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With the advent of the Internet of Everything, the proliferation of data has put a huge burden on data centers and network bandwidth. To ease the pressure on data centers, edge computing, a new computing paradigm, is gradually gaining attention. Meanwhile, artificial intelligence services based on deep learning are also thriving. However, such intelligent services are usually deployed in data centers, which cause high latency. The combination of edge computing and artificial intelligence provides an effective solution to this problem. This new intelligence paradigm is called edge intelligence. In this paper, we focus on edge training and edge inference, the prior training models using local data at the resource-constrained edge devices. The latter deploying models at the edge devices through model compression and inference acceleration. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of existing architectures, technologies, frameworks and implementations in these two areas, and discusses existing challenges, possible solutions and future directions. We believe that this survey will make more researchers aware of edge intelligence.

The intelligence community (IC) plays an essential role in the national security of the United States. Decision makers rely on IC analyses and predictions to reduce uncertainty and to provide warnings about everything from international diplomatic relations to overseas conflicts. In today's complex and rapidly changing world, it is more important than ever that analytic products be accurate and timely. Recognizing that need, the IC has been actively seeking ways to improve its performance and expand its capabilities. In 2008, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to establish a committee to synthesize and assess evidence from the behavioral and social sciences relevant to analytic methods and their potential application for the U.S. intelligence community. In Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social Sciences , the NRC offers the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) recommendations to address many of the IC's challenges. Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow asserts that one of the most important things that the IC can learn from the behavioral and social sciences is how to characterize and evaluate its analytic assumptions, methods, technologies, and management practices. Behavioral and social scientific knowledge can help the IC to understand and improve all phases of the analytic cycle: how to recruit, select, train, and motivate analysts; how to master and deploy the most suitable analytic methods; how to organize the day-to-day work of analysts, as individuals and teams; and how to communicate with its customers. The report makes five broad recommendations which offer practical ways to apply the behavioral and social sciences, which will bring the IC substantial immediate and longer-term benefits with modest costs and minimal disruption.

An innovative history of US intelligence officers on the ground and the first official contacts between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party From 1944 to 1947, the United States planted a liaison mission in the headquarters of Chinese Communist forces behind the lines. Nicknamed the \"Dixie Mission,\" for its location in \"rebel\" territory, it was an interagency delegation that included intelligence officers from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the US Army, and the State Department. Mission to Mao is a social history of the OSS officers in the field that reveals the weakness of US intelligence diplomacy in the 1940s. Drawing on over 14,000 unpublished records from five archives as well as white papers and memoirs from the participants, Sara B. Castro demonstrates how the US intelligence officers in China clashed with political appointees and Washington over the direction of the US relationship with the Chinese Communists. Interagency and political conflicts erupted over assessments of Communist capabilities and whether or not the mission would later involve operations with the Communists. Castro shows how potential benefits for the war effort were thwarted by politicization, rivalries, and the biases of US intelligence officials. Mission to Mao is a fresh look at US intelligence in WW II China and takes readers beyond the history of \"China Hands\" versus American anticommunists, introducing more nuance.

People interpret verbal expressions of probabilities (e.g. 'very likely') in different ways, yet words are commonly preferred to numbers when communicating uncertainty. Simply providing numerical translations alongside reports or text containing verbal probabilities should encourage consistency, but these guidelines are often ignored. In an online experiment with 924 participants, we compared four different formats for presenting verbal probabilities with the numerical guidelines used in the US Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 to see whether any could improve the correspondence between the intended meaning and participants' interpretation ('in-context'). This extends previous work in the domain of climate science. The four experimental conditions we tested were: 1. numerical guidelines bracketed in text, e.g. X is very unlikely (05-20%), 2. click to see the full guidelines table in a new window, 3. numerical guidelines appear in a mouse over tool tip, and 4. no guidelines provided (control). Results indicate that correspondence with the ICD 203 standard is substantially improved only when numerical guidelines are bracketed in text. For this condition, average correspondence was 66%, compared with 32% in the control. We also elicited 'context-free' numerical judgements from participants for each of the seven verbal probability expressions contained in ICD 203 (i.e., we asked participants what range of numbers they, personally, would assign to those expressions), and constructed 'evidence-based lexicons' based on two methods from similar research, 'membership functions' and 'peak values', that reflect our large sample's intuitive translations of the terms. Better aligning the intended and assumed meaning of fuzzy words like 'unlikely' can reduce communication problems between the reporter and receiver of probabilistic information. In turn, this can improve decision making under uncertainty.

