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The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad is a comprehensive treatment of this 300 year-old conflict. Thematically organized, refreshingly accessible and well-written, it cuts through the rhetoric to provide the critical lens through which readers can truly understand the “why” and “how” of insurgencies and terrorism – and lay bare the intricacies of the Chechen and North Caucasus conflict – one of the world's longest-running contemporary insurgencies. A fascinating case study of a counterinsurgency campaign that is in direct contravention of US and Western doctrine, this book is also the perfect companion to those studying insurgencies because it shows an enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency in action. As such, it's been chosen as a textbook in numerous terrorism and insurgency programs throughout the world, and named to the “Top 150 Books on Terrorism and Counterterrorism” by the Terrorism Research Initiative. The book examines the differences and linkages between insurgency and terrorism; the origins of conflict in the North Caucasus; and the influences of different strains of Islam, of al-Qaida, and of the War on Terror. A critical examination of never- before-revealed Russian counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns explains why those campaigns have consistently failed and why the region has seen such an upswing in violence since the conflict was officially declared “over” in 2006.

Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.

En este artículo argumentamos que, desde la atomización violenta producida por la desmovilización de las AUC y el abandono de las pretensiones nacionales por parte de las organizaciones insurgentes, en Colombia no se desarrolla un único conflicto armado transversal a todo el país. Por el contrario, permanecen activos múltiples conflictos cuyas dinámicas a nivel subregional son independientes de lo que sucede en otras subregiones, aun cuando se encuentren geográficamente cerca. Para analizar cada uno de estos conflictos proponemos que se tengan en cuenta tres elementos: la naturaleza de los actores armados, las interacciones que se gestan entre ellos y el territorio en el que actúan. A partir de esto, analizamos dos conflictos armados que tienen lugar en el Caribe: el de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta y el del sur de Córdoba. En estos, identificamos cuatro tipos de conflictividad: hegemonía criminal, paz mafiosa, competencia armada y competencia armada con alianzas en su interior. Palabras clave: Conflicto armado, crimen organizado, actores armados, interacciones armadas. In this article, we argue that since the violent atomization due to the demobilization of the United Self-Defences of Colombia (AUC, in Spanish) and the abandonment of national claims by insurgent organizations, what we see is not a single armed conflict across Colombia. Multiple conflicts remain active, whose dynamics at the subregional level are independent from what happens in other subregions, even when they are geographically close. To analyze each of these conflicts, we propose that three elements be taken into account: the nature of the armed actors, the interactions that take place between them, and the territories in which they operate. Based on these aspects, we analyze two armed conflicts that take place in the Caribbean--that of the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta and that of the south of Córdoba. With these, we identify four types of conflict: criminal hegemony, mafia peace, armed competition, and armed competition with internal alliances. Keywords: Armed conflict; organized crime; armed actors; armed interactions.

Insurgent cohesion is central to explaining patterns of violence, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency, and civil war outcomes. Cohesive insurgent groups produce more effective war-fighting forces and are more credible negotiators; organizational cohesion shapes both the duration of wars and their ultimate resolution. In Networks of Rebellion , Paul Staniland explains why insurgent leaders differ so radically in their ability to build strong organizations and why the cohesion of armed groups changes over time during conflicts. He outlines a new way of thinking about the sources and structure of insurgent groups, distinguishing among integrated, vanguard, parochial, and fragmented groups. Staniland compares insurgent groups, their differing social bases, and how the nature of the coalitions and networks within which these armed groups were built has determined their discipline and internal control. He examines insurgent groups in Afghanistan, 1975 to the present day, Kashmir (1988-2003), Sri Lanka from the 1970s to the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in 2009, and several communist uprisings in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. The initial organization of an insurgent group depends on the position of its leaders in prewar political networks. These social bases shape what leaders can and cannot do when they build a new insurgent group. Counterinsurgency, insurgent strategy, and international intervention can cause organizational change. During war, insurgent groups are embedded in social ties that determine they how they organize, fight, and negotiate; as these ties shift, organizational structure changes as well. The organizational cohesion of insurgent groups is central to explaining patterns of violence, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency, and civil war outcomes. Cohesive insurgent groups produce more effective war-fighting forces and are more credible negotiators; organizational cohesion shapes both the duration of wars and their ultimate resolution. In Networks of Rebellion , Paul Staniland explains why insurgent leaders differ so radically in their ability to build strong organizations and why the cohesion of armed groups changes over time during conflicts. He outlines a new way of thinking about the sources and structure of insurgent groups, distinguishing among integrated, vanguard, parochial, and fragmented groups.Staniland compares insurgent groups, their differing social bases, and how the nature of the coalitions and networks within which these armed groups were built has determined their discipline and internal control. He examines insurgent groups in Afghanistan, 1975 to the present day, Kashmir (1988-2003), Sri Lanka from the 1970s to the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in 2009, and several communist uprisings in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. The initial organization of an insurgent group depends on the position of its leaders in prewar political networks. These social bases shape what leaders can and cannot do when they build a new insurgent group. Counterinsurgency, insurgent strategy, and international intervention can cause organizational change. During war, insurgent groups are embedded in social ties that determine they how they organize, fight, and negotiate; as these ties shift, organizational structure changes as well.