Explore the vast range of titles available.

The idea that qualities can be had partly or to an intermediate degree is controversial among contemporary metaphysicians, but also has a considerable pedigree among philosophers and scientists. In this paper, we first aim to show that metaphysical sense can be made of this idea by proposing a partial taxonomy of metaphysical accounts of graded qualities, focusing on three particular approaches: one which explicates having a quality to a degree in terms of having a property with an in-built degree, another based on the idea that instantiation admits of degrees, and a third which derives the degree to which a quality is had from the aspects of multi-dimensional properties. Our second aim is to demonstrate that the choice between these account can make a substantial metaphysical difference. To make this point, we rely on two case studies (involving quantum observables and values) in which we apply the accounts in order to model apparent cases of metaphysical gradedness.

Undergraduate students may benefit more from learning mathematics through a single abstract, symbolic representation than from learning multiple concrete examples.

In this paper, I submit that it is the controlled part of skilled action, that is, that part of an action that accounts for the exact, nuanced ways in which a skilled performer modifies, adjusts and guides her performance for which an adequate, philosophical theory of skill must account. I will argue that neither Jason Stanley nor Hubert Dreyfus have an adequate account of control. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, I will argue that both Stanley and Dreyfus relinquish an account of control for precisely the same reason: each reduce control to a passive, mechanistic, automatic process, which then prevents them from producing a substantive account of how controlled processes can be characterized by seemingly intelligent features and integrated with personal-level states. I will end by introducing three different kinds of control, which are constitutive of skilled action: strategic control, selective, top—down, automatic attention, and motor control. It will become clear that Dreyfus cannot account for any of these three kinds of control while Stanley has difficulty tackling the two latter kinds.

This paper challenges the traditional metaphysical assumption that properties can be located in spacetime and examines the ontological implications of categorizing spacetime itself. By introducing a two-category ontology, we argue that attempts to locate properties in spacetime represent a category mistake, as this notion fails to address the fundamental categorization of spacetime. We propose that the notion of instantiation should be conceptually separated from spatiotemporal location, thereby allowing for properties that are Platonic yet immanent. Furthermore, we reevaluate the debate between Platonism and Aristotelianism, advocating that Platonic properties can possess a form of immanence previously thought to be exclusive to Aristotelian frameworks. This reformation not only underscores the need for categorizing spacetime but also reshapes our understanding of the instantiation and immanence of properties within ontological dependence frameworks.

This study presents a factor graph optimization (FGO)-based integration of the terrain-referenced navigation (TRN) and inertial navigation. Particularly, the problem is subject to multiple sources of bias: 1) measurement bias of the radar altimeter, and 2) odometry bias of the inertial navigation system (INS). Considering relatively slower dynamics of bias propagation compared to the INS, the proposed method instantiates bias nodes more sparsely than position nodes, achieving more stable and accurate results. Due to highly ambiguous characteristics of terrain elevation, the TRN is mostly tackled with non-parametric Bayesian estimators, such as the particle filter (PF). However, the PF has a weakness in solving heterogeneously scaled problem, where in this case the bias sources exhibiting small noise characteristics, and the filtering regime cannot explore correlations among historical measurements. We then demonstrate that fixed-lag smoothing of FGO, which optimizes a windowed bundle of factors, can perform as well as or better than the PF approach via multiple stepwise numerical experiments. Moreover, by sparsely instantiating nodes that designate biases, the system dimension is reduced, thus reducing the average computation time by up to 60% compared to the fully connected case.

While volume-driven industries such as automotive are characterized by a high degree of data backflow across all production cycles, there is still a certain residue in the planning and construction of process plants. This is firstly due to the high proportion of customer-specific requirements and secondly to the significant amount of value added on site during construction. To handle recurring project-specific process plants as time- and cost-efficiently as possible, optimal information exchange among contractors of various disciplines and the plant developer is a prerequisite. For this purpose, a holistic digital representation of the plant is created, which consolidates all relevant information in one place serving as a foundation of multiple digital twins. An approach to identify and define relevant information depending on their subsequent use is developed. On this basis, a framework is proposed to enable a multipliable BOM-based automatic definition of information backflow to instantiate digital representations in parallel to the planning and construction process. Furthermore, project-specific contextual information will be captured and referenced in a structured form preventing their loss for subsequent similar projects.

The article deals with the instantiation of variables in schemas within the Relational Morphology theory. On the basis of an approach to word-formation from concept to form, the article argues that for the question of what lexemes are retrieved from the lexicon to instantiate the variables in schemas in order to achieve the required meaning of the resulting word within the generative role of schemas, it is important to distinguish different functions of word-formation, namely those that provide mere variations on existing lexemes in contrast to the function of word-formation that provides names for concepts in the extra-linguistic world. In the first case, the variables in schemas are instantiated with lexemes on which we perform the variation, whereas, in the second case, the lexemes result from prior mental processing of the concept to be named. The paper thus also provides the description of the process of conceptualization within the naming function of word-formation and demonstrates the principles of conceptualization on various examples.

Despite years of decision support systems (DSS) research, DSS artifacts are frequently criticized for lacking practitioner relevance and for neglecting configurability and contextual dynamism. Tailoring in end-user contexts can produce relevant emergent DSS artifacts, but design theory for this is lacking. Design science research (DSR) has important implications for improving DSS uptake, but generally this has not been promoted in the form of metadesigns with design principles applicable to other DSS developments. This paper describes a metadesign theory for tailorable DSS, generated through action design research studies in different primary industries. Design knowledge from a DSS developed in an agricultural domain was distilled and generalized into a design theory comprising: (1) a general solution concept (metadesign), and (2) five hypothesized design principles. These were then instantiated via a second development in which the metadesign and design principles were applied in a different domain (forestry) to produce a successful DSS, thus testing the metadesign and validating the design principles. In addition to contributing to DSR and illustrating innovation in tailorable technology, the paper demonstrates the utility of action design research to support theory development in DSS design.

In a series of papers published in the sixties and seventies, Jaakko Hintikka, drawing upon Kant’s conception, defines an argument to be analytic whenever it does not introduce new individuals into the discussion and argues that there exists a class of arguments in polyadic first-order logic that are to be synthetic according to this sense. His work has been utterly overlooked in the literature. In this paper, I claim that the value of Hintikka’s contribution has been obscured by his formalisation of the original definition. Therefore, I provide (i) a brief reconstruction of the historical framework of the problem and the revolutionary import of Hintikka’s contribution, (ii) a clarification of the most complicated steps of Hintikka’s elaboration of his insight, (iii) a criticism of several features that play a fundamental role in Hintikka’s formalisation and (iv) a selection from Hintikka’s own material of some valuable suggestions towards a clear and workable formalisation. As for the pars construens , I isolate in the approach of depth-bounded first-order logics (D'Agostino et al. 2021) an alternative formalisation of the notion of syntheticity as the introduction of new individuals in the reasoning, and I show that it is not affected by the same difficulties as Hintikka’s proposal. In so doing, I hope to have contributed to the realisation of the project of rehabilitating Kant’s analytic–synthetic distinction in the context of modern first-order logic with the purpose of showing, against the logical empiricist movement, that logic is not analytic.

Traditionally, cognitive values have been thought of as a collective pool of considerations in science that frequently trade against each other. I argue here that a finer-grained account of the value of cognitive values can help reduce such tensions. I separate the values into groups, minimal epistemic criteria, pragmatic considerations, and genuine epistemic assurance, based in part on the distinction between values that describe theories per se and values that describe theory-evidence relationships. This allows us to clarify why these values are central to science and what role they should play, while reducing the tensions among them.