This work investigates the connection between intelligence history, domestic policy, military history and foreign relations in a time of increasing bureaucratization of the modern state. The issues of globalization of foreign relations and the development of modern communication are also discussed.

This book explores the challenges leaders in intelligence communities face in an increasingly complex security environment and how to develop future leaders to deal with these issues. As the security and policy making environment becomes increasingly complicated for decision-makers, the focus on intelligence agencies ‘to deliver’ more value will increase. This book is the first extensive exploration of contemporary leadership in the context of intelligence agencies, principally in the ‘Five Eyes’ nations (i.e. Australia, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand). It provides a grounded theoretical approach to building practitioner and researcher understanding of what individual and organisational factors result in better leadership. Using interviews from former senior intelligence leaders and a survey of 208 current and former intelligence leaders, the work explores the key challenges that leaders will likely face in the twenty-first century and how to address these. It also explores what principles are most likely to be important in developing future leaders of intelligence agencies in the future. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, leadership studies, security studies, and international relations.

In December 1974, a front-page story in the New York Times revealed the explosive details of illegal domestic spying by the Central Intelligence Agency.This included political surveillance, eavesdropping, detention, and interrogation.

The Soviet Union was one of the most secretive states that ever existed. Defended by a complex apparatus of rules and checks administered by the secret police, the Soviet state had seemingly unprecedented capabilities based on its near monopoly of productive capital, monolithic authority, and secretive decision making. But behind the scenes, Soviet secrecy was double-edged: it raised transaction costs, incentivized indecision, compromised the effectiveness of government officials, eroded citizens' trust in institutions and in each other, and led to a secretive society and an uninformed elite. The result is what this book calls the secrecy/capacity tradeoff: a bargain in which the Soviet state accepted the reduction of state capacity as the cost of ensuring its own survival. This book is the first comprehensive, analytical, multi-faceted history of Soviet secrecy in the English language. Harrison combines quantitative and qualitative evidence to evaluate the impact of secrecy on Soviet state capacity from the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Based on multiple years of research in once-secret Soviet-era archives, this book addresses two gaps in history and social science: one the core role of secrecy in building and stabilizing the communist states of the twentieth century; the other the corrosive effects of secrecy on the capabilities of authoritarian states.

The history of secret intelligence, like secret intelligence itself, is fraught with difficulties surrounding both the reliability and completeness of the sources, and the motivations behind their release-which can be the product of ongoing propaganda efforts as well as competition among agencies. Indeed, these difficulties lead to the Scylla and Charybdis of overestimating the importance of secret intelligence for foreign policy and statecraft and also underestimating its importance in these same areas-problems that generally beset the actual use of secret intelligence in modern states. But in recent decades, traditional perspectives have given ground and judgments have been revised in light of new evidence. This volume brings together a collection of essays avoiding the traditional pitfalls while carrying out the essential task of analyzing the recent evidence concerning the history of the European state system of the last century. The essays offer an array of insight across countries and across time. Together they highlight the critical importance of the prevailing domestic circumstances-technological, governmental, ideological, cultural, financial-in which intelligence operates. A keen interdisciplinary eye focused on these developments leaves us with a far more complete understanding of secret intelligence in Europe than we've had before.

What is the role of intelligence agencies in strategy and policy? How do policymakers use (or misuse) intelligence estimates? When do intelligence-policy relations work best? How do intelligence-policy failures influence threat assessment, military strategy, and foreign policy? These questions are at the heart of recent national security controversies, including the 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq. In both cases the relationship between intelligence and policy broke down-with disastrous consequences.InFixing the Facts, Joshua Rovner explores the complex interaction between intelligence and policy and shines a spotlight on the problem of politicization. Major episodes in the history of American foreign policy have been closely tied to the manipulation of intelligence estimates. Rovner describes how the Johnson administration dealt with the intelligence community during the Vietnam War; how President Nixon and President Ford politicized estimates on the Soviet Union; and how pressure from the George W. Bush administration contributed to flawed intelligence on Iraq. He also compares the U.S. case with the British experience between 1998 and 2003, and demonstrates that high-profile government inquiries in both countries were fundamentally wrong about what happened before the war.