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Important changes have buffeted the insurance industry over the past decade. The 1999 repeal of key provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act unleashed a wave of conglomeration in financial services, as bank holding companies acquired insurance and securities businesses and, to a much lesser degree, insurance companies acquired securities firms and banks. Rivalry within the sector has intensified: insurance companies have developed products that compete directly with the offerings of banks and securities firms and vice versa. In addition, the industry has become increasingly global. Against this backdrop, pressure has been building for fundamental changes to the structure of insurance regulation in the United States. Despite several court challenges over the years, insurance continues to be regulated by the states. Many insurance companies view state regulation as an increasing drag on their efficiency and competitiveness and support a federal regulatory system. However, powerful stakeholders, including state officials, state and regional insurance companies, and many insurance agents, oppose federal regulation. As a result, proposals to establish an optional federal charter (OFC) for insurance companies and agents remain mired in fierce debate. The Future of Insurance Regulation in the United States gathers some of the country's leading experts on financial regulation to assess the case for an enhanced federal role in the insurance sector. They pay particular attention to the merits of an OFC and how it might be designed. They also consider the principles that should guide insurance regulatory policies, regardless of the institutional framework, and examine the implications of financial convergence and the internationalization of insurance markets for an optimal regulatory structure. The debate over insurance regulation has only grown in complexity and intensity since the financial crisis began in the fall of 2008. This book will both inform and help to shape those critical discussions. Contributors: John A. Cooke (International Financial Services London), Robert Detlefsen (National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies), Martin F. Grace (Georgia State University), Robert W. Klein (Georgia State University), Robert E. Litan (Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and Brookings Institution), Phil O'Connor (PROactive Strategies), Hal S. Scott (Harvard Law School), Harold D. Skipper (Georgia State University), Peter J. Wallison (American Enterprise Institute).

\"Solvency II is the most important regulatory innovation in the field of insurance in the past 20 years. The length of this project, the number of operators involved through impact studies and assessments, the adopted procedure and the wide range of innovations have created an atmosphere of great expectation around Solvency II entering into force. The adoption of a risk-based approach appears to be the most important innovation of the new regulatory framework because it determines important issues related to capital requirements and their supervision as well as their disclosure to the market. Capital Requirements, Disclosure, and Supervision in the European Insurance Industry provides an interesting analysis of Solvency II's issues by combining both the theoretical approach and the empirical implications and effects on the European insurance industry. It discusses the new challenges facing insurance companies through the examination of its structure, the rules with which insurance companies operating in Europe have to be compliant, and their implementation. \"-- Provided by publisher.

Analysis on a dual insurance regulation system and its effectiveness relevant to the current system of regulation. In Regulating the Business of Insurance in a Federal System, Joseph F. Zimmerman provides an up-to-date historical description and analysis of the regulation of the business of insurance in the United States. He focuses on the controversial issue of whether Congress should authorize optional federal charters for insurance companies, thereby establishing a dual charter system superficially similar to the dual banking system. Reviewing the evidence between federal and state level regulation of the financial securities industry, Zimmerman finds that federal regulation falls woefully short of its state counterpart. He concludes that the current system, rather than the proposed dual insurance regulatory system, is the most efficient and effective.

In the 1990s, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms. Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale for supervising the solvency of insurance companies: policyholders are the \"bankers\" of insurance companies. But because policyholders are too dispersed to effectively monitor insurers, it might be efficient to delegate monitoring to an institution--a prudential authority. Applying recent developments in corporate finance theory and the economic theory of organizations, the authors describe in practical terms how such authorities could be created and given the incentives to behave exactly like bankers behave toward borrowers, as \"tough\" claimholders.

The Handbook presents an overall analytical framework for assessing financial system stability and developmental needs, providing broad guidance on approaches, methodologies, and techniques of assessing financial systems. Although the Handbook draws substantially on World Bank and IMF experience with the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and from the broader policy and operational work in both institutions, it is designed for generic use in financial sector assessments, whether conducted by country authorities themselves, or by World Bank and IMF teams.

The paper discusses the limits to market-based risk transfer in the financial system and the implications for the management of systemic long-term financial risks. Financial instruments or markets to transfer and better manage these risks across institutions and sectors are, as yet, either nascent or nonexistent. As such, the paper investigates why these markets remain \"incomplete.\" It also explores a range of options by which policymakers may encourage the development of these markets as part of governments' role as a risk manager.

In recent years, the IMF has released a growing number of reports and other documents covering economic and financial developments and trends in member countries. Each report, prepared by a staff team after discussions with government officials, is published at the option of the member country.

This paper discusses key findings of the Detailed Assessment of Observance on the Insurance Core Principles on South Africa. Insurance regulatory and supervisory regime in South Africa is in transition. Currently, the Financial Services Board (FSB-SA) regulates the nonbanking financial services industry, including the insurance sector, in South Africa. With the goal of achieving a safer financial sector to serve South Africa better, the government has proposed major changes in the financial sector. The four policy objectives are: financial stability, consumer protection and market conduct, financial inclusion, and combating financial crime. Market realities in the insurance sector pose significant regulatory challenges, which are well recognized by the authorities.