity, disability and physical function, symptoms of depression and anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, quality of life and well-being, and quality of life and social functioning. Conclusions This systematic review summarizes the current evidence for the association between perceived injustice and pain-related outcomes. There is strong evidence that perceived injustice is associated with pain intensity, disability-related variables, and mental health outcomes. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

PurposeWith a basis in social identity and equity theories, this study investigates the relationship between employees' perceptions of organizational injustice and their knowledge hiding, along with the mediating role of organizational dis-identification and the potential moderating role of benevolence.Design/methodology/approachThe hypotheses were tested with three-wave survey data collected from employees in Pakistani organizations.FindingsThe experience of organizational injustice enhances knowledge hiding because employees psychologically disconnect from their organization. This mediation by organizational dis-identification is buffered by benevolence or tolerance for inequity, which reduces employees' likelihood of reacting negatively to the unfavourable experience of injustice.Practical implicationsFor practitioners, this study identifies organizational dis-identification as a key mechanism through which employees' perceptions of organizational injustice spur their propensity to conceal knowledge, and it reveals how this process might be mitigated by a sense of obligation to contribute or “give” to organizational well-being.Originality/valueThis study establishes a more complete understanding of the connection between employees' perceptions of organizational injustice and their knowledge hiding, with particular attention devoted to hitherto unspecified factors that explain or influence this process.

Diversity is an undeniable fact of nature (Gaston and Spicer in Biodiversity: an introduction. Wiley, Hoboken, 2004), and there is now evidence that nature did not stop generating diversity just before “designing” the human brain (Joel et al. in Proc Natl Acad Sci 112(50):15,468–15,473. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1509654112,2015). If neurodiversity is a fact of nature, what about neurodivergence? Although the terms “neurodiversity” and “neurodivergence” are sometimes used interchangeably, this is, we believe, a mistake: “neurodiversity” is a term of inclusion whereas “neurodivergence” is a term of exclusion. To make the difference clear, note that everyone can be said to be neurodiverse, but that it is almost impossible for everyone to be neurodivergent. Neurodivergence is, we claim here, a fact of society. Neurodivergent individuals are those whose cognitive profile diverges from an established cognitive norm, a norm that is not an objective statistical fact of human neurological functioning but a standard established and maintained by socio-political processes. In this paper, we describe the socio-political mechanisms that build neurodivergence out of neurodiversity which, inspired by Mihai (Contemp Polit Theory 17(4):395–416. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-017-0186-z, 2018), we call “epistemic and cognitive marginalization”. First, we extend the traditional concept of neurodiversity, which we believe too closely tied to a neuroreductionist conception of cognition, to that of “extended neurodiversity,” thereby viewing neurodiversity through the lens of 4E (i.e., embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive) cognition. Considering that human cognition depends on epistemic resources, both for their construction (diachronic dependence) and their online dynamic expression (synchronic dependence), we hypothesize that the differential access to epistemic resources in society, a form of epistemic injustice, is an overlooked mechanism that turns neurodiversity into neurodivergence. In doing so, we shed light on a type of epistemic injustice that might be missing from the epistemic injustice literature: cognitive injustices.

This paper criticises Miranda Fricker's account of the primary harm of testimonial injustice as a kind of epistemic objectification, where the latter is understood on the model provided by Martha Nussbaum's influential analysis of sexual objectification and where it is taken to involve the denial of someone's epistemic agency. I examine the existing objections to Fricker's account of the primary harm, criticising some while accepting the force of others, and I argue that one of Fricker's own central examples of testimonial injustice in fact offers the basis of a particularly telling objection. While Fricker's other critics have mostly concluded that we need to look at alternative theoretical resources to offer an account of the primary harm of testimonial injustice, I aim to show that this is premature; both Fricker and her critics have underestimated the resources provided by Nussbaum's analysis of objectification when offering an account of the primary harm, and something very much in the spirit of Fricker's account survives the objections.

This thesis is a collection of four discrete essays on the topic of political resistance. While the contents of the individual essays are disparate, they are nonetheless connected by substantive and methodological themes. I discuss these issues, and the broader framing of the thesis, in the Introduction. The first essay, Clarifying Our Duties to Resist, examines a prominent argument according to which the moral principles that ground individuals’ duties to comply in just conditions also ground their duties to resist injustice in unjust conditions. I argue that this argument does not apply to conditions where injustice is entrenched and normalised. The second essay, Differentiating Disobedients, considers the question of the ways in which morally motivated individuals should differentiate themselves from criminals when they engage in political resistance or disobedience. I argue that the category of morally motivated disobedients is potentially more inclusive than has been commonly assumed. The third essay, The Legitimate Targets of Political Disobedience, address the question of what individuals can legitimately target during their acts of political disobedience. I defend a novel principle that allows us to make fine-grained differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate targets. The fourth essay, Vandalising Tainted Commemorations, adjudicates a contemporary disagreement about what we should do about commemorations of people or events implicated in injustice. I offer a qualified defence of vandalising tainted commemorations, as a strategy that adjudicates the demands of the two dominant yet opposing views on the issue. In a final note, In Lieu of A Conclusion, I review the work that has been done, and identify several areas for future work.