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4,342 result(s) for "Intentionality"
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El Prólogo del Lazarillo a la luz de los prólogos del licenciado Arce de Otálora con otras consideraciones
Este trabajo propone nuevas posibilidades en la interpretación del Prólogo del Lazarillo y la intención del «caso» tras un cuidadoso análisis comparativo con las obras de Arce de Otálora.
Intentionality and action
The book links the concept of intention to human action. It provides answers to questions like: Why do we act intentionally? Which impact do reasons and motives have on our decisions? Certain events are identified as intentional actions when they are considered as being rationalized by reasons. The linguistic description of such events enables us to reveal the structure of intention. The mental and the linguistic constitute irreducible ways of understanding events. Among the topics discussed are intentionality, actions, the linguistic form to talk about intentionality and actions, Brentano?s view of intentionality, the phenomenological approach to intention and Wittgenstein's proposals. The contributions by Wolfgang Kèunne, Peter Simons, Christian Bermes, Kevin Mulligan, Severin Schroeder, Antâonio Marques, Margit Gaffal, Michel Le Du, Jesâus Padilla Gâalvez, Bernhard Obsieger and Amir Horowitz show that actions and decisions are guided by intentional considerations.
The interplay between I and We intentionality
We and I intentionality appear to be two distinct forms of human intentionality, as one cannot be explained in terms of the other. We-intentionality is part of the psychological infrastructure at the basis of human cooperative behavior, while I-intentionality is potentially more related to competitive relationships with conspecifics. Our work tries to empirically address the relationship between these two forms of human intentionality as exhibited during the early stages of human development. The experimental setting consisted of four different games, two competitive and two cooperative. We focused our experiment on three age groups and schooling: Early Elementary School Children (mean = 5 years 6 months; σ = 4.2 months), Late Elementary School Children (mean = 9 years 4 months; σ = 7.5 months), and Adult University students (mean = 21 years; σ = 11 months). The key aspect of the investigation was that only one participant was informed of the game, rules, and reward. The second participant came to the set uninformed. It was the first participant's decision whether and how to engage the latter in the game. We were especially interested in the communicative behaviors: when and how the informed participant would share his or her information. We observed that the Adult University Informed participants shared their information with the Adult University Uninformed participants, while this almost never happened in Early Elementary School Children. Late Elementary School Children presented a split halfway between keeping and sharing the information. The results seem to support the hypothesis of a developmental relationship between the two forms of intentions. They also suggest that the two forms of intentionality are complementary. Each plays a specific role in human relationships with social and physical environments: the We-intentionality would establish the common ground within which the I-intentionality would manifest itself.
The Purposiveness Principle in Translation Evaluation
In recent years, the evaluation of translation quality has been widely commented upon in the domestic translation community, with numerous theoretical achievements. However, the author holds that rather than theory, it should be more of practice, in which the practical purposes of translation are involved. The purposes can be roughly classified into two: content-oriented translation and translation for overall appreciation. Different translation purposes should have different evaluation characteristics. In general, there are unified standards for the former; but for the latter, there appear widely accepted distinctions of merits and demerits, and also being complex and not absolutized. This paper, in the light of the purposive evaluation principle, typically discusses the respective evaluation in practice via translation examples.
Between Critique and Affirmation. Blaustein’s Functional Metaphysics of Culture
The article reconsiders Leopold Blaustein’s philosophy by focusing on his critical stance toward metaphysics. While Witold Płotka interprets Blaustein as a philosopher of metaphysical neutrality, I argue that Blaustein should rather be seen as a critic of metaphysical idealism who nonetheless develops a minimal and functional form of metaphysical reflection. This reflection is grounded not in ontological assumptions, but in the implicit meaningfulness of anthropological experience. The article examines four domains—intentionality, humanistic psychology, aesthetics, and education—and includes a final boundary-case analysis of religious spirituality, in order to clarify the scope and limits of Blaustein’s functional metaphysics. Drawing on his critique of Ingarden and his own educational writings, I argue that Blaustein’s philosophy ultimately points toward a non-speculative, yet normatively rich conception of culture and value. His project, although critical of traditional metaphysics, remains open to a constructive transformation of metaphysical thinking rooted in human experience and practical reason